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ABSTRACT 
This study empirically identifies various sector-specific threshold inflation levels in 
Ghana with annual and monthly data covering the period 1960 to 2017. The results of 
the assessment have been compiled into four essays.  
The first essay reviews Ghana’s inflationary history from pre-independence to the 
current era and assesses the myriad of historical monetary policy frameworks and 
inflation management tools employed by successive political regimes. Average 
inflation of 31% was recorded during the monetary targeting regime up to 1991 where 
credit controls were instituted. Over the next decade, with the adoption of open market 
operations (OMO), average inflation dropped to 28%. Similarly, prior to the formal 
adoption of inflation targeting (IT) in 2007, average inflation further declined to 15% 
between 2002 and 2006. Since the formal adoption of IT, a one percentage point drop 
in average inflation to 14% was recorded. Overall, a consistent decline in average 
inflation has been witnessed across the different policy frameworks. Decadal  and 5-
year analyses of Ghana’s inflation since 1960 also confirm the overall downward trend 
of Ghana’s inflation to the present day. Since 2012, a burgeoning of a creeping 
inflationary spiral is evident. Recently, from 2014 the economy ushered in a new spell 
of moderate inflation with average annual inflation being 16%. We identify Ghana’s 
foremost macroeconomic problem as inflation persistence. 
The second essay tests for the presence of threshold effects in Ghana’s headline 
inflation. It uses Regime Switching Threshold Autoregressive and Smooth Transition 
Regression Models to identify inflation thresholds and their effects on output growth. 
The findings suggest threshold effects exist within Ghana’s inflation, with the 
estimated threshold at 11%. Expected switching probabilities of inflationary regimes 
are also estimated. We find a 97% chance of a high inflation regime succeeding a low 
inflationary period and a 3% chance of a low inflation period succeeding a low inflation 
period. There exists a 94% likelihood of succession from one high inflationary period 
to another and a 6% chance of transition from a high inflation era to a low one. While 
the Ghanaian economy can remain in a continuously low inflation era for no more than 
one year, it will take approximately 37 years to exit any high inflation spell it enters. 
This essay particularly makes a contribution by adding to the very scanty threshold 
inflation non-linearity literature on Ghana 
The third essay examines Inflation Persistence (IP) in Ghana. In doing so it employs 
Stock’s (1991) 95% confidence interval for the largest root of the autoregression and 
identifies a reduction in inflation persistence during low and stable inflationary 
episodes in Ghana, as well as an increase in persistence during higher levels of 
inflation. We adopt the Dornbusch-Fisher (1993) framework to the case of Ghana in 
mapping out moderate persistent spells of inflation between 1960 and 2015. We find 
evidence of a reduction in inflation persistence after the introduction of the Structural 
Adjustment Program (SAP) of the 1980s. Moreover, the Central Bank’s formal 
adoption of the inflation targeting framework in 2007 similarly led to a fall in inflation 
persistence across the aggregate economy. At the sectoral level, Ghana’s food sector 
is the most affected by IP. We empirically examine the effectiveness of historical policy 
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interventions on aggregate and sectoral IP and find dwindling levels of effectiveness 
over time. Lastly we compare Ghana’s inflation persistence with other economies and 
conclude that in pursuing single digit inflation, policy makers should continuously 
monitor inflation persistence. Based on its findings, this essay also contributes to 
literature by taking a first pass on which strand of the inflation-growth non-linearity 
literature that sectoral inflation data subscribes to. 
The fourth essay tests for the presence of inflation inertia and threshold effects in 
sectoral inflation in Ghana. It uses Regime Switching Threshold Autoregressive and 
Smooth Transition Regression Models to identify thresholds and also the effect of 
sectoral inflation on sectoral output growth. The findings suggest that threshold effects 
exist within Ghana’s sectoral inflation, with estimated thresholds of 11.5% -15.2% and 
13% for the food and non-food sectors respectively. In the food sector, while no 
threshold is identified for the dry season, a markedly differing threshold of 6.1% is 
identified for the rainy season as general food prices in Ghana drop during periods of 
sustained rainfall. Inflationary expectations (inertia) are evident in the non-food sector 
and serve as a key determinant of non-food output growth in Ghana. Using Markov 
Switching models, expected durations and expected switching probabilities of 
inflationary regimes are also estimated. This paper contributes to literature by 
pioneering the probe of threshold inflation non-linearity at the sectoral level of an 
economy.  
The combined evidence in this thesis quite strongly indicates the failure of Ghana’s 
current inflation targeting framework in catering for sectorial differences within the 
economy. Clearly, inflation targets are seldom met, and persistence in inflation is 
increasing to pre policy implementation levels at both the aggregate economy and the 
food and non-food sectors. The output potential of Ghana’s sectors as well as the long 
term success of the inflation targeting framework is therefore in jeopardy if urgent 
interventions are not effectively implemented. 
Key words: Threshold, Inflation, Sectoral, Persistence, Economic Growth, Output, 
Threshold Autoregressive Model, Smooth Transition Regression, Markov Switching 
models, Expected Durations, Expected Switching Probabilities, Inflationary Regimes, 
Food, Non-food   
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Inflation and economic growth have been closely studied macroeconomic variables 
in developing countries (Bick, 2010; Gokal and Hanif, 2004). The relationship 
between inflation and growth is however more complex than envisaged and calls for 
further research. This complexity has implications for optimal inflation policy and 
inflation targeting (Correa and Minella, 2010; Nobay and Peel, 2000). 
The work by Drukker et al. (2005), which categorizes into four distinct strands the 
predictions from extant literature regarding the inflation-growth nexus, aptly 
highlights the complexity. In the first strand, pioneered by Tobin (1965), inflation has 
a positive effect on long-run growth; the second strand posits that inflation has no 
effect on growth (Sidrauski, 1967); the third strand points to a negative effect of 
inflation on long-run growth (Stockman, 1981); and the fourth strand suggests that a 
nonlinear relationship exists where if inflation rises above a threshold level, it has a 
negative effect on long-run growth (Huybens and Smith, 1998).  
Consequently, there is considerable debate surrounding the optimal inflation rate for 
these economies. While some consensus does exist in the literature, suggesting a 
non-linear relationship between inflation and economic growth (Ghosh and Phillips, 
1998; Judson and Orphanides, 1999; Khan and Senhadji, 2001; Gillman et al., 2004, 
there are still substantial views on a linear relationship between inflation and growth 
(Fischer, 1993; Sarel, 1995; Bruno and Easterly, 1998; Barro, 1991. 
Several studies exist on the first three predictions (Daly, 1985; Barro, 1991; Fischer, 
1993; Sowa and Kwakye, 1994; Smyth, 1995a,b; Hondroyiannis and Papapetrou, 1997; 
Freeman and Yerger, 1998, 2000; Tsionas, 2001; Bitros and Panas, 2001; Kiley, 2003; 
Tsionas 2003a,b; Bitros and Panas, 2006; Ocran, 2007; Risso and Sánchez Carrera, 2009; 
Narayan and Smyth, 2009; Misztal, 2010; Umaru and Zubairu, 2012; Ying and Haiguang, 
2013; Tang, 2014). Huybens and Smith (1998), in their study on the fourth prediction, 
ask a fundamental yet crucial question: ―what level of inflation should countries aim 
for?‖ Khan (2005) suggests that as a useful rule of thumb single digit inflation should 
be the target, implying the existence of a non-linear relationship between inflation 
and economic growth.  
In probing further the non-linearity of the inflation-growth relationship, several studies 
including cross-country ones abound (Ghosh and Phillips, 1998; Khan and Senhadji, 
2001; Burdekin et al., 2004; Mubarik, 2005; Fabayo and Ajilore, 2006; Hodge, 2006; 
Fang et al., 2007; Hayat and Kalirajan, 2009; Kremer et al., 2013; Iqbal and Nawaz, 
2009; Bick, 2010; Frimpong and Oteng-Abeyie, 2010; Quartey, 2010; Salami and 
Kelikume, 2010; Sargsyan, 2005; Espinoza et al., 2010; Ayyoub et al., 2011; Hwang 
and Wu, 2011; López-Villavicencio and Mignon, 2011; Marbuah, 2011; Mohanty et 






al., 2011; Morar, 2011; Bawa and Abdullahi, 2012; Adusei, 2012; Ahortor et al., 
2012; Vinayagathasan, 2013; Rasool et al., 2014). Others are Barro (1995), Boyd et 
al. (1996), Bruno (1993), Bruno and Easterly (1998), Sarel (1995), Ghosh and 
Phillips (1998), Judson and Orphanides (1999), Freeman and Yerger (2000), 
Gylfason and Herbertsson (2001), Harris (2001), Gillman et al. (2001), Khan and 
Senhadji (2001), Tsionas (2003b), Burdekin et al. (2004), Gillman et al. (2004), 
Drukker et al. (2005), Mahadevan and Asafu-Adjaye (2006), Pollin and Zhu (2006), 
Fang et al. (2007), Narayan and Smyth (2009), Bick (2010), Espinoza et al. (2010), 
Heintz and Ndikumana (2010), Huang et al. (2010), López-Villavicencio and Mignon 
(2011), Eggoh and Khan (2013), Kremer et al. (2013), and Vinayagathasan (2013).  
However, recent studies such as Sepehri and Moshiri (2004), Hult et al. (2008), 
Kremer et al. (2013) and Van de Vijver et al. (2015) suggest that cross-country 
studies are flawed with their inability to factor country-specific idiosyncrasies into 
their analysis, leading to a generalization of findings. Temple (2000) similarly warns 
against the risk of pooling together countries with very different inflation dynamics, as 
a few extremely high values may well affect the overall results. Furthermore, Reyes 
(2004), and Tung and Thanh (2015) point out that since each economy has 
differentiated dynamics, varied macroeconomic variables will impact each country 
differently depending on the stage of development of its current business cycle 
regime. As such, when it comes to steering sound country-specific policy decisions 
in the right direction, cross-country studies are usually handicapped. 
Having said that, even with the limitations of the cross-country studies, only a 
handful of them, such as Sarel (1995), Bruno (1993), Bruno and Easterly (1998), 
Burdekin et al. (2004), Pollin and Zhu (2006), Fang et al. (2007), Espinoza et al. 
(2010), Huang et al. (2010), Kremer et al. (2013), and Eggoh and Khan (2014), have 
included Ghana in their cross-country threshold inflation analysis. 
Within the context of Ghana, seminal studies on inflation include Chhibber and 
Schafik (1990), Sowa and Kwakye (1993, 1994), Sowa (1994, 1996), Bawumia and 
Abrado-Otoo (2003) and Ocran (2007). Chhibber and Shafik (1990) used Ghanaian 
data and modelled inflation in the presence of an active parallel market but found 
that official devaluation does not cause inflation because prices had already adjusted 
to the parallel exchange rate. They emphasised that though inflation in the past had 
been accounted for by structural factors, inflation in Ghana is primarily a monetary 
phenomenon. Wage-cost inflation did not play a significant role in explaining the 
general price level. 
Sowa and Kwakye (1993) provided an alternative model to Chhibber and Shafik 
(1990) where they specified all the possible causes of inflation in Ghana. Monetary 
and real factors and expectations were incorporated in a simple model where 
inflation was explained by growth in money, exchange rate, real output, and price 
expectations. The main conclusion of their work was that supply constraint is the 






strongest force behind Ghana‘s inflationary push. Contrary to the findings of 
Chhibber and Shafik (1990), exchange rate devaluation appeared significant in the 
inflationary process.  
In subsequent studies, Sowa (1994, 1996) attempted to solve the spurious 
regression problem associated with earlier research such as in Sowa and Kwakye 
(1993). Using data for the period 1963-1990, Sowa captured the period of economic 
decadence and economic reforms. He found inflation to be co-integrated with output, 
money and the parallel market exchange rate in the long run. Real output and money 
were significant variables but the parallel exchange rate did not have any significant 
effect on inflation, confirming earlier findings by Sowa and Kwakye (1993) and 
Chhibber and Shafik (1990).  
Bawumia and Abradu-Otoo (2003) developed a simple theoretical model of price 
determination in Ghana where inflation is modelled as a function of the money 
supply, expected inflation, the exchange rate and real output within an error 
correction framework. Using monthly data spanning the period 1983–99, they found 
that inflation in Ghana is positively related to the money supply and the exchange 
rate and is negatively related to real income in the long run. In the short run, the 
impact of the exchange rate on inflation occurs after a month, whereas the impact of 
real economic activity takes place after 2 months while money affects inflation with a 
longer lag (4 months later).  
Ocran (2007) used data over the period 1960–2003 and found that past inflation has 
a significant impact on inflation in the short run. Also, growth in the money stock and 
changes in the Government of Ghana Treasury bill rate have significant impacts on 
inflation. While the exchange rate appears significant, foreign price and terms of 
trade changes do not affect inflation directly in the short run; rather, their effects are 
transmitted through the error correction mechanism. Excess money supply does not 
determine inflation in the long run, given that the error correction term representing 
the monetary sector did not enter the short-run model significantly.  
More recently, a number of authors such as Frimpong and Oteng-Abeyie (2010), 
Quartey (2010), Marbuah (2011) and Ahortor et al. (2012) have established the 
existence of a threshold level of inflation for the entire economy above which the 
effect of inflation becomes both negative and statistically significant. This thesis goes 
beyond the works mentioned above by revisiting their studies and extending the 
analysis to the estimation of the inflation thresholds at the sectoral level within the 
Ghanaian economy. Thus, this study also responds to the observations by Heintz 
and Ndikumana (2010) and Chaudhry et al. (2013), who suggest that in countries 
with strong regional variations, a single economy-wide inflation target may not be 
meaningful in attaining optimum growth. The thesis estimates economy-wide and 
sectoral inflation persistence and suggests a possible inverse relationship between 
an economy‘s inflation level and its inflation persistence. 






1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT AND RESEARCH SIGNIFICANCE 
Inflation persistence has been a problem in many developing countries including 
Ghana (Phiri, 2016; Gerlach and Tillmann, 2012; Ocran, 2007; Vega and Winkelried, 
2005). Examining the causes and consequences of failure to properly manage 
inflation is useful for policy making (Taylor, 2000) particularly for developing 
countries in Africa because it affects both forecasts of infation and the effects of 
changes (such as exchange rate changes) in monetary policy on inflation. We 
examine the possibility that low and stable inflation leads to reduced pass-through of 
costs to consumers. 
The argument on whether inflation is a boon or a bane rages on (Clarida and 
Waldman, 2008; Temple, 1998). Various studies suggest that inflation within 
controllable bounds is good for an economy (Bhatia, 1960; Tobin, 1965; Phiri, 2016) 
since growth cannot be present in an economy without inflation as supply and 
demand remain invariant (Sarel, 1995). Moreover, inflation gives a boost to 
enterprises and a jolt to a stagnant economy. However, the assertion by Mundell 
(1963) that inflation reduces the value of money and also the purchasing power of 
individuals when it spirals out of control led to Huybens and Smith (1998) asking a 
pivotal question: ―what level of inflation should countries aim for?‖ A plethora of 
studies on threshold inflation non-linearity therefore arose with researchers 
investigating the inflation threshold rate or inflexion point at which the inflation-growth 
relationship becomes negative.  
Several cross-country studies on the estimation of the threshold level of inflation 
abound in the literature. They include Barro (1995), Boyd et al. (1996), Bruno and 
Easterly (1995, 1998), Sarel (1995), Ghosh and Phillips (1998), Judson and 
Orphanides (1999), Freeman and Yerger (2000), Gylfason and Herbertsson (2001), 
Harris et al. (2001), Khan and Senhadji (2001), Tsionas (2003b), Burdekin et al. 
(2004), Gillman et al. (2004), Drukker et al. (2005), Mahadevan and Asafu-Adjaye 
(2006), Pollin and Zhu (2006), Fang et al. (2007), Narayan and Smyth (2009), Bick 
(2010), Espinoza et al. (2010), Heintz and Ndikumana (2010), Huang et al. (2010), 
López-Villavicencio and Mignon (2011), Eggoh and Khan (2014), Kremer et al. 
(2013), Vinayagathasan (2013).  
A number of inherent flaws however exist in cross-country studies (Sepehri and 
Moshiri, 2004; Hult et al., 2008; Kremer et al., 2013; Van de Vijver et al., 2015). Their 
inability to factor country-specific idiosyncrasies into their analysis inadvertently 
leads to an over-generalization of findings, as the majority of such studies merely 
focus on groupings of industrial and developing countries. Temple (2000) similarly 
warns against the risk of pooling together countries with very different inflation 
dynamics, as a few extremely high values may well affect the overall results. 
Furthermore, Reyes (2007), and Tung and Thanh (2015) point out that since each 
economy has differentiated dynamics, varied macroeconomic variables would impact 






each country differently depending on the stage of development of its current 
business cycle regime. As such, when it comes to steering sound country-specific 
policy decisions in the right direction, cross-country studies are usually handicapped. 
Even with the obvious limitations of the cross-country studies, only a handful 
considered Ghana worthy of inclusion in their cross-country threshold inflation 
analysis (Sarel, 1995; Bruno and Easterly, 1995; 1998; Burdekin et al., 2004; Pollin 
and Zhu, 2006; Fang et al., 2007; Espinoza et al., 2010; Huang et al., 2010; Kremer 
et al., 2013; Eggoh and Khan, 2014).  
Building on the above, at a country-specific level, there exist to date a mere four 
threshold inflation studies on Ghana: Frimpong and Oteng-Abeyie (2010), Quartey 
(2010), Marbuah (2011) and Ahortor et al. (2012). One possible explanation for the 
meagre number of Ghana-specific studies could be lack of access to data spanning 
sufficient lengths for rigorous econometric analysis. 
Despite the very scanty threshold inflation literature on Ghana, a lack of consensus 
on the precise economy-wide threshold inflation level remains. Frimpong and Oteng-
Abeyie (2010) find a threshold of 11%, while Marbuah (2011) and Ahortor et al. 
(2012) both identify a 10% threshold, and Quartey‘s (2010) estimate being a 
conspicuously high 22.2%. Why the range of aggregate threshold estimates are so 
wide apart remains to be investigated. This puzzle of divergent and conflicting 
threshold estimates, coupled with the fact that no prior attempt has been made to 
estimate sector-specific inflation thresholds, gives this study the two-pronged task of 
revisiting those papers and estimating sectoral thresholds. 
Moreover, all the four papers mentioned above fail to test for the direction of 
causality between inflation and growth, and thus a potential bias could exist if 
causality runs from growth to inflation or less seriously, an endogeneity crisis if the 
reverse is the case (Khan and Senhadji, 2001). While Fischer (1993) argues that 
causality is more likely to run predominantly from inflation to growth, it is important 
that this assumption is explicitly tested (Khan and Senhadji, 2001) within the context 
of Ghana. We therefore revisit their studies by testing for the direction of causality, 
after which we push the frontiers of research by estimating inflation thresholds at the 
sector-specific level. Sectoral estimation and, more importantly, aggregate re-
estimation of the threshold level of inflation, is essential in the Ghanaian economy 
which has quite recently been hit with recurring power outages and rising 
joblessness, high underemployment rates, and open unemployment. 
The intuition behind sector-specific analysis for the Ghanaian economy is 
multifaceted, and intertwines with the motivation and significance of this study. While 
aggregate inflation data seems to suggest a harmony with the fourth theoretical 
strand of threshold non-linearity, it could well be that disaggregated or sectoral data 
might exhibit compatibility with an alternate theoretical strand, or possibly, none of 






the strands identified by Drukker et al. (2005). This paper thus assists in determining 
which theory is affirmed when sectoral inflation data is employed. 
Over and above all the foregoing points, the dual nature of the Ghanaian economy 
as well as its very diverse sectoral variations implies that a single economy-wide 
inflation target may not be meaningful in attaining optimum growth (Heintz and 
Ndikumana, 2011). Certain sectors may still be able to contribute much more to 
Ghana‘s economic growth in far higher rates of inflation above the so-called 
economy-wide optimum inflation level. Indeed Christiaensen et al. (2011) and 
Cervantes-Godoy and Dewbre (2010) assert that stifling the output potential of a key 
sector, such as the agricultural sector which is a lynchpin for inclusive growth, could 
impede efforts to achieve poverty reduction in the economy.  
Chaudhry et al. (2013) observe that no empirical study has been carried out to 
ascertain the inflation threshold level within the various sectors of an economy, much 
less the Ghanaian economy. It is therefore crucial that a line of studies open up 
which focus on sectoral threshold inflation levels, as the nationwide inflation target 
band set by the central bank may favour only certain sectors of the economy, to the 
detriment of other sectors, thereby unduly sacrificing sectoral output growth.  
Evidently, in the same manner that cross-country inflation threshold studies fail to 
recognize the idiosyncrasies of the various countries within the study, nationwide 
inflation threshold studies also fail to recognize the idiosyncrasies of the various 
sectors within the economy.  
The Ghanaian economy exhibits sectoral and regional variations which uniquely 
drive economic activities. Inflation data from the Ghana Statistical Service (GSS) 
clearly reveals these variations (see Figure 1.1 and Table 1.1 below). 
 
Figure 1.1: Headline, food and non-food inflation (1990-2015)  






Source: GSS CPI Newsletters (several issues) 
Table 1.1: Sectoral year-on-year inflation (%) 
 Jan-18 Feb-18 Mar-18 
FOOD 6.8 7.2 7.3 
Fruits 9.2 9.8 9.8 
Vegetables 8.4 8.7 8.2 
Coffee, Tea and Cocoa 8.2 9.3 10.6 
Mineral Water, Soft Drinks, Fruits 7.7 8.3 8.7 
Food Products 7.4 7.7 8.1 
Meat and Meat Products 7.3 8.2 8.8 
Cereals and Cereal Products 6.7 7.1 7.1 
Oils and Fats 6.2 6.1 6.7 
Sugar, Jam, Honey, Chocolate 6 6.1 6.4 
Fish and Sea Food 6 6.5 6.7 
Milk, Cheese and Eggs 5.5 5.4 5.7 
    
NON-FOOD 12 12.2 11.8 
Transport 17.9 18.9 18.4 
Clothing and Footwear 16.7 16.6 16.4 
Recreation and Culture 13.7 13.2 12.6 
Miscellaneous Goods and Services 12.7 12.9 12 
Furnishings, Household Equipment 12.1 12 11.9 
Hotels, Cafes and Restaurants 8.9 8.3 7.2 
Alcoholic Beverages, Tobacco 8.9 8.8 8.9 
Housing, Water, Electricity, Gas 7.4 7.8 7.3 
Communications 7.3 8 8.2 
Health 7.2 7.4 7.3 
Food and Non-Alcoholic Beverages 6.8   
Education 5.5 6.1 6.7 
    
REGION 10.3 10.6 10.4 
Upper East 7.8 8.1 8 
Northern 9.3 9.6 9.6 
Volta 9.5 9.6 9.7 
Central 9.8 9.9 9.9 
Eastern 9.9 10 9.9 
Western 10.2 10.4 10.5 
Greater Accra 10.8 11.2 10.7 
Ashanti 10.9 11.1 10.6 
Brong Ahafo 11.2 11.4 11.3 
Upper West 12.1 11.7 11.9 
Source: GSS  






Sectoral and regional inflationary dynamics are evidently out of the bounds of the 
2018 BOG inflation target of 6-10%. This suggests that pronounced sectoral and 
regional inflation dynamics exist, thus fuelling the justification for a critical 
examination of disaggregated inflation thresholds since a single economy-wide 
inflation target system may not appropriately cater for these variations, ultimately 
dampening Ghana‘s growth potential.  
With Ghana‘s food sector being majorly rainfall-dependent, it is highly probable that 
each farming season as well as each farming hub will possess optimal threshold 
inflation levels which are markedly distinct from the aggregate target, and most 
importantly are time-varying. No prior attempt has however been made to investigate 
and estimate such differentiated sectoral inflation thresholds. 
Most studies that have explored the issue of threshold inflation non-linearity have 
mainly focused on cross-country groupings, with empirical analysis on macro-level 
data, while failing to clearly account for country-specific idiosyncrasies. This thesis 
sidesteps the cross-country level of analysis, and re-estimates the aggregate 
inflation threshold for Ghana, on which previous studies have thus far failed to reach 
a consensus. 
This thesis contributes to the broader inflation literature by being one of the first, if 
not the first, to probe the possible existence of threshold inflation non-linearity at the 
sectoral level of an economy. Thus, this study acts upon the observations by Heintz 
and Ndikumana (2010) and Chaudhry et al. (2013), who suggest that in countries 
with strong regional variations, a single economy-wide inflation target may not be 
meaningful in attaining optimum growth.  
Since relevant studies of this nature remain non-existent, this study may 
consequently be a notable novelty within the inflation-growth nexus as central banks, 
in the hope of boosting growth, subsequently resort to setting sector-specific inflation 
targets as against setting a single economy-wide inflation target. 
1.3 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
i. Determine the nature of the causal and possible long-run relationships 
between price levels and economic growth in Ghana. 
ii. Identify the threshold level and optimal range of inflation for the Ghanaian 
economy. 
iii. Investigate aggregate and sectoral levels of inflation persistence within the 
Ghanaian economy. 
iv. Compare the level of Ghana‘s inflation persistence with selected sub-Saharan 
African economies. 






1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
i. Is there a causal relationship between price levels and economic growth in 
Ghana? What is the long-run relationship between the two?  
ii. Do sector-specific threshold inflation levels exist within the Ghanaian 
economy? If so, what are these sector-specific threshold inflation levels and 
optimal inflation ranges within the Ghanaian economy? 
iii. Does inflation persistence exist at the aggregate and sectoral levels of the 
Ghanaian economy? 
iv. How do levels of inflation persistence in the Ghanaian economy compare to 
selected sub-Saharan African economies? 
The thesis makes a unique contribution to the literature in three primary ways. 
Firstly, it is a pioneer in probing the threshold inflation non-linearity at the sectoral 
level of an economy. Secondly, it adds to the very scanty threshold inflation non-
linearity literature on the Ghanaian economy, particularly since extant studies fail to 
arrive at a consensus for the threshold rate of inflation for the economy. Thirdly, it 
opens up a theoretical and empirical debate regarding which strand of the inflation-
growth non-linearity literature sectoral inflation data subscribes to and takes a first 
pass on the possible strand based on its findings. 
1.5 CHAPTER ORGANIZATION 
The thesis is thematically organized around the research objectives into six chapters, 
four of which are stand-alone essays on the thesis topic. Chapter one introduces the 
research by highlighting the research problem and the significance of the study. 
Chapter Two provides the literature review. Chapter Three captures the historical 
overview of inflationary trends and inflation management in Ghana. 
Empirical investigations begin from Chapter Four which focuses re-estimating the 
economy-wide threshold level of inflation. Chapter Five is the empirical chapter on 
threshold inflation estimation at the sectoral levels. Chapter Six is an empirical 
chapter on assessing inflation persistence at the aggregate and sectoral levels of the 
Ghanaian economy. Chapter Seven draws the curtain on the thesis with a summary 
of the conclusions and policy recommendations.  
Tables and figures are included in the main text of chapters. 
  








2.1 INFLATION NON-LINEARITY  
In developing the theoretical framework for the non-linear relationship between 
inflation and growth, we begin with Sarel (1995), who suggests that as economies 
target inflation rates below the threshold level, but greater than zero, they are able to 
avoid the negative effects of inflation on growth, and thereby achieve sustainable 
growth rates and lower unemployment in the long run. 
According to Tobin (1972), at the inflation threshold level, full employment occurs, 
and below full employment, prices decline and stagnate since labour supply exceeds 
labour demand. When labour demand exceeds labour supply, the economy will 
move above full employment and will witness increments in prices. 
Harris et al. (2001) suggest that the reason for the inflation–growth non-linearity is 
that at low rates of inflation, consumers use money primarily for purchases, and use 
very little credit. As a result, the demand for money is inelastic, and only becomes 
elastic as inflation rises. As long as demand remains inelastic and inflation is low, 
consumers are more likely to use money for credit and consumption goods for 
leisure. At higher inflation rates and a more elastic demand for money, the rate of 
substitution from goods to leisure falls and is rather translated into an increase in the 
rate of substitution from money to credit. The growth rate decreases by increasingly 
smaller quantities because leisure increases at a decreasing rate. Subsequently, at 
higher rates of inflation, a larger negative impact on growth occurs than at lower 
rates of inflation. 
Huybens and Smith (1998), in modelling a small open economy, find a unique 
relationship between inflation and growth at both high and low steady states of 
inflation. They find that at the higher steady state level of inflation, when the money 
growth rate is increased, it will result in a further increase in inflation rates beyond 
levels at which capital formation becomes conducive, thereby harming economic 
growth. On the other hand, with a lower steady state of inflation, when the money 
growth rate increases, there will be an attendant increment in the steady state level 
of inflation. Huybens and Smith (1998) however suggest that this increment will be 
small enough to still accommodate capital formation. 
The uncertainty associated with high, volatile and unanticipated inflation has been 
found to be one of the main determinants of the rate of return on capital and 
investment (Bruno, 1993; Pindyck and Solimano, 1993). Indeed, inflationary 
expectations in an economy may reduce the rate of return of capital, accumulation of 
human capital, and investment in research and development, and inevitably 
undermine investor confidence regarding the direction of monetary policy. This 
channel is the ‗accumulation or investment channel‘ (Yabu and Kessy, 2015) (see 






Figure 2.3). In the literature, an alternate channel exists although Briault (1995) 
documents that it is harder to formalize in a theoretical model. 
 
Figure 2.1: Transmission mechanism from inflation to growth  
Source: Li (2006), Yabu and Kessy (2015) 
Through an ‗efficiency channel‘, high inflation reduces total factor productivity by 
inducing frequent changes in price that may be costly to firms. This impacts 
consumers‘ optimal levels of cash holding and generates larger forecasting errors by 
distorting the information content of prices, encouraging economic agents to spend 
more time and resources in gathering information and protecting themselves against 
the damage that may be caused by price instability, thereby jeopardizing efficient 
resource allocation (see Figure 2.1). 
Keynesian models thus provided a more comprehensive model which aptly linked 
inflation to growth under the AD–AS framework, where the AS curve is upward 
sloping in the short run so that changes in the demand side of the economy affect 
both price and output (Dornbusch et al., 1996). A strictly vertical AS curve will not 
suffice as changes on the demand side of the economy will affect only prices and not 
output.  
The AD–AS framework thus yields an adjustment path which shows an initial positive 
relationship between inflation and economic growth but eventually turns negative 
towards the latter part of the adjustment path (Dornbusch et al., 1996) (see Figure 
2.4) due to the time inconsistency problem (TIP). Under the TIP, producers feel that 
only the prices of their products have increased while other producers are operating 
at the same price level. The relationship between inflation and growth is thus positive 
as the TIP lures the producers into more output. Moreover, Blanchard and Kiyotaki 
(1987) argue that along this section of the adjustment path, inflation and economic 
growth are positively related because of the agreement of firms to supply goods at a 
later date at pre-agreed prices, with the implication being that output will not decline 
even at increased economy-wide prices since the firm is obliged to produce. 







Figure 2.2: Unitary and double inflation threshold levels 
Source: Fabayo and Ajilore (2006) 
Giving credence to the Keynesian model, Huybens and Smith (1998) intimate the 
existence of a threshold levl above which inflation has a negative effect on long-run 
growth (Figure 2.2). π1 is the inflation threshold if only one threshold exists, while π0 
and π1 are the two thresholds in a scenario where two thresholds exist. This 
phenomenon occurs as financial market efficiency becomes affected by varied 
informational asymmetries because in the presence of high inflation, market frictions 
are heightened, which then interfere in the effectiveness of the financial system in 
allocating resources, leading to a reduction in real returns to savings, increased 
credit rationing, and limited investment levels, thereby stifling growth. 
In the late 1980s, endogenous growth models were postulated, being pioneered by 
Romer‘s (1986) and Rebelo‘s (1991) Ak models, Lucas‘s (1988) human capital 
model; Romer‘s (1990) variety expansion R&D endogenous growth model; Aghion 
and Howit‘s (1992) Schumpeterian R&D growth models.  
Gillman and Kejak (2005) present a general monetary endogenous growth model 
with both human and physical capital. Within this model, they categorize a nested set 
of models. In the first subset of models, inflation acts as a tax on physical capital with 
a negative long-run Tobin (1965)-type effect. In the second subset, inflation acts as a 
tax on human capital and there is a positive Tobin (1965) effect. Within the third 
subset of more generalized models with human and physical capital, inflation acts 
more as a tax on human capital and there is a positive Tobin (1965) effect.  
In their models with human capital, the employment rate and inflation rate are 
negatively related and thus models which exclude this tend to overstate inflationary 
effects above the given baseline level if indeed non-linearity is significant. The 
underlying money demand elasticity explains the non-linearity in that rising interest 






elasticity, coupled with increasing inflation, causes easier substitution away from 
inflation. A near constant interest elasticity money demand, as in the standard cash-
in-advance model, leads to a near linear response. In the physical capital models, 
producing an implied interest elasticity of money demand that rises in magnitude with 
the inflation rate where credit production included as a substitute to cash can 
account for the inflation-growth non-linearity.  
 
Vaona (2012) extends the New-Keynesian literature with wage staggering from the 
relationship between inflation and the level of output to the inflation-growth nexus. 
The labour market serves as a transmission channel in exploring how inflation 
affects growth while side-stepping credit, capital or product markets.  
At low levels of inflation, the time discounting effect prevails leading to a greater 
labour supply and therefore to faster capital accumulation and growth. On the 
contrary, at high inflation rates the employment cycling effect is stronger leading to 
less labour demand and therefore to slower growth. The labour cycling effect is due 
to the fact that firms substitute between different kinds of labour because agents 
belonging to different cohorts have different wages, being some of them locked in 
past contracts. In accommodating an intertemporal elasticity of substitution of non-
negative values for working time, inflation proves to have considerable real effects 
such as hurting economic growth and reducing welfare of economic agents. 
The inflation-growth nexus with regards to the Schumpetarian growth model with CIA 
constraints on consumption and R&D investment can be viewed in two theortical 
frameworks using open and closed economies. 
In the open-economy framework, Chu et al. (2015) analyze the growth effects of 
inflation by considering a setting with international trade in intermediate goods. Given 
that technologies transfer across countries through trade, monetary policy can 
induce a technology spillover effect across countries by affecting domestic 
innovation. They aruge that if R&D subsidies are financed by a labor-income tax, 
then increasing R&D subsidies will raise the income tax rate and reduce labor 
supply. Conversely, decreasing inflation will increase labor supply leading to 
unidentical effects of the two instruments. An increase in domestic inflation 
decreases domestic R&D investment and the growth rate of domestic technology. 
Since a country‘s economic growth depends on both domestic and foreign 
technologies, an increase in foreign inflation also affects the domestic economy, and 
when each government conducts its monetary policy unilaterally to maximize the 
welfare of only domestic households, the Nash-equilibrium inflation rates are 
generally different from the optimal inflation rates chosen by cooperative 
governments who maximize the aggregate welfare of domestic and foreign 
households. Under the special case of inelastic labor supply, the Nash-equilibrium 
inflation rates coincide with the optimal inflation rates while under the more general 






case of elastic labor supply, the Nash-equilibrium inflation rates become higher than 
the optimal inflation rates due to a crosscountry spillover effect of monetary policy. 
The intuition can be explained as follows. When the government in a country 
reduces its inflation, the welfare gain from increased R&D is shared by the other 
country through technology spillovers, whereas the welfare cost of increasing labor 
supply falls entirely on domestic households. As a result, the governments do not 
reduce inflation sufficiently in the Nash equilibrium. 
The wedge between the Nash-equilibrium and optimal inflation rates depends on the 
market power of firms. Under the CIA constraint on consumption, a larger markup 
reduces this wedge. However, under the CIA constraint on R&D investment, the 
opposite resultant effect is that a larger markup amplifies the inflationary bias from 
monetary policy competition. These different implications highlight the importance of 
the differences between the two CIA constraints. The main difference between the 
CIA constraint on consumption and the CIA constraint on R&D is that under the 
latter, an increase in the inflation rate leads to a reallocation of labor from R&D to 
production. As a result, higher inflation rates would be chosen by governments in the 
Nash equilibrium to depress R&D when the negative R&D externality in the form of a 
business-stealing effect determined by the markup becomes stronger. In contrast, 
under the CIA constraint on consumption, this reallocation effect is absent because 
an increase in the inflation rate reduces both R&D and production by decreasing 
labor supply. Given that increasing the markup worsens a monopolistic distortionary 
effect on the production of goods, governments would reduce inflation in the Nash 
equilibrium to stimulate production when this monopolistic distortion measured by the 
markup becomes stronger. 
Chu et al. (2017) further develop the open-economy framework in a monetary 
Schumpeterian growth model with endogenous entry of firms and random quality 
improvements. With elastic labor supply, the scale of the economy becomes 
endogenous and exerts an influence on the inflation-growth relationship. The growth 
effect of the nominal interest rate via the CIA constraint on consumption disappears 
under an endogenous market structure because the market structure endogenously 
responds to the scale of the economy, measured by equilibrium labor, through which 
the nominal interest rate affects economic growth. Under an endogenous market 
structure, the growth effect of the nominal interest rate via the CIA constraint on R&D 
continues to be present because the nominal interest rate directly affects the 
incentives for R&D (rather than through the scale of the economy. Specifically, an 
increase in the nominal interest rate decreases R&D and the arrival rate of 
innovations which fruther increases the present value of future profits. The resulting 
higher value of inventions leads to a lower threshold of quality improvements above 
which an innovation is implemented generating a positive effect on economic growth 
due to more entries. Together with the negative effect on the arrival rate of 






innovations, an increase in the nominal interest rate would have an inverted-U effect 
on economic growth if the entry cost is sufficiently large. 
He and Zou (2016) who apply Chu et al. (2015, 2017) argue the government 
crowding-out effect which suggests that governments reap seigniorage revenue from 
higher rates of money growth, attract additional labor into the government and 
banking sectors and thereby decrease the profit of entrepreneurs. When part of the 
revenue goes to entrepreneurs, the seigniorage effect kicks in and more resources 
would be attracted into R&D. When government retains the larger share of the 
revenue, the government crowding-out effect dominates and inflation retards growth. 
Conversely, when entrepreneurs get the larger share, the seigniorage effect 
dominates and inflation boosts growth. 
Within the closed economy framework, Awaratari et al. (2018) formulate an R&D-
based endogenous growth framework which assumes the existence of 
heterogeneous production capabilities amongst economic agents in a production 
function whereby agents above a certain capability threshold automatically become 
innovators and entrepreneurs, whereas those below the threshold are incapable of 
undertaking entrepreneurial activities and therefore become workers. In this 
analytical framework, a variety of intermediate and final goods were introduced into 
the model as well as money in the form of cash-in-advance (CIA) constraints on 
consumption and expenditure. 
However, if agents are homogeneous a spike in inflation will negatively affects the 
net profit margin of intermediate good firms, which disincentivizes the benefits of 
R&D and consequently depresses economic growth. Therefore, the negative 
relationship between inflation and growth is nonlinear in an economy with 
homogeneous capabilities. However, in a heterogeneous capability production 
function, the link between inflation and growth is nonlinear as an increase in inflation 
rate depresses the marginal benefit of R&D, which implies an increase in the 
production capability threshold level of entrepreneurship. In a low inflation economy, 
the effect of a rise in inflation on economic growth is relatively insignificant. 
Conversely, in a high inflation rate economy, a further rise in inflation rates would a 
significant effect on occupational changes for economic agents with high production 











Table 2.1: Summary table of empirical literature (sorted by year of publication) 






Estimation method(s) Methodological issues Summary of findings 
1 Daly, D. 1985 Canada 1966-1982; 
annual 
Survey method Comparisons with similar studies 
on the United Kingdom are 
made. 
Inflation exerts pressure on 
profit margins and rates of 
return in the manufacturing 
sector. 
2 Smyth, D.J. 1995a Germany 1951-1991; 
annual 
OLS Time and the reciprocal of time 
are both incorporated into the 
regression model. 
Inflation reduces economic 
growth both substantially 
and significantly. 
3 Smyth, D.J. 1995b USA 1955-1993; 
annual 
OLS Residuals from the equations are 
estimated using iterative SUR 
(seemingly unrelated 
regression). 
Inflation reduces the 
multifactor productivity 
growth rate both 
substantially and 
significantly. 







Incorporation of the 1986 
stabilization program births 
evidence of co-integration over 
the two sub-periods, which is 
otherwise absent over the entire 
period under study. 
Inflation has a negative and 
short-run effect on 
productivity. 
5 Freeman, D.G. & 
Yerger, D.B. 1998 
USA 1955-1993; 
annual 
Granger causality, VECM There exists a spurious statistical 
correlation between productivity 
growth and inflation. 
Inflation has a statistically 
insignificant impact on 
multifactor productivity 
growth. 
6 Hondroyiannis, G. & 8 OECD countries 1960-1995; Multivariate co- Reference is made to a United There might exist a uni-
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annual integration, VECM States model of inflation and 
productivity growth. 
directional causality from 
inflation to productivity 
growth. 
7 Saunders, P.J. 1998 USA 1947-1994; 
annual 
Trivariate ECM Two separate measures of 
inflation are employed: the 
percentage change in a) CPI, 
and b) the GDP implicit price 
deflator. 
In the short run, inflation 
impacts productivity growth. 
In the long run, however, 
monetary policy plays the 
predominant role in 
determining productivity 
growth. 
8 Freeman, D.G. & 





Hsiao causality test, 
Granger causality test, 
Engle-Granger co-
integration tests 
Cyclical effects are controlled for. Regarding either sign or 
magnitude, a consistent 
relationship between 
inflation and productivity 
growth fails to exist in major 
industrial countries 
9 Bitros, G.C. & 
Panas, E.E. 2001 
Greece 1963-1980; 
annual 
Translog flexible cost 
function 
Manufacturing output is 
decomposed to 3 main sources: 
technical change, inflation and 
economies of scale. 
Inflation causes a sizeable 
reduction in manufacturing 
output. 




VECM A bivariate relationship between 
productivity and inflation is 
spurious. 
A bi-directional causal 
relationship exists between 
inflation and productivity 
growth. 





Dolado and Lutkepohl 
causality tests 
The Bayesian test for unit roots 
is employed to avoid the over-
acceptance of the null hypothesis 
of unit roots unlike other 
traditional unit root tests. 
Long-run causality between 
inflation and productivity 
exists in 7 countries. This 
causality is bi-directional in 5 
countries. 
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12 Kiley, M.T. 2003 USA 1949-2000; 
annual 
Phillips-Curve analysis The data for 1948 is omitted, 
even though it is available, in 
order to allow for the inclusion of 
lagged inflation. 
Inflation and productivity are 
negatively correlated. 







Bayesian and causality 
analysis 
Due to the finite sample, the 
Bayesian approach to co-
integration is preferred and 
employed over the Johansen 
MLE. 
Causality exists in 7 
countries, of which 5 have a 
bi-directional relationship. 




ADF unit root test, PP unit 
root test, Dolado and 
Lutkephol causality test, 
Co-integration test 
(Johansen and Juselius, 
Engle-Granger, Phillips-
Ouliaris-Hansen)  
The econometrics used 
determines to a huge extent, the 
inferences that can be made on 
the inflation–productivity nexus. 
Co-integration between 
inflation and productivity 
does not exist in most cases, 
however, significant 
causality is observed in 
several countries. 
15 Dritsakis, N. 2004 Romania 1990-2003; 
quarterly 
ECM In order to preserve the time 
series proliferative (rapidly 
growing) effect, the data is 
expressed in logarithmic form. 
There exists causation 
between inflation and 
productivity. 
16 Strauss, J. & 






Panel co-integration and 
Granger causality 
Prices and wage-adjusted 
productivity are not cointegrated. 
Prices cause movements in 
unit labour cost and are 
weakly exogenous. 
17 Christopoulos, D.K. 






Panel unit root and panel 
co-integration tests 
Special emphasis is placed on 
recently developed tests for 
heterogeneous panels.  
There exists a uni-directional 
causal relationship from 
inflation to productivity 
growth. In 33.3% of the 
countries, there exists a 
short-run causal relationship 
between productivity growth 
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Stochastic translog cost 
frontier, VECM, Granger 
causality test 
A modified Wald test is employed 
to prevent the need to initially 
establish either the rank of co-
integration or the order of 
integration. 
There exists a negative one 
way causality from inflation 
to mining productivity 
growth. 
19 Bitros, G.C. & 
Panas, E.E. 2006 
Greece 1964-1980; 
annual 
Generalized Box-Cox Adoption of the most general 
flexible functional form for the 
cost function. 
Inflation causes a 
statistically significant and 
sizable reduction in total 
factor productivity. There 
even exists an inflation-
productivity trade-off in the 
long run. 
20 Blunch, N. & 








The Engle-Granger approach is 
employed to test various 
economic hypotheses regarding 
the interactions of the various 
sectors by testing parameter 
restrictions. 
There exists one long-run 
sectoral relationship in both 
Ivory Coast and Zimbabwe 
at the aggregate sector 
level. In Ghana, however, 
there was no cointegrating 
relationship. 
21 Mahadevan, R. & 
Asafu-Adjaye, J. 
2006 




Money supply is employed as a 
possible effective monetary 
policy tool. 
Inflation and productivity 
growth is non-uniform across 
the 9 countries. 




OLS Unit root tests and co-integration 
tests are absent. 
There are two threshold 
levels of inflation: 6% and 
11%. 
23 Narayan, P. & 






Panel co-integration The t-bar test by Im et al. (2003) 
is employed over the Breitung 
(2000) test in order to eliminate 
Little evidence exists to 
stipulate any effect of 
inflation on productivity in 6 
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Japan, UK, USA) the assumption of convergence 
to the equilibrium at the same 
speed, which is the basis for the 
alternative hypothesis by the 
latter. 
countries. In the UK, 
however, there exists a 
statistically significant 
negative long-run effect of 
inflation on productivity. 





Co-integration 9% is suggested as the threshold 
level in the estimated model. 
A significant and negative 
long-run relationship 
between inflation and GDP 
exists. 
25 Misztal, P. 2010 Poland 1991-2009; 
annual 
Mixed methods: Survey, 
VAR, TAR 
A priori, a non-linear model is 
employed, tested, and proved to 
be the case in reality. 
Inflation has a negative 
impact on economic growth. 
26 Ayyoub, M., 
Chaudhry, I.S. & 
Farooq, F. 2011 
Pakistan 1972-2010; 
annual 
OLS There was no test for co-
integration. 
When inflation exceeds a 
particular threshold, it 
becomes harmful to the 
growth of GDP. 







Growth accounting equations are 
employed. 
While moderate inflation of 
2.5% does indeed benefit 
economic growth, inflation 
levels beyond this point 
impede growth in China. 
28 Marbuah, G. 2011 Ghana 1955-2009; 
annual 
Unit root tests, Threshold 
Regression model (TAR), 
Granger causality 
The Zivot and Andrews (ZA) test 
is employed to forestall any 
possible spurious relationships in 
the time series data by 
identifying unknown structural 
breaks. 
Inflation rates beyond 10% 
hamper economic growth. 
29 Adusei, M. 2012 South Africa 1965-2010; 
annual 
Fully Modified Ordinary 
Least Squares (FMOLS), 
A dummy variable is 
incorporated which takes the 
Single digit inflation has a 
negative effect on economic 
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2 Stage Least Squares 
(2SLS) 
values 1 and 0 for years of single 
and double digit inflation 
respectively. 
growth in the long run. 
30 Bawa, S. & 





Varied econometric methods, 
explanatory variables and 
frequency of data have varied 
effects on the negative and 
significant relationship between 
the inflation rate and the growth 
of the economy. 
Beyond the threshold level 
of 13%, inflation has a high 
inimical effect on growth. 
31 Koulakiotis, A., 







Panel univariate GARCH A GARCH (1,1) model is 
estimated. 
There exists a bidirectional 
effect between inflation and 
GDP at the 10% significance 
level. 
32 Kumar, S., Webber, 





Tests for structural change are 
employed; both inflation and real 
wages Granger cause 
productivity in the long run. 
Inflation‘s effect on the 
manufacturing sector‘s 
productivity has limited 
statistical significance. 
33 Umaru, A. & 
Zubairu, A.A. 2012 
Nigeria 1970-2010; 
annual 
Unit root tests, Granger 
causality test of causation 
Variables are log-transformed.  Inflation has a positive effect 
on economic growth through 
the process of encouraging 
productivity. 
34 Chaudhry, I.S., 




OLS Autocorrelation among the error 
terms is tested using the Durban 
(DW) test statistic. 
The impact of inflation on a 
sector is highly dependent 
on the nature of the sector. 
35 Kim, S., Lim, H. & 
Park, D. 2013 
South Korea 1985-2002; 
quarterly 
Granger causality Solow residual estimates are 
obtained to obviate the South 
Korea business cycle upshots. 
A unidirectional yet inverse 
Granger causality 
relationship from productivity 
growth to inflation is found. 
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36 Phiri, A. 2013 Zambia 1998-2011; 
quarterly 
Threshold autoregressive 
(TAR) model; Conditional 
least squares (CLS) 
The model identifies the optimal 
inflation level at which adverse 
inflationary effects on economic 
growth are inhibited. 
Economic growth will thrive 
even in the presence of a 
moderately high inflation 
rate. 
37 Ying, Y. & 
Haiguang, G. 2013 
China 1996-2012; 
annual 
Survery method, Least 
squares linear regression 
Static process is employed in the 
empirical analysis. 
There exists a significant 
uncertainty between the 
development of productivity 
and inflation. 
38 Joudaki, H.A., 
Sadrabadi, M.H.H. 
& Sarlak, A. 2014 
Iran 1978-2011; 
annual 
Unit root tests, Co-
integration, Granger 
causality test, Barivash 
Gadefri test for self-
correlation, ARCH test 
The initial hypothesis is the 
existence of a two-way causal 
relationship between growth and 
inflation. 
There is a one-sided 
relationship between 
inflation and economic 
growth, and that relationship 
is significant and negative. 
39 Oyinbo, O. & 
Rekwot, G.Z. 2014 
Nigeria 1970-2011; 
annual 
ADF, Unrestricted VAR, 
Pairwise Granger 
causality tests 
There was no test for the 
presence of co-integration. 
There exists a unidirectional 
causation from inflation to 
the productivity of 
agriculture. However, there 
is no causation between 
inflation and economic 
growth. 
40 Rasool, S.A., 
Raashid, M., Raja, 




Unit root tests, Co-
integration, VECM 
One unstationary variable (M2) is 
made stationary by taking its log. 
There exists a negative and 
significant relationship 
between inflation and 
economic growth. After a 
certain level, inflation 
becomes harmful to the 
growth of GDP in Pakistan. 
41 Tang, C.F. 2014 Malaysia 1970-2007; 
annual 
Bounds test and Granger 
causality 
The efficiency wage theory is 
proven to hold in Malaysia. 
Negative relationship 
between inflation and labour 
productivity. However, real 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za






wage has a non-linear effect 
on labour productivity and it 
is an inverted U-shaped 
relationship. 




Data is seasonally adjusted and 
transformed into log form. 
There exists a strong 
interaction between inflation 
and productivity of labour. 
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CHAPTER 3:  
A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF INFLATION MANAGEMENT AND 
INFLATIONARY TRENDS IN GHANA1 
 
Abstract 
We review Ghana‘s inflationary history from pre-independence to the current era and 
assess historical monetary policy and inflation management frameworks as 
employed by successive political regimes. Average inflation of 31% is recorded 
during the monetary targeting regime up to 1991 when credit controls were instituted. 
Over the next decade, with the adoption of open market operations (OMO), average 
inflation dropped to 28%. Prior to the formal adoption of inflation targeting (IT) in 
2007, average inflation declined further to 15% between 2002 and 2006. Since the 
formal adoption of IT, a one percentage point drop in average inflation to 14% was 
recorded. Overall, a consistent decline in average inflation has been witnessed 
across the different policy frameworks. Since 2012, burgeoning of a creeping 
inflationary spiral is evident. Particularly the economy ushered in a new spell of 
moderate inflation from 2014 with average annual inflation being 16%. We identify 
Ghana‘s foremost macroeconomic problem as inflation persistence. 
 
JEL classification: E31; E42; E58; N17 
 
Key words: Inflation, Inflation Target, Persistence, Monetary Policy, Ghana 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Inflation is one of the intractable problems the Ghanaian economy has faced for a 
very long time (Sowa and Kwakye, 1993). High and variable levels of inflation 
particularly through the 1970s and 1980s has led to inflation often being referred to 
as Ghana‘s chief problem (Sowa and Kwakye, 1993, 1994; Sowa 1994, 1996; Boafo-
Arthur, 1999; Ocran, 2007; Marbuah, 2011).  
Having registered low rates of inflation in the years immediately after independence, 
the country had its first taste of double-digit inflation in 1964. This was followed by a 
brief period of respite from 1967-71 with inflation below 10% per annum. A stint of 
sub-zero inflation (-8%) was recorded in 1967. However, since 1972 double-digit 
inflation has generally been the norm, with levels ranging between 10% (1972) and a 
record high of 123% (1983) (see Figure 3.1). 
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Markets and Risk Management (AIFMRM) Economics Postgraduate summer school, University of 
Cape Town – South Africa, 15th-23rd December 2016, and (vi) Africa Finance Association 
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Figure 3.1: Inflation and rates of real GDP growth (1960-2015)  
Source: WDI (2016) 
In May 2007, in a bid to try and curb the inflation problem, the Bank of Ghana 
formally adopted the inflation targeting framework using interest rates as its 
monetary instrument (Bank of Ghana, 2007). Even so, the inflation target each year 
has consistently been missed (Frimpong and Oteng-Abeyie, 2010) and average 
annual inflation has reduced only marginally from 12.9% between 2004-2006, to 
12.8% between 2007-2014, with single digit inflation rates recorded only in 2011 and 
2012.  
Due to external shocks following the high food prices and global financial crisis, fiscal 
dominance from excessive government expenditure, huge fiscal deficit, and 
exchange rate depreciation, the disinflation process suffered a jolt when in 2008, 
inflation hit 16.5%. The soaring inflation continued the following year, pegging 19.3% 
despite a regime of fiscal consolidation through a contractionary fiscal policy. 
Examining the causes and consequences of failure to properly manage inflation is 
useful for policy making (Taylor, 2000) particularly for developing countries in Africa 
because it affects both forecasts of infation and the effects of changes (such as 
exchange rate changes) in monetary policy on inflation. Moreover it has impllications 
for debt servicing, savings and wage setting. Billi and Khan (2008) suggest that 
inflation rates should be kept both low and yet at positive values for four fundamental 
reasons. Firstly, errors in measuring inflation could result in the officially declared 
inflation rate actually lying above the economy‘s actual inflation rate. Secondly, as a 
result of employees refusing nominal wage cuts, employers would be unable to 
reduce wages, thereby causing a downward rigidity in nominal wages. If demand 
increases in the presence of zero inflation, firms will be forced to lay off staff as they 
cannot offer lower wages. Therefore, real wages can safely be reduced without the 
attendant effect on nominal wages even if there is a small amount of inflation. 
Thirdly, in order to avoid deflation, which is more costly than inflation, governments 
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while the value of debt rises, the prices of assets fall. As a result, debtors will face an 
increased burden of repayments since the real cost of servicing debts also increase. 
Debtors will attempt to sell assets in order to settle their debts, which will simply 
cause a further fall in asset prices. Thereafter, a vicious cycle occurs in which the 
cost of debt will perpetually rise while asset values fall until deflation ceases. 
Fourthly, as inflation falls, nominal interest rates also fall. This suggests that as 
inflation attains a zero lower bound, nominal interest rates will also be zero, which 
will imply that central banks will be unable to utilize the interest rate tool to implement 
monetary policies. 
In this paper, we review Ghana‘s inflationary history from pre-independence to the 
current era and assess the myriad inflation management tools employed by 
successive democratic and military regimes.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 3.2 assesses the 
persistence of inflation in the Ghanaian economy, while Section 3.3 delves into 
inflation management in Ghana. A brief historical record of monetary policy 
frameworks in Ghana follows in Section 3.4, and in Section 3.5 we focus on Ghana‘s 
formal adoption of inflation targeting. Finally, the conclusion and recommendations 
are in Section 3.6.  
3.2 HOW PERSISTENT HAS INFLATION BEEN IN GHANA? 
Using Dornbusch and Fisher‘s (1993) definition of moderate inflation as at least three 
consecutive years of annual inflation rates between 15% and 30%, five clear 
patterns can be identified in Ghana since 1960. The inflation episode experienced 
from 1973 to 1984 was the longest moderate inflation spell. Incidentally during this 
period, Ghana experienced the highest inflation levels of 117% in 1977 and 1981, 
and 123% in 1983. The episode lasted over a decade (1973-1984) with average 
annual inflation rates of 60%. It succeeded a period of low inflation (7.6% per 
annum) but for the next three years, inflation averaged 25% and the economy drifted 
into another spell during which inflation averaged 29% between 1986 and 1991. 
Table 3.1: Persistent moderate inflation spells since 1960 
  Average Period Inflation (%) 
Period of moderate 
inflation 
Duration During the period 3 years before 
period 
3 years after 
period 
1973-1984  12 years 59.8 7.6 24.9 
1986-1991  6 years 29.4 57.6 20.0 
1993-1998  6 years 33.1 21.8 23.5 
2000-2003  4 years 24.9 18.3 12.9 
2014-2016  3 years 16.0 9.8 n/a 
Source: Authors‘ computation based on WDI (2016) 
Note: n/a: not available 




Average annual inflation hovered at 33% per annum between 1993 and 1998. The 
six year period from 1993-1998 was both preceded and succeeded by average 
annual inflation rates of over 20% for three consecutive years. Moderate inflation 
subsided between 2004 and 2013, with the most recent being 16% average annual 
inflation lasting from 2014 to 2016. The three year period prior to this final spell saw 
Ghana attain single digit inflation of 9.8% on average (see Table 3.1). However, from 
2011, average annual inflation has consistently risen, from 9% to 15.5% in 2014, and 
subsequently to 17.1% in 2015. With the official 2016 inflation rate recording 15.4%, 
the economy has once more been ushered into another spell of inflation persistence. 
Unlike other countries that did not stay in moderate inflation spells for protracted 
periods (Dornbusch and Fisher, 1993), Ghana appears to have been saddled with 
moderate inflation for a long time (Ocran, 2007). 
3.3 INFLATION PATTERNS AND MANAGEMENT IN GHANA 
Figure 3.1 presents the levels of inflation in Ghana from 1960 till 2015. Prior to 1972, 
lower inflation rates on average are observed compared to subsequent periods of 
hyperinflation and declining economic growth, ultimately leading to the adoption of 
an Economic Recovery Program (ERP) in 1983. Following the example of Ocran 
(2007), we divide the discussion into five phases: the post-tranquil era (1957-1966), 
rising inflation (1967-1971), the hyperinflation period (1972-1982), stabilization phase 
(1983-2003), and the current inflation experience (2004-date). 
3.3.1 Post-tranquil era (1957-1966) 
Prior to this first period, Ocran (2007) describes Ghana‘s inflation experience as 
tranquil due to the existence of the West African Currency Board (WACB), to which 
Ghana belonged. With the help of the WACB, the Ghana government was able to 
keep inflation at bay by relying solely on taxing or borrowing, and not on the printing 
of money to finance its expenditure. Indeed, in the years of the WACB, Ghana 
persistently experienced single digit inflation rates which were estimated at less than 
1%. However, following Ghana‘s independence and exit from the WACB in 1957, the 
board could no longer dictate the path of Ghana‘s monetary policy. The then 
Nkrumah administration swiftly embarked on a massive and unprecedented 
industrialization drive. All over the country, import substitution industries were 
established, and due to the sudden volumes of major infrastructure investments, the 
economy inevitably began to heat up (Sowa, 1994; Ocran, 2007).  
Being state owned and managed, and excessively protected by overlapping levels of 
tariff structures, these industries performed woefully, due in part to incompetent 
management and difficulties in obtaining input supplies and to dwindling foreign 
exchange reserves. Following the collapse of the commodity market, surpluses 
which Ghana had stored up due to the heavy taxation of its cocoa crop eventually 
dried up. Yet the investment drive went on unabated, being financed heavily with 
overseas loans. Gradually, inflation started to rise from its previous less than unitary 




value under the WACB to an average of 8% per annum between 1960 and 1963. 
The excessive investment activity during this period was evidenced more in demand 
pressure than in output expansion, causing a strong upward pressure on prices 
(Sowa, 1994).  
The growing inflation was managed by maintaining import supplies and financing 
fiscal deficits with external reserves which had been accumulated prior to 
independence. As these reserves dried up, the government resorted to central bank 
financing since attempts to increase import duties failed to close the budget gap. 
From an average of 8% per annum between 1960 and 1963, inflation increased to 
15.8% in 1964, and almost tripled to an average of 23% per annum between 1964 
and 1966. Ripples of the 1964 inflationary pressure led to a persistence in inflation, 
particularly sustained by constraints on foreign exchange which led to shortages of 
most consumer items. Following the 1966 military takeover, the first inflationary 
phase was immediately succeeded by the IMF-supported stabilization attempt in 
1967 which nevertheless failed to stem the steady rise of inflation. 
3.3.2 Rising inflation (1967-1971) 
In a bid to cool down the economy, the new military government, the National 
Liberation Council (NLC) promptly entered into a standby agreement with the IMF, 
which among other things was aimed at driving external trade liberalization, and the 
tightening of monetary and fiscal policies by reducing public spending and excessive 
bank financing. This yielded some fruit as Ghana registered her first ever and only 
deflation rate of -8% in 1967 (Figure 3.2). In July of that same year, the currency was 
devalued by 30%. Meanwhile extensive state participation in the economy was 
reduced and minimal investments made, leading to a massive nationwide economic 
retrenchment. Evidently, the measures which managed to contain inflation also took 
a heavy toll on the growth of the economy as monetary policy was further tightened 
through credit restrictions and interest rate increases. The ensuing civilian 
government that took over deepened its predecessor‘s pro-liberalization policies, 
while it relaxed its fiscal policy stance. External borrowing and foreign reserves 
sustained the government‘s recurrent and investment outlays which had increased 
substantially over the period.  
Inflation was kept in check as a result of the contractionary orientation it adopted 
towards its monetary policy, despite having a rather relaxed approach to its fiscal 
policy. Economic activity experienced a marked boost in growth between 1969 and 
1970, the highest in Ghana‘s history at the time. As this era drew to a close in 1970, 
inflation had risen marginally to 10% from a low of 3%. During this period, the 
commodity market collapse forced the government to draw up an austere budget 
aimed at cutting expenditure and exploring potential revenue sources in order to 
cushion the economy from the effect of the cocoa price downturn. This was coupled 
with a further 44% devaluation of the local currency in 1971, and an additional 10-
20% tax levy on selected forex transactions. These actions turned out to be highly 




unpopular and ultimately led to the government‘s demise and overthrow in 1972, 
ushering Ghana into an unforgettable episode of hyperinflation. 
3.3.3 Hyperinflation period (1972-1982)  
Arguably, the 1972-1978 period saw the most reckless expansionary economic 
policy stance ever in Ghana‘s history (Ocran, 2007). Under the new military regime, 
a major reversal of the ousted government‘s economic policy was effected. This 
began with the revaluation of the local currency by 42%, and the reinstating of 
external trade controls. A succession of military takeovers led to incumbent regimes 
repetitively pursuing expansionary fiscal programmes attended by increased budget 
deficits which were primarily financed by central bank loans to government and state 
institutions. Economic stagnation, widespread shortage of goods and distorted 
relative prices with strong upward price rigidity were some of the inevitable effects of 
the reckless central bank financing. 
Between 1972 and 1976, in spite of price controls, inflation surged from 10.2% to 
56.1%. By 1977, an all-time high (at the time) of 116.4% was recorded. Over the 
next six years, average inflation hovered around 73%, partly due to announcements 
of exchange rate adjustments. Excess money supply growth, shortages of raw 
materials and spare parts for manufacturers, as well as erratic power cuts caused by 
low water levels in two of the country‘s foremost hydro dams2 all contributed to 
massive domestic price increases. The infamous oil price shocks of 1973 and 1977 
also increased import prices, further fuelling the abnormally high levels of inflation.  
Following the 1973 oil price shock and the accompanying erosion of its balance of 
payment position, the then government resorted to excessive borrowing through the 
central bank as well as arbitrary printing of money to close its budget gap. The 
ensuing printing of money led to an inflation spiral, with inflation rocketing to 117% in 
1977 and 1981. The inflation crises worsened when extensive price control 
mechanisms were employed in the hope of curtailing the inflationary spiral. Indeed, 
despite widespread price controls during this decade, corruption, foreign currency 
trading in parallel markets, and smuggling of goods became the order of the day, so 
much so that average inflation hovered at a staggering 51% per annum between 
1972 and 1982. Another military takeover occurred in 1978, and that regime quickly 
moved to devalue the currency by 58% in search of a short-term (one year) standby 
agreement with the IMF. After yet another military takeover in June 1979, a civilian-
elected government came to power barely three months later in September 1979.  
This government also embarked on expansionary economic policies, especially in 
the public sector, where the country experienced a doubling of the producer price for 
cocoa, and an overnight tripling of public workers‘ wages. Sowa (1994) and Ocran 
(2007) attribute the inflationary experience during this phase to excessive demand 
pressure sustained by an expansionary fiscal stance and loose monetary policies.  
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Foreign exchange scarcity as a result of over-dependence on volatile cocoa earnings 
constrained the ability to supply essential imports for consumption and production 
due to the behaviour of the world commodities market during that period. This was 
coupled with structural economic constraints, low output and a weak production base 
– all major actors on the influence of the inflationary trend of this era. 
Inflation management was primarily undertaken using price controls and fixed 
exchange rates during this period. However these mechanisms did little to remove 
the causes of inflationary pressure at the time, leading to several distorted prices 
underscoring widespread structural constraints, particularly in domestic production 
and external trade. By the end of 1982, declining per capita incomes, increasing 
external deficits and poor infrastructure led to pronounced calls for a revised 
direction of economic management. 
3.3.4 Stabilization phase (1983-2003) 
The revised direction of economic management came in the form of the ERP which 
was launched in 1983 by the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) 
government in April 1983. This stabilization phase was attended by a dual 
combination of unfavourable man-made and natural conditions.  
The price distortions of the late 1970s, and a rather dysfunctional economic system 
forced the government to turn to the IMF and World Bank for assistance, particularly 
when inflation reached a record-high of 123%. This high inflation can be attributed to 
a 991% devaluation of the local currency that year (Ocran, 2007). The primary goals 
of the ERP were to stem the slide in the economy, minimize imbalances, control 
inflation and establish a path of sustainable growth (Sowa, 1994). It employed 
mechanisms which included price deregulation, financial management reforms, 
exchange rate corrections, trade liberalization, and the rehabilitation of economic 
and social infrastructure. Although one year after the introduction of the ERP, 
inflation plummeted from 123% to 40%, Sowa (1994) contends that the remarkable 
drop cannot fully be attributed to the programme since the ERP did not really take off 
until 1984, and moreover since the agricultural sector had also started to recover 
from the infamous 1983 drought.  
During the reform years of 1983-2000, annual inflation averaged 34%, although in 
some years (such as in 1985 and 1992), inflation hovered around 10%. Inflation 
dropped to an annual average of 27% between 1987 and 1993, as against 50% 
during the early reform years of 1983-1986. Nevertheless, Sowa (1994) asserts that 
while the ERP failed to rein in inflation during the period, it enabled the agricultural 
sector to recover quickly by attracting external inflows which eased supply 
constraints.  
Bouts of high inflation between the late 1990s and early 2000s were attributed to 
external shocks, unsustainable macroeconomic policies through an expansionary 
monetary stance, as well as exchange rate depreciation and increases in prices of 




petroleum products during the period. A 100% increase in petroleum prices in the 
first quarter of 2003 ensured that this era ended on a high inflationary note, propelled 
by public workers‘ demands for higher wages. 
All in all, during this phase, inflation management was highly unsuccessful (Ocran, 
2007) as the overall period average was 34% per annum. Indeed the target for 
inflation by the year 2000 was 5%, while the economy actually registered a 25% 
inflation rate. Even in 1985, 1992 and 1999, when inflation came close to being 
single digit, it could not be sustained over the next calendar year. Such has been the 
pattern of consistently missed inflation targets to date (Frimpong and Oteng-Abeyie, 
2010). 
3.3.5 Current inflation experience (2004-date) 
Presently, Ghana finds herself in the post second stabilization inflation phase, where 
annual inflation over the period 2004-2015 has averaged over 13%, hitting a high of 
19% in 2009. 
Beginning in 2004 until late 2007 a period of disinflation began, taming inflation to 
almost 10% in 2007. Contributory factors include the debt relief initiative from the 
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) and Multilateral Debt Relief program, and 
the resurgence of aid inflows and external loans. These were augmented by inward 
private transfers3 from the central Bank of Ghana (BOG) purposely to ‗buy off‘ 
accumulated rates of inflation in the economy (CEPA, 2009; Alagidede et al., 2014).  
In May 2007, in a bid to try and curb the inflation problem, the BOG formally adopted 
the inflation targeting framework using interest rates as its monetary instrument 
(Bank of Ghana, 2007). Even so, the inflation target each year has consistently been 
missed (Frimpong and Oteng-Abeyie, 2010) (see Table 3.2 and Figure 3.2 below), 
and average annual inflation has reduced only marginally from 12.9% between 2004-
2006, to 12.8% between 2007-2014, with single digit inflation rates recorded only in 
2011 and 2012.  
Table 3.2: Actual and targeted (band) inflation levels (%) (2007-2017) 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Targeted 
(Band) 
9±2 9±2 9±2 9±2 9±2 9±2 9±2 9±2 8±2 8±2 8±2 
Actual 
Inflation 
10.7 16.5 19.3 10.7 8.7 9.2 11.6 15.5 17.1 17.5 n/a 
Deviation 
(Band) 
-1.7±2 -7.5±2 -10.3±2 -1.7±2 0.3±2 -0.2±2 -2.6±2 -6.5±2 -9.1±2 -9.5±2 n/a 
Source: Ghana Statistical Service CPI Newsletters (several issues), WDI (2017) 
Note:  n/a: not available 
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 These included remittances. 




A graphical radar chart depiction of Table 3.2 is given in Figure 3.2 below. 
 
Figure 3.2: Actual and targeted inflation levels (2007-2016) 
Due to external shocks following the high food prices and global financial crisis, fiscal 
dominance from excessive government expenditure4, huge fiscal deficit5, and 
exchange rate depreciation, the disinflation process suffered a jolt when in 2008, 
inflation hit 16.5%. The soaring inflation continued the following year, pegging 19.3% 
despite a regime of fiscal consolidation through a contractionary fiscal policy6. 
Inflation levels sustained a downward trend through 2010 and 2011, with 2011 being 
the first time the economy had witnessed a single digit annual average inflation rate 
since 1971. General improvements in macroeconomic management, including fiscal 
policy, and lower food inflation rates contributed in driving down headline inflation. In 
fact, the maintenance of single-digit inflation during this period was made possible 
exclusively by food inflation as non-food inflation remained in double digits for the 
entire period. Fuel and utilities, which constitute major items of the Consumer Price 
Index (CPI) enjoyed subsidies which kept their prices below market prices. 
Moreover, close management of the exchange rate coupled with subdued global 
inflation following the 2007-08 financial crisis and attendant recessionary conditions 
in major countries contributed to the lower rates of inflation.  
Although the single digit feat was repeated in 2012, a 30% economy-wide hike in 
utility and fuel prices at the tail end of 2011 due to the removal of the fuel and utility 
subsidies contributed to a burgeoning of an inflationary spiral in ensuing years.  
                                                          
4
 46.5% of GDP against total revenue shortfall of 31.3% of GDP. 
5
 13.9% of GDP. 
6
 Fiscal deficit by December 2009 had dropped to 7.3% of GDP. 



































8.1 38.8 48.2 27.6 18.4 12.6* 
Source: Ghana Statistical Service CPI Newsletters (several issues), WDI 2017  
Notes: n/a: not available  
 * this is the average from 2010-2016 
Ever since 2011, a mild inflationary spiral has been witnessed with a high of 17% 
recorded in 2015. It is however noteworthy to indicate that both decadal and half-
decadal analyses on inflation data from 1960 reveal a consistent downward trend in 
average inflation rates from a peak of 48.2% to 12.6% (decadal) and from a high of 
70.3% to 11.1% (half decadal) (see Table 3.3 and Figure 3.3). 
 
Figure 3.3: Trend for decadal and half-decadal average inflation rates (%) 
(1960-2014) 
Indeed, inflation in this phase is best characterized as persistent, experiencing a 
somewhat cyclical pattern, with sharp hikes in inflation rates particularly in years 
immediately succeeding an election year. In trying to achieve economic stability, 
several monetary and fiscal policies have been directed at keeping inflation low 




(price stability) while sustaining high rates of economic growth. We take a brief look 
at the historical record of monetary policy frameworks in Ghana. 
3.4 A BRIEF HISTORICAL RECORD OF MONETARY POLICY FRAMEWORKS IN 
GHANA 
Most central banks conduct monetary policy by either pursuing direct inflation 
targeting or monetary aggregate targeting. Ghana‘s monetary policy has evolved in 
recent years from essentially a monetary targeting approach to an inflation targeting 
approach (see Figure 3.4 below).  
 
Figure 3.4: Inflation history in Ghana (19607-2016)  
Source: Authors‘ computation 
The monetary-targeting approach was in place up to 2006 and had two variants. The 
first was a credit-control approach which was implemented up to 1991, and the 
second variant, in place between 1992 and 2006, used OMO. 
The credit control approach targeted domestic credit directly in order to achieve 
money supply targets as an intermediate variable and, finally, inflation targets. Under 
this framework, the BOG‘s opinion was that inflation is primarily a monetary problem 
and therefore targeting money supply growth was the best method of controlling 
inflation in the economy. Credit controls involved the imposition of ceilings on the 
commercial banks‘ credit to the private sector, and the regulation of borrowing and 
deposit interest rates. Year after year, the central bank could determine both money 
supply growth and inflation targets and set the ceilings and rates accordingly.  
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While it seemed a simple system to implement, there were inherent problems 
associated with it. The setting of credit ceilings led to excessive liquidity with no 
vehicles to invest in, and the very low interest rates meant that the government could 
borrow money at negligible costs. Indeed, the credit targets were mostly violated due 
to higher budget financing, leading to breaches of the money supply targets. 
The second variant of monetary targeting employed OMO. This involved the BOG‘s 
sale and purchase of financial instruments as the operating instrument and money 
supply as the intermediate target. The persistence of excess liquidity in the economy 
ensured that OMO was invariably unidirectional, involving the sale of instruments.  
Undermining factors to the OMO included the lack of a clear demarcation between 
the sale of instruments to mop up liquidity, and that to raise money to finance the 
budget. Furthermore in order to reduce cost, there was some interference with the 
market process to set both quantity and price (interest rate) targets.  
Besides these operational difficulties, the relationship between money supply and 
inflation supposedly became increasingly tenuous, a phenomenon which usually 
occurs during financial and other structural changes in an economy. Indeed till this 
day, monetary growth rates have been much higher than inflation rates, presumably 
due to growing money demand amid the structural changes taking place in the 
Ghanaian economy (Kwakye, 2013). More recently, the BOG has used reserve 
requirements to manage money supply. 
Against the backdrop of limited success in achieving intermediate and final targets 
under the monetary targeting framework, including due to the apparent weakening of 
the link between monetary aggregates and inflation, the BOG decided to shift from 
monetary targeting to inflation targeting (IT) in May 2007.  
3.5 THE FORMAL ADOPTION OF INFLATION TARGETING IN GHANA 
Under IT, the BOG uses its monetary policy rate (MPR) to target inflation directly 
without using monetary aggregates as a route. The MPR is transmitted by banks 
through their own rates to the economy. The IT framework is based on the notion 
that policy is designed to target inflation through an inflation forecast. Given that the 
inflation forecast is a function of many macroeconomic variables, policy reacts to a 
whole range of variables, not just money supply as in the case of the monetary 
targeting framework. That is, the IT framework is premised on the fact that inflation is 
not solely a monetary phenomenon. In this framework, the BOG‘s MPR is the 
monetary policy tool, while the overnight money market interest rate (interbank rate) 
is the operating target. 
While understanding this framework is straightforward, its practical implementation is 
far more demanding. In the real world, full information and knowledge of the 
monetary policy transmission mechanism (magnitudes and lags) is imperfect, hence 




achieving consensus on any moment of the probability distribution of exogenous 
variables is very difficult. However difficult, independent central banks must make 
decisions based on this imperfect aggregate information and then convincingly 
explain the rationale for those measures to the financial markets and the public at 
large (Roger, 2010). 
In practice, the transmission of the MPR has been tenuous and slow due to low 
competition in the banking industry, other structural weaknesses in the financial 
system, lack of safety nets in lending, and persistence of excess liquidity in the 
economy. This situation has somewhat undermined the IT process. Further, IT has 
been undermined by fiscal dominance, inadequate exchange rate flexibility, 
inadequate transparency, and possible shortcomings with data and forecasting. 
Since formally adopting the inflation targeting framework in May 2007, the BOG 
together with the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning revises and announces 
explicit inflation target bands in the Budget Statement at the beginning of each fiscal 
year.  
While inflation rates were lower under the initial stages of the IT regime, a 
burgeoning of a mild inflationary spiral seems to be taking root as we pointed out 
earlier. All the same, one cannot attribute the earlier levels of subdued inflation rates 
entirely to the effectiveness of IT.  
Evidently, several factors contributed to the lower inflation rates at the initial stages 
of the IT regime. General improvements in macroeconomic management, including 
fiscal policy, and lower food inflation rates contributed in driving down headline 
inflation. Fuel and utilities, which constitute major items of the CPI enjoyed subsidies 
which kept their prices below market prices. Close management of the exchange 
rate coupled with subdued global inflation which followed the 2007-08 financial crisis 
and attendant recessionary conditions in major countries contributed to the lower 
rates of inflation. 
While Ghana has long moved away from the system of credit controls or fixed 
exchange rates, which were plagued by considerable operational difficulties, the 
pure forms of monetary and exchange rate-targeting approaches to monetary policy 
do not currently appear to be viable options. However, monetary aggregates and the 
exchange rate remain important determinants of inflation in Ghana and must be 
taken into account under any approach that is used. From our overview of inflation 
management and inflationary trends in Ghana since its political independence in 
1957, a number of crucial highlights are revealed below. 
3.6 CONCLUSION 
Firstly, in a supply-constrained economy where close to half of the CPI basket is 
comprised of food, as is the case in Ghana, managing inflation can be a difficult task. 




This difficulty is amplified by food supply shocks brought about by natural and man-
made occurrences coupled with inflationary effects of exogenously determined 
factors such as fuel and utility prices. The common practice in other jurisdictions is to 
select a core measure of inflation, which the monetary authorities can effectively 
control. It is still necessary, however, to monitor the headline measure while the 
authorities consistently provide firm assurances of their preparedness to tackle any 
second-round effects likely to emanate from the influence of exogenously 
determined items in the economy‘s consumption basket.  
Secondly, in the face of overwhelming fiscal dominance, managing inflation becomes 
increasingly difficult. Fiscal dominance that also spills over into central bank 
financing of budget deficits renders monetary policy incapable of properly controlling 
inflation. The restoration of the approach of fiscal discipline that complements 
monetary policy rather than opposing it is the way forward. In addition, the BOG‘s 
autonomy needs further strengthening so as to give the BOG the necessary liberties 
to use its instruments freely and to be able to resist the arbitrary usage of its funds 
for financing budget deficits.  
Thirdly, employing a market-based approach such as IT in an economy with 
relatively low intermediation and shallow financial depth is likely going to be flawed 
with setbacks. The foremost setback is the inability of the financial sector to 
effectively transmit monetary policy signals to the real economy. If inflation targeting 
is to succeed in the Ghanaian economy, urgent policies will be needed to transform 
the financial sector and align it along the trajectory of sustainable economic 
development. 
In summary, Ghana has been saddled with the bane of inflation persistence for a 
long time. Currently, the economy is in the middle of another spell of moderate 
inflation which began in 2014, with average annual inflation during this period 
peaking at 16%. Therefore while single digit inflation is being heralded as essential 
for all economies, a careful inquiry into the relationship between inflationary levels 
and inflation persistence needs to be undertaken as a declining inflation rate may not 
necessarily imply that inflationary expectations (persistence) are being subdued. 
  





ON THRESHOLD INFLATION EFFECTS IN GHANA8 
Abstract 
This paper tests for the presence of threshold effects in Ghana‘s headline inflation. It 
uses Regime Switching Threshold Autoregressive and Smooth Transition 
Regression Models to identify inflation thresholds and their effects on output growth. 
The findings suggest threshold effects exist within Ghana‘s inflation, with the 
estimated threshold at 11%. Expected switching probabilities of inflationary regimes 
are also estimated. We find a 97% chance of a high inflation regime succeeding a 
low inflationary period and a 3% chance of a low inflation period succeeding a low 
inflation period. There exists a 94% likelihood of succession from one high 
inflationary period to another and a 6% chance of transition from a high inflation era 
to a low one. While the Ghanaian economy can remain in a continuously low inflation 
era for no more than one year, it will take approximately 37 years to exit any high 
inflation spell it enters. This paper particularly makes a contribution by adding to the 
very scanty threshold inflation non-linearity literature on Ghana. 
 
JEL classification: E31; E52 
 
Key words: Threshold, Inflation, Threshold Autoregressive Model, Smooth 
Transition Regression, Output, Ghana 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Low and stable inflation in Ghana is an infrequent phenomenon. In many developing 
countries, the link between inflation and economic growth has been a subject of 
much scholarly attention (Bick, 2010; Gokal and Hanif, 2004; Phiri, 2016; Gerlach 
and Tillmann, 2012; Ocran, 2007; Vega and Winkelried, 2005).  
However, no study to the best of our knowledge has explored transition probabilities 
and expected durations of inflationary episodes. Inflation can be well represented as 
a regime-switching process, characterized by two regimes - loosely described as 
price stability and high inflation. This line of reasoning suggests that the probability of 
moving from low to high inflation is allowed to depend on the rate of money growth 
which can thus act as an early detection system of the risk of the departure of 
inflation from the price stability regime (Amisano and Fagan, 2013). Arguably for a 
central bank committed to price stability, such a signal may be a more valuable piece 
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of information than a forecast for inflation at a specific horizon within the given 
regime which is critical for inflation management and to deal with inflation 
intractability in Ghana.  
Inflation and economic growth have proved to possess a more than complex 
relationship. This complexity is aptly captured by Drukker et al. (2005) who 
categorize the predictions from extant literature regarding the inflation–growth nexus 
into four distinct strands. In the first strand, pioneered by Tobin (1965), inflation has a 
positive effect on long-run growth; the second strand posits that inflation has no 
effect on growth (Sidrauski, 1967); the third strand points to a negative effect of 
inflation on long-run growth (Stockman, 1981) and the fourth strand suggests that a 
nonlinear relationship exists where, if inflation rises above a threshold level, it has a 
negative effect on long run-growth (Huybens and Smith, 1998). This complexity has 
implications for optimal inflation policy and inflation targeting (Correa and Minella, 
2010; Nobay and Peel, 2000), and consequently, there is considerable uncertainty 
surrounding the optimal inflation rate thus calling for further research.  
Extant literature suggests a non-linear relationship between inflation and economic 
growth (Ghosh and Phillips, 1998; Judson and Orphanides, 1999; Khan and 
Senhadji, 2001; Gillman et al., 2004). However the nature of this relationship and the 
consequent inflation threshold is rather inconclusive (Ghosh and Phillips, 1998; Khan 
and Senhadji, 2001; Burdekin et al., 2004; Mubarik, 2005; Fabayo and Ajilore, 2006; 
Hodge, 2006; Fang et al., 2007; Hayat and Kalirajan, 2009; Kremer et al., 2013; 
Iqbal and Nawaz, 2009; Bick, 2010; Frimpong and Oteng-Abeyie, 2010; Quartey, 
2010; Salami and Kelikume, 2010; Sargsyan, 2005; Espinoza et al., 2010; Ayyoub et 
al., 2011; Hwang and Wu, 2011; López-Villavicencio and Mignon, 2011; Marbuah, 
2011; Mohanty et al., 2011; Morar, 2011; Bawa and Abdullahi, 2012; Adusei, 2012; 
Ahortor et al., 2012; Vinayagathasan, 2013; Rasool et al., 2014). Varying threshold 
estimates exist even for the same country and in some cases up to two thresholds 
are estimated. Mubarik (2005) and Hussain (2005), in separate studies on Pakistan 
found thresholds of 9% and 4-6% respectively. Lee and Wong (2005) estimated two 
thresholds for Japan. They concluded that while a low (lower than 2.52%) or 
moderate (between 2.52% and 9.66%) inflation rate has a significantly positive effect 
on growth, a high inflation rate (above the upper bound of 9.66%) is detrimental to 
Japan‘s economic growth. In separate studies on Nigeria, Fabayo and Ajilore (2006) 
found a 6% threshold while Ahortor et al. (2012) identified a 13% threshold.  
Similarly in Ghana huge variations exist within estimated thresholds. While Frimpong 
and Oteng-Abeyie (2010) identify a threshold of 11%, Marbuah (2011) and Ahortor et 
al. (2012) both find a 10% threshold and Quartey (2010) estimates a distinctly high 
threshold of 22.2%. Why the range of aggregate threshold estimates are so wide 
apart remains to be investigated. The wide range of threshold estimates are not 
helpful in setting optimal targets and could suggest potential estimation biases. 
Moreover, all the four studies on threshold inflation in Ghana fail to ascertain the 
direction of causality between inflation and growth and thus, a potential bias could 




exist (Khan and Senhadji, 2001). If inflation is not an exogenous variable in their 
growth-inflation regressions, then the coefficient estimates may be biased. The 
seriousness of this problem will depend, to a large extent, on whether the causality 
runs mainly from inflation to growth, in which case the endogeneity problem may not 
be serious, or the other way around, in which case a bias may be present. As argued 
by Fischer (1993), the causality is more likely to run predominantly from inflation to 
growth, in which case the problem of simultaneity bias may not be very important. 
Nonetheless, this assumption needs to be explicitly tested. 
This study thus employs the Granger causality test to identify the direction of 
causality between inflation and growth and re-estimates Ghana‘s threshold rate of 
inflation using two estimation techniques: the Threshold Autoregression (TAR), and 
Smooth Transition Regression (STR) modelling procedures. Both the TAR and STR 
methods are particularly suited to this study for four primary reasons. Firstly in TAR 
and STR modelling, an exogenously given variable, which may or may not be a 
regressor, can be used to split the sample into two or more regimes. Secondly, TAR 
and STR models are suited in situations like ours where issues of data availability 
exist. Thirdly, while the TAR approach was developed to identify abrupt changes in 
the threshold variable, the STR method is able to model both smooth and abrupt 
changes in the threshold variable, hence making both methods suited for the 
comparability of results. Finally, both methods have been very frequently utilized by 
threshold papers both in time series and panel frameworks. The obvious limitation of 
this paper is our inability to employ other equally sophisticated methods such as the 
Threshold GARCH and STR GARCH due to the lack of higher frequency data for 
Ghana. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 4.2 looks into the 
theoretical and empirical review on threshold inflation and growth, and Section 4.3 
outlines the methodology. Results follow in Section 4.4, with the conclusion and 
recommendations in Section 4.5. 
4.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
4.2.1 Theoretical models 
Considering the fundamental issues regarding the inflation-growth nexus, a variety of 
theoretical models which are grounded in neoclassical growth theory exist. 
According to Yilmaz (2010), the following three approaches effectively address the 
fundamental issues regarding the inflation-growth relationship: 
i. the money in-utility approach (MIU) 
ii. the cash-in-advance model (CIA) 
iii. the transaction costs approach (TCA) 







The MIU approach includes money into general equilibrium models by assuming that 
money yields direct utility. This model incorporates money balances into the agents‘ 
utility model. 
 




      ( )   ̇( )   ̇( )   ( ( )  ( ))    ( )  ( ( )   ) ( )   ( ) …(4.2) 
where        and ℓ are consumption, real money balances, physical capital stock 
and labour effort per capita respectively,     and   are rates of time preference, 
population growth and inflation, respectively; and   denotes lump-sum real money 
transfer payments (taxes if negative). The instantaneous utility function  ( ) is 
assumed to satisfy the conditions of                          
            While the instantaneous production function  ( ) is neoclassical, the 
Equation 4.2 denotes the flow budget constraint.  
According to Yilmaz (2010), studies that have utilized this model include Tobin 
(1965), Sidrauski (1967), Fischer (1979), and Asako (1983). Using this approach, 
Sidrauski (1967) finds that due to the neutrality of money in the long run, a rise in the 
rate of monetary expansion would raise prices but leave the capital stock and output 
level unaffected. 
The CIA model captures the role of money as a medium of exchange by requiring 
explicitly that money be used to purchase consumption and/or investment goods. 
This specification can be represented by assuming the individual faces, in addition to 
a budget constraint, CIA constraint (or liquidity), 
  ( )    ̇( )   ( ) …(4.3) 
All the consumption goods  ( ) and only a fraction   ,   - of investment 
goods  ( ), are purchased by real money balance, ( ). 
Studies that have also employed this model include Lucas (1980), Stockman (1981), 
Gomme (1993), Ireland (1994), and Dotsey and Sarte (2000). Using this approach, 
Stockman (1981) presents a model of an economy in which money complements 
capital. 
In the TCA approach, Yilmaz (2010) explains that in order to model the role of 
money in facilitating transactions, one has to assume that the purchase of goods 
requires the input of transaction services, and that these services are produced by 
money and time. The shopping time   required for given levels of consumption  , 
and real money holdings   is defined by   (   ), where  ( ) is a well-defined 
function. 







Here, the utility function is defined as 
  (     )   (       (   )) …(4.4) 
where  ( )     ( )    is leisure. 
Studies that have also employed this model include Wang and Yip (1992). 
4.2.2 Inflation–growth nexus 
The theoretical underpinnings of the inflation–growth nexus find their roots in 
classical economics growth models based on supply-side theories which strongly 
underscore the need for incentives to save and invest if an economy is to grow. 
While the Keynesian theory provides the AD–AS framework which is a more 
comprehensive model for linking inflation to growth (Snowden and Vane, 2005), the 
monetarists emphasize the role of monetary growth in determining inflation. 
Proponents of the neoclassical and endogenous growth theories also seek to 
account for the growth effects of inflation through investment and capital 
accumulation channels. A discussion on each of the above growth models in relation 
to the inflation–growth nexus is provided. 
Classical economists, building upon Smith (1776) linked supply-side theories to land, 
labour and capital as factors of production, arguing that growth exhibits increasing 
returns to scale and is thus self-reinforcing. Smith viewed savings as a creator of 
investment and hence growth, with income distribution regarded as the primary 
factor of an economy‘s growth rate. Competition of capitalists for workers and not the 
marginal productivity of labour was posited as the main factor in profit decline due to 
wage bid-ups of workers (Kaldor, 1956; Samuelson, 1959). Even though the link 
between change in price levels (inflation) and its effects on output and profit levels 
were not explicitly articulated in classical growth theories, a negative relationship 
between the two variables is implicitly suggested, being indicated by the reduction in 
firms‘ profit levels through higher wage costs (Fabayo and Ajilore, 2006). 
In support of the above, Stockman (1981) developed a neoclassical model whereby 
an individual‘s welfare declines due to increases in inflation with the resultant effect 
as a lower steady state output level. Money in this model is a complement to capital 
and is prompted by the fact that as firms put up cash in financing their investment 
projects, the cash is sometimes directly part of the financing package, whereas at 
other times, banks will require compensating balances. Stockman models this cash 
investment as a cash-in-advance restriction on both consumption and capital 
purchases, and since inflation erodes the purchasing power of money balances over 
time, people reduce their purchases of both cash goods and capital when the 
inflation rate rises. Correspondingly, a negative relationship is observed between 
inflation and the steady-state output level. 







The Neo-Keynesian‘s major development was the introduction of the concept of 
potential output, which is an economy‘s optimum level of output given its natural and 
institutional constraints. This level of output, more commonly referred to as the non-
accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU), is the economy‘s natural rate of 
unemployment – the unemployment rate at which the inflation rate is neither rising 
nor falling. In this particular framework, the built-in inflation rate is endogenously 
determined, that is, by the normal workings of the economy where inflation depends 
on the natural employment rate and actual output level (Gordon, 1997; Roberts, 
1995). Endogenous growth theories trace the inflation–growth transmission through 
capital accumulation and investment channels, particularly the rate of return on 
capital (Gillman et al., 2004) as hikes in inflation decrease the rate of return and 
capital accumulation, thereby negatively affecting growth. Alternate models in a 
monetary exchange framework by Lucas (1980) trace the inflation–growth 
transmission through returns on both human capital and capital income. Growth will 
be hampered since a tax on human capital would cause labour-to-leisure 
substitution, thereby lowering the rate of return on human capital while inflation (tax) 
on capital income directly hinders growth (McCallum and Goodfriend, 1987; Lucas 
and Stokey, 1987). 
Indeed, despite the heightened interest in the inflation–growth nexus over the last 
five to six decades, prior to the mid twentieth century, mainstream economic theory 
had been largely silent on the effect of inflation on economic growth mainly due to 
the general belief at the time that the effect of inflation on growth was not particularly 
important (Sarel, 1995). With the birth of the Phillips curve. however, academics 
began to research the existence of an inflation–unemployment trade-off, and hence 
an inflation–growth trade-off. This trade-off is grounded on a Keynesian-neoclassical 
aggregate demand and supply model in which output temporarily varies with 
changes in aggregate demand in the same direction as price levels, which suggests 
a positive inflation growth relationship, and therefore implies that if the growth is not 
jobless, then a negative Phillips curve relationship exists between inflation and 
unemployment. This hypothesis by Phillips (1958) proposed that high inflation 
produced lower unemployment, and hence higher economic growth rates. 
Conclusively, the hypothesis by Phillips was that if an economy wanted to grow and 
reduce unemployment, it had to be receptive to high inflation rates. 








Figure 3.1: The Phillips curve, unemployment and the rate of change of money 
wage rates in the United Kingdom (1861–1958)  
Source: Phillips (1958) 
This generated intense debate between monetarist and structuralist economists as 
the former argued that inflation hinders growth, while the latter suggested the 
opposite (Mallik and Chowdhury, 2001). 
In developing this theoretical framework, we begin with the three factors identified by 
Phillips (1958) that explain the rates of change of money wage rates: the level of 
unemployment, the rate of change of unemployment, and the change in retail prices. 
With respect to the level of unemployment, in an economy where labour demand 
exceeds labour supply, the rate of unemployment will be very low, and employers 
will be induced to pay higher wages in order to compete for and attract the already 
scarce labour, thereby causing wage rates to increase rapidly. In another economy 
where labour supply exceeds labour demand, workers will be inclined to offer their 
labour for less than the prevailing wage rates, thereby causing a gradual decline in 
labour wages. This scenario exhibits the non-linear relationship that exists between 
wage rates and unemployment. This can be related to an economy‘s growth since 
high inflation leads to low unemployment, causing an increase in productivity, and 
therefore bringing about higher economic growth. 
With regard to the rate of change of unemployment, in the event of a boom in a 
business cycle, unemployment will fall as a result of an increase in the demand for 
labour. Phillips explains that employers will be more eager to offer higher wages 
during this economic period than during other economic periods when 
unemployment was unchanged but demand for labour was not increasing. 
Conversely, during an economic bust, unemployment will increase as a result of a 
fall in labour demand. Employers will thus remain reluctant to increase labour wages 







during this period as workers will have less bargaining power during this economic 
bust than during another economic period when unemployment was the same but 
labour demand was not falling. 
The last factor according to Phillips is the change in retail prices, which are 
expressed through the cost of living in the economy. In the event of a big hike in 
import levels, retail prices within the economy are affected. Otherwise, they are 
negligible when import levels do not increase greatly. Phillips explains that 
anticipated increments in retail prices will have an insignificant effect since any 
adjustments to the cost of living taken on by employers will be embedded in the 
wage rates they will be willing to make to recruit additional labour in the event of an 
increase in labour demand. However, if price increments are sudden, then the jumps 
in retail prices will also be high, and adjusting the cost of living will be a considerable 
expense for employers. As wage rates rise, import and retail prices will rise higher, 
thereby initiating a recurrent wage spiral until import prices fall once again. 
Consequently, Phillips suggests that an inverse and non-linear relationship exists 
between money wage rates and unemployment, such that higher wage rates lead to 
lower unemployment. In terms of inflation and growth, rises in money wage rates 
result in inflation level increases. Lower unemployment will then lead to higher 
productivity and consequently, higher economic growth. Conclusively, the hypothesis 
by Phillips was that if an economy wanted to grow and reduce unemployment, it had 
to be receptive to high inflation rates. 
Both Mundell (1963) and Tobin (1965) support the positive inflation-growth 
relationship hypothesis by Phillips (1958). This is referred to in the literature as the 
Mundell–Tobin effect (Smithin, 2013). In his paper, Mundel (1963) argues that the 
wealth in an economy is either in money or shares, and that in the presence of 
inflation, a shift of savings from money to shares occurs. This will thus stimulate 
growth, and as such, the reverse effect on growth will occur if inflation falls. Although 
arriving at the same conclusion as Mundell (1963), Tobin (1965) employs a different 
transmission mechanism from inflation to growth by suggesting that as a result of 
increased capital stock in an economy, inflation hikes will cause an increase in the 
growth rate. In the event of price inflation, public funds are directed more towards 
financing the nation‘s budget through taxes, and less towards savings. As a result, 
the government is able to channel the funds into capital formation, thereby having a 
positive effect on economic growth. 
By the Mundell–Tobin effect, therefore, since money and capital are considered 
substitutes, inflation increments will cause an adjustment of agents‘ portfolio 
balances as money balances get shifted to capital stocks, which will thus increase 
economic activity. 







Although the above arguments were in perfect harmony with Phillips (1958), other 
authors had contrasting views regarding the inflation–growth nexus. Kormendi and 
Meguire (1985) helped to shift the then conventional and empirical knowledge on the 
inflation–growth nexus from a positive one to a negative one. Both Fischer and 
Modigliani (1978) and Stockman (1981) also had reason to suggest that inflation and 
growth are negatively related. Fischer and Modigliani (1978) indicate that in an 
economy with inflation, economic costs such as wasted time and misallocated 
resources exert a negative effect on economic growth. Stockman (1981) also 
illustrates an economy in which agents‘ wealth is divided between money and capital 
stock. The portion allocated to money is thus spent on household consumption and 
investment. However, at heightened inflationary levels, consumption inevitably 
decreases and investment increases as investments will be expected to produce 
higher returns. However, due to the lower returns on money, the net return becomes 
low. As a result, investment and capital stock fall, and the growth of the economy 
reduces because of lower consumption, lower investment, and lower capital stock. 
All in all, Friedman (1973, p. 41) regards as controversial the varied theoretical 
positions regarding the inflation–growth relationship. He states ―historically, all 
possible combinations have occurred: inflation, with and without development; no 
inflation, with and without development‖. 
The above discussions have all been on the short-run effects on inflation on 
economic growth. Further extensions to the Phillips curve were developed to also 
cater for the long-run possibilities. In this regard, Phelps (1967) and Friedman (1977) 
argue that at the natural rate of unemployment, when the both the natural and 
anticipated rates of inflation are equal, then the Phillips curve becomes vertical in the 
long run.  
They further argue that in the long run an economy will always revert to the long-run 
Phillips curve since both the actual and expected inflation rates will be equal to each 
other as a result of people‘s expectations. In support of the vertical long-run Phillips 
curve, Lucas and Rapping (1969) suggest that it is only in the short run that a 
positive inflation–unemployment relationship exists. 








Figure 4.2: The vertical long-run Phillips curve at the natural rate of 
unemployment 
Source: Friedman (1977) 
In employing a cash-in-advance model, Jones and Manuelli (1995) attempt to 
determine the long-run effect of inflation on economic growth. They posit that several 
possibilities of the effect of high inflation on growth could emerge depending on the 
particular model employed. The first possibility is that high inflation could impact 
growth positively because of the reduction of the taxes paid on capital in the face of 
rising depreciation. The opposite effect on economic growth could also occur 
because as money supply increases, nominal interest rates also increase. Tax 
credits on depreciation then fall, leading to an increase in the cost of capital. A third 
possibility depends on the effect inflation has on the choice of labour–leisure. 
Contrasting effects will occur on growth depending on whether cash and credit 
goods are complements or substitutes. If cash and credit goods are complements, 
an increase in the price of cash goods will result in a decline in the consumption of 
both kinds of goods, and will ultimately cause an increase in the demand for leisure 
goods, thereby causing a fall in the growth rate. Conversely, if cash and credit goods 
can substitute for each other, then increases in cash goods will swing consumption 
towards credit goods, thereby resulting in an initial dip in the growth rate but a 
subsequent rise in the growth rate. 
An endogenous growth model which suggests a negative inflation–growth nexus was 
also developed by Ambler and Cardia (1998). In their model, while a negative 
relationship exists in the long run only in cross-sectional studies, it exists in both the 
long and short run for time series models. In the long run, a negative relationship 
arises as a result of monetary expansion, because increments in monetary 
expansion result in higher consumption taxes, causing customers to spend more on 







leisure activities and less on consumption. Employment in the steady state thus 
decreases and results in a decline in the economy‘s growth rate. 
The close link between inflation levels and economic stability has sparked interest 
among economists to understand the causes of the underlying trends in inflation. 
Economists hold two differing views on inflation: monetarist and structuralist (Laidler, 
2014). The former tends to place more emphasis on the link between inflation and 
money while the latter underlines inflation, price-setting institutions and market 
structure. Nonetheless, some economists also hold the view that neither monetary 
nor structural factors alone can fully explain inflation, particularly in Africa. 
This monetarist–structuralist debate makes it hard to determine what actually causes 
inflation, especially in Africa where structural factors are more highlighted (Harvey, 
2012). The structuralists‘ approach emphasizes supply-side sources of inflation 
arising from rising costs of production such as rising labour cost and input prices 
(Bernanke, 2005). Demand-side factors underpinned by expansionary fiscal and 
monetary policies on the other hand explain the monetarist hypothesis (Friedman, 
1963; Hendry, 2001). 
For monetary theorists such as Friedman and Schwartz (2008), price-level stability 
most likely leads to a high rate of growth. Proponents of the institutional theory of 
inflation on the other hand are more sceptical regarding the negative relationship 
between inflation and growth (Teles and Uhlig, 2010). Although the latter assent that 
price hikes have the tendency to engender inflation, and that high inflation rates 
undermine growth, they stop short of agreeing that all price hikes initiate an 
inflationary process. 
In support, Mundell (1963) articulated a framework distinct from excess demand for 
commodities in which wealth reduces because of inflationary expectations (inertia) or 
inflation hikes. Indeed Mundell (1963) and Tobin (1965) argue that the wealth in an 
economy is either in money or shares, and that as people attempt to accumulate 
their desired level of wealth in the presence of inflation, a shift of savings from 
money to shares occurs, driving down real interest rates. Greater savings means 
greater capital accumulation, thus stimulating growth, with the reverse effect on 
growth if inflation falls. Tobin (1965) developed Mundell‘s (1963) theory further by 
incorporating money as a store of value that serves as a financial capital asset which 
causes productive economic agents to acquire more capital rather than holding on to 
idle cash balances. Thus the increasing intensity on capital stock will promote 
economic growth, essentially intimating that inflation hikes enhance economic 
growth. 
By employing an alternate transmission mechanism, Milton Friedman arrived at a 
conclusion of no effect of inflation on growth, essentially challenging the concept of 
the Phillips curve. Friedman, who coined the term ‗Monetarism‘, emphasized key 







long-run properties of the economy such as the quantity theory of money, and 
money neutrality which focused on the long-run supply-side properties of the 
economy as opposed to short-run dynamics. The quantity theory of money linked 
inflation and growth by equating the total amount of spending in the economy to the 
total amount of money in existence. Friedman proposed that inflation was the 
product of an increase in the supply or velocity of money at a rate greater than the 
rate of growth in the economy. He argued that in an economy where the cost of 
everything doubles, individuals having to pay twice as much for goods and services 
will not bother as long as their wages also double. Moreover, individuals will 
anticipate future levels of inflation and incorporate its effects into their behaviour, 
leaving output and employment unaffected.  
This concept, referred to as neutrality of money, holds if the equilibrium values of 
real variables such as output level are independent of the level of the money supply 
in the long run (Tobin, 1965). Superneutrality on the other hand holds when real 
variables are independent of the long-run money supply growth rate. Sidrauski 
(1967) with his seminal work on the context of an infinitely-lived representative agent 
model proposed another development in the neoclassical models, with money being 
superneutral. The main consequence here is that an increase in the inflation rate 
does not affect the steady state capital stock, leaving economic growth untouched. In 
summary, monetarism suggests that in the long run, prices are mainly affected by 
the growth rate in the money, and if the growth in money supply exceeds the 
economic growth rate, the result will be inflation, albeit with no real effect on growth. 
Neoclassicalists such as Swan (1956) and Solow (1956), in their attempt to explain 
growth, developed models which exhibited diminishing returns to labour and capital 
separately but constant returns to both factors jointly. They introduced changes in 
technology (the primary factor in explaining long-term growth) as a replacement for 
investment, and its level was assumed to be determined exogenously, independently 
of all other factors, including inflation (Todaro, 2000). 
If inflation had no effect on growth, then it would be harmless. In reality however, 
inflation does have real consequences for an economy‘s rate of growth by impacting 
capital accumulation, investment and exports (Yabu and Kessy, 2015; Fabayo and 
Ajilore, 2006).  
Regarding the structural view of inflation, Canavese (1982) identifies a transmission 
mechanism that is prevalent in many African and Latin American economies. He 
argues that, due to the structure of African and Latin American economies, growth in 
the industrial sector coupled with an increasing rate of urbanization results in 
changes in the amount and structure of food and raw materials demanded. Low 
agricultural sector productivity therefore fails to produce a quick response of supply 
to the new demand, with the resultant effect being hikes in the relative price of 
agricultural goods. Moreover, if industrial prices exhibit upward stickiness because of 







an oligopolistic market structure, money prices of agricultural goods will rise. 
Canavese then identifies that so-called ‗propagation elements‘ act as conduits in 
amplifying such structural inflationary pressure. Because of rising costs of living, 
wages will have to increase and thus induce rises in industrial sector production 
costs. Canavese also notes that such rises in costs cyclically engender the entire 
process described above. If benefit margins are to be kept constant, a higher money 
price is warranted for industrial goods and so a new adjustment of relative prices will 
be inevitable. The whole process assumes the existence of a passive money supply 
that assures equilibrium in money markets: an increasing money supply thus ratifies 
higher prices.  
Canavese (1982) further notes that in industrialized economies, a balance of 
payments disequilibrium develops since industrialization efforts require new and 
increasing expenditures in imports relative to income derived from exports. A slowing 
down of the growth rate of foreign demand for primary goods contributes to a 
deterioration of the terms of trade. Where autonomous compensating capital 
movements are absent, disequilibrium-correcting policies such as rate of exchange 
devaluations and/or import quotas are adopted. Changes in the relative prices of 
imported goods are the attendant consequences. Structural inflationary pressure 
appears and the so-called ‗propagation elements‘ once again amplify it through the 
economic system.  
In support, Streeten (1987) argues that the practice of applying the AD–AS model in 
explaining inflation for developing countries lacks correctness. According to him, the 
approach fails to incorporate an inherently balanced structure where substitution 
possibilities between consumption, production and inter-sectoral flows of resources 
between different sectors of the economy are not quite smooth and quick. 
Chhibber et al. (1989) also observe that the inflationary process goes beyond simple 
monetary explanation. They identified three transmission mechanisms for the 
inflationary dynamics in Zimbabwe. Firstly, cost-push factors such as nominal wage 
changes, the pass-through effect of import prices, and government price controls 
impact domestic prices directly. Secondly, excess money supply interactions with 
modes of deficit financing translate into pressure on prices and finally, unfavourable 
supply conditions lead to price pressures.  
London (1989) uses both time series data for individual countries and cross-section 
data over several African countries and finds that while the monetarist view holds in 
the cross-section equations, they fail to hold in the individual time series models for 
all the countries. Like Chhibber et al. (1989), London suggests that other non-
monetary growth factors such as output shocks arising from supply bottlenecks, and 
exchange rate depreciation help to adequately explain inflation dynamics in African 
economies. Locally, not too many studies have focused on the impacts of market 
liberalization and monetary management on domestic inflation. Sowa and Acquaye 







(1999) investigate the macroeconomic impacts of liberalization in the exchange and 
financial markets on domestic inflation in Ghana. The result shows that output and 
monetary factors contribute significantly to domestic inflation, but the contributions of 
interest rate and exchange rate are minimal. 
In developing the theoretical framework for the non-linear relationship between 
inflation and growth, we begin with Sarel (1995) who suggests that as economies 
target inflation rates below the threshold level, but greater than zero, they are able to 
avoid the negative effects of inflation on growth, and thereby achieve sustainable 
growth rates and lower unemployment in the long run. 
Billi and Khan (2008) suggest that inflation rates should be kept both low and yet at 
positive values for four fundamental reasons. Firstly, errors in measuring inflation 
could result in the officially declared inflation rate actually lying above the economy‘s 
actual inflation rate. Secondly, as a result of employees refusing nominal wage cuts, 
employers would be unable to reduce wages, thereby causing a downward rigidity in 
nominal wages. If demand increases in the presence of zero inflation, firms will be 
forced to lay off staff as they cannot offer lower wages. Therefore, real wages can 
safely be reduced without the attendant effect on nominal wages even if there is a 
small amount of inflation. Thirdly, in order to avoid deflation, which is more costly 
than inflation, governments should endeavour to maintain low and positive rates of 
inflation. During deflation, while the value of debt rises, the prices of assets fall. As a 
result, debtors will face an increased burden of repayment since the real cost of 
servicing debts also increase. Debtors will attempt to sell assets in order to settle 
their debts, which will simply cause a further fall in asset prices. Thereafter, a vicious 
cycle occurs in which the cost of debt will perpetually rise while asset values fall until 
deflation ceases. Fourthly, as inflation falls, nominal interest rates also fall. This 
suggests that as inflation attains a zero lower bound, nominal interest rates will also 
be zero, which will imply that central banks will be unable to utilize the interest rate 
tool to implement monetary policies. 
According to Tobin (1972), at the inflation threshold level, full employment occurs, 
and below full employment, prices decline and stagnate since labour supply exceeds 
labour demand. When labour demand exceeds labour supply, the economy will 
move above full employment and will witness increments in prices. 
Harris et al. (2001) suggest that the reason for the inflation–growth non-linearity is 
that at low rates of inflation, consumers use money primarily for purchases, and use 
very little credit. As a result, the demand for money is inelastic, and only becomes 
elastic as inflation rises. As long as demand remains inelastic and inflation is low, 
consumers are more likely to use money for credit, and consumption goods for 
leisure. At higher inflation rates and a more elastic demand for money, the rate of 
substitution from goods to leisure falls and is rather translated into an increase in the 
rate of substitution from money to credit. The growth rate decreases by increasingly 







smaller quantities because leisure increases at a decreasing rate. Subsequently, at 
higher rates of inflation, a larger negative impact on growth occurs than at lower 
rates of inflation. 
Huybens and Smith (1998), in modelling a small open economy, find a unique 
relationship between inflation and growth at both high and low steady states of 
inflation. They find that at the higher steady state level of inflation, when the money 
growth rate is increased, it will result in a further increase in inflation rates beyond 
levels at which capital formation becomes conducive, thereby harming economic 
growth. On the other hand, with a lower steady state of inflation, when the money 
growth rate increases, there will be an attendant increment in the steady state level 
of inflation. Huybens and Smith (1998) however suggest that this increment will be 
small enough to still accommodate capital formation. 
The uncertainty associated with high, volatile and unanticipated inflation has been 
found to be one of the main determinants of the rate of return on capital and 
investment (Bruno, 1993; Pindyck and Solimano, 1993). Indeed, inflationary 
expectations in an economy may reduce the rate of return of capital, accumulation of 
human capital, investment in research and development, and inevitably undermine 
investor confidence regarding the direction of monetary policy. This channel is the 
‗accumulation or investment channel‘ (Yabu and Kessy, 2015) (see figure 3). In the 
literature, an alternate channel exists although Briault (1995) documents that it is 
harder to formalize in a theoretical model. 
 
Figure 4.3: Transmission mechanism from inflation to growth 
Source: Li (2006), Yabu and Kessy (2015) 







Through an ‗efficiency channel‘, high inflation reduces total factor productivity by 
inducing frequent changes in price that may be costly to firms. This impacts 
consumers‘ optimal levels of cash holding and generates larger forecasting errors by 
distorting the information content of prices, encouraging economic agents to spend 
more time and resources in gathering information and protecting themselves against 
the damage that may be caused by price instability thereby jeopardizing efficient 
resource allocation (see Figure 4.1). 
Keynesian models thus provided a more comprehensive model which aptly linked 
inflation to growth under the AD–AS framework, where the AS curve is upward 
sloping in the short run so that changes in the demand side of the economy affect 
both price and output (Dornbusch et al., 1996). A strictly vertical AS curve will not 
suffice as changes on the demand side of the economy will affect only prices and not 
output.  
The AD–AS framework thus yields an adjustment path which shows an initial positive 
relationship between inflation and economic growth but eventually turns negative 
towards the latter part of the adjustment path (Dornbusch et al., 1996) (see Figure 
4.4) due to the time inconsistency problem (TIP). Under the TIP, producers feel that 
only the prices of their products have increased while the other producers are 
operating at the same price level. The relationship between inflation and growth is 
thus positive as the TIP lures the producers into more output. Moreover, Blanchard 
and Kiyotaki (1987) argue that along this section of the adjustment path, inflation and 
economic growth are positively related because of the agreement of firms to supply 
goods at a later date at pre-agreed prices, with the implication being that output will 
not decline even at increased economy-wide prices since the firm is obliged to 
produce. 
 
Figure 4.4: Unitary and double Inflation threshold levels 







Source: Fabayo and Ajilore (2006) 
Giving credence to the Keynesian model, Huybens and Smith (1998) intimate the 
existence of a threshold level of inflation above which inflation has a negative effect 
on long-run growth (Figure 4.3). π1 is the inflation threshold if only one threshold 
exists, while π0 and π1 are the two thresholds in a scenario where two thresholds 
exist. This phenomenon occurs as financial market efficiency becomes affected by 
varied informational asymmetries because in the presence of high inflation, market 
frictions are heightened, which then interfere in the effectiveness of the financial 
system in allocating resources, leading to a reduction in real returns to savings, 
increased credit rationing, and limited investment levels, thereby stifling growth. 
Empirical findings on the inflation–growth relationship over the decades have been 
mixed. Among the first authors to analyse the relationship was Bhatia (1960) who 
applied linear models to five country-specific studies with data from 1812 to 1912. 
His findings indicate that while inflation negatively impacted growth in Japan and 
Germany, it served to promote growth in Canada, Sweden and the United Kingdom, 
backing Tobin‘s (1965) assertion that inflation was good for growth. Phiri (2013), in 
his study on Zambia, agreed with the above assertion. He used a threshold 
autoregressive model and stipulated that even in the presence of moderately high 
inflation rates, economic growth will thrive nonetheless.  
Subsequent findings however were not as optimistic regarding any potential benefits 
of inflation to economic growth. Dorrance (1963, 1966) in two studies on developed 
economies found no conclusive empirical evidence for either a positive or a negative 
association between the two variables. Johnson (1967) also conducted a study on 
developing economies and came to the same conclusion as Dorrance. In the 1960s, 
chiefly due to Sidrauski (1967), the widely accepted view was that the effect of 
inflation on growth was zero, or at best negligible.  
To this day, some authors such as Freeman and Yerger (1998, 2000) maintain that 
any observed statistical relationship between inflation and growth is spurious. Their 
studies on USA and OECD countries with annual data from 1955-1993 and 1964-
1994 respectively concluded that inflation has a statistically insignificant effect on 
multifactor productivity growth. They found that a consistent relationship between 
growth and inflation failed to exist in major industrial countries. In support, Yilmaz 
(2010), using an Error Correction Model (ECM) on seasonally adjusted quarterly 
data from 1988 to 2007 found no inflation-growth relationship in Turkey. His finding 
thus supports Sidrauski‘s (1967) hypothesis of the superneutrality of money. 
Tsionas (2003a, 2003b) arrived at the same conclusion after analysing annual data 
between 1960 and 1997 for 15 European economies. Kheir-El-Din and Abou-Ali 
(2008) analysed data on Egypt and found two distinct sub-periods in their data: high 
and more volatile growth rates were associated with the high inflation periods prior to 







1991. From that year onwards, however, they found that lower and less volatile 
growth is associated with significantly lower inflation. They found no significant 
difference between the two time periods, and concluded on a non-existent inflation–
growth relationship. More recently, Narayan and Smyth (2009) and Kumar et al. 
(2012) analysed annual data for G7 countries and Australia respectively, and apart 
from the UK, where a negative effect was established, they found no evidence to 
stipulate any effect of inflation on growth. 
However, changes in the view of a neutral inflation-growth relationship came in the 
1970s and 1980s after many countries experienced severe macroeconomic crises in 
the face of high and persistent inflation. During this period, the contours of a negative 
inflation–growth relationship began to form after several studies devoted much 
attention to the nexus. Kormendi and Meguire (1985) examined a panel of 47 
countries for the period 1950-1977 and found that a 1% increase in inflation 
accounted for a 0.57 % drop in growth. Employing data from 1960-1990, Barro 
(1995) used instrumental variable estimation methods and also found a negative 
association between inflation and growth in large cross-section and panel studies 
while Smyth (1995a, 1995b) arrived at the same conclusion in country-specific 
studies on USA and Germany. Bitros and Panas (2006) and Risso and Sanchez 
Carrera (2009), in their studies on Greece and Mexico respectively, observed that 
inflation sizably reduced total factor productivity in the long run. Many other authors, 
including Adusei (2012), Joudaki et al. (2014) and Tang (2014) provided evidence 
backing Stockman‘s (1981) assertion of a statistically and significant negative 
inflation–growth relationship. 
Others however questioned whether a uniformly negative inflation–growth 
relationship could exist irrespective of how high inflation was. These included Levine 
and Renelt (1992), Fischer (1993), Bullard and Keating (1995), Bruno and Easterly 
(1998), and Clark (1997), who intimated that the negative inflation–growth 
relationship emerges only after inflation exceeds some threshold, thus making it non-
linear.  
The consensus of threshold inflation non-linearity has gained widespread empirical 
support in recent decades. However, in terms of the optimal threshold level, 
empirical evidence differs substantially across studies.  
Fischer (1993), being arguably one of the very first to examine the possible 
existence of an inflation–growth non-linearity, utilized a panel of 93 countries that 
comprised both developing and industrialized economies. He found a negative 
inflation–growth relationship and observed that the strength of the negative 
relationship tends to weaken when inflation exceeds 40%. 
Bruno and Easterly (1998) employed a non-parametric approach to examine 26 high 
inflation countries between 1961 and 1992 and found a threshold level for an 







inflation crisis to be 40%. They suggest that when high inflation countries are omitted 
from the sample, then an inconclusive inflation–growth relationship exists below the 
threshold level. 
Ghosh and Phillips (1998) used panel regressions, allowing for a non-linear 
specification on a dataset which included 145 countries over the period 1969-1996 
and found a 2.5% threshold inflation rate. For IMF member countries at low inflation 
rates, they identified that a positive inflation–growth relationship exists, and that for 
member countries at higher inflation rates, a negative inflation-growth relationship 
exists. Furthermore, their findings identify a non-linear inflation-growth relationship. 
Khan and Senhadji (2001), arguably the most seminal in this line of studies, 
employed newly introduced econometric techniques developed by Chan and Tsay 
(1998), and Hansen (1999) to analyse an unbalanced panel dataset of 140 countries 
over the period 1960-1998. The uniqueness of their study is that, unlike previous 
studies at the time which computed threshold rates for the entire panel, this study 
went further to find separate threshold inflation rates for industrialized countries on 
the one hand, and developing countries on the other hand. The study concluded that 
the threshold level is lower for industrialized economies than in developing ones. 
They found a 1-3% threshold level for industrialized countries, an 11-12% threshold 
level for developing countries, and an 11% threshold for the entire sample. 
Indeed, many more cross-country studies on threshold inflation abound in the 
literature. Yet according to Sepehri and Moshiri (2004), Hult et al. (2008), Kremer et 
al. (2013) and Van de Vijver et al. (2015), cross-country studies are widely known to 
be flawed with their inability to factor various country-specific idiosyncrasies into their 
analysis due to the generality of their findings, as most such studies merely focus on 
groupings of industrial and developing countries. Temple (2000) similarly warns 
against the risk of pooling together countries with very different inflation dynamics, as 
a few extremely high values may well derive the overall results. Furthermore, Reyes 
(2007), and Tung and Thanh (2015) point out that since each economy has 
differentiated dynamics, varied macroeconomic variables would impact each country 
differently depending on the stage of development of its current business cycle 
regime. As such, when it comes to steering sound country-specific policy decisions 
in the right direction, cross-country studies are usually handicapped. 
In all the cross-country studies above, the implicit assumption was that there existed 
only one unique structural break in the inflation–growth non-linearity nexus. As 
earlier suggested by Temple (2000) and Reyes (2007), Sepehri and Moshiri (2004) 
subsequently argued that in analysing a panel of different types of economies at 
varied stages of their growth, it is inappropriate to impose a single ‗inverted U-shape‘ 
relationship across the entire sample. In the light of this, an increasing number of 
time series studies evolved which began to focus on case studies of particular 







countries, testing for the existence of an inflation–growth threshold effect. The next 
section thus takes a look at country-specific time series studies. 
Following the threshold autoregression model of Khan and Sendhadji (2001), 
Mubarik (2005) estimated the threshold inflation rate for Pakistan using annual data 
from 1973 to 2000 and found a 9% threshold rate of inflation. Surprisingly, however, 
Hussain (2005), using data from 1973 to 2005, found no threshold effect. 
Nonetheless, Hussain suggested that an economy risks harming its growth if it 
targets inflation that exceeds the range of 4-6%. 
Lee and Wong (2005) employed the TAR estimation method introduced by Tong 
(1978) and Hansen (1996) on quarterly data from 1970-2001 from Japan and found 
two threshold levels: 2.52% and 9.66%. They thus conclude that while a low (lower 
than 2.52%) or moderate (between 2.52% and 9.66%) inflation rate has a 
significantly positive effect on growth, a high inflation rate (above the upper bound of 
9.66%) is detrimental to Japan‘s economic growth.  
Fabayo and Ajilore (2006) examined data for Nigeria from 1970-2003 and found 
evidence of a 6% threshold inflation level. In conducting sensitivity analysis, they 
confirmed the robustness of their findings, and concluded by suggesting that the goal 
of macroeconomic policy in Nigeria should be to bring inflation down to the 6% single 
digit threshold level. Ahortor et al. (2012) employed data from 1970 to 2008. After 
eliminating real exchange rates and the openness index due to poor performance 
within the model, they re-estimated a threshold rate of 13%.  
Within the context of Ghana, a number of authors have established the existence of 
a threshold level of inflation for the entire economy, above which the effect of 
inflation becomes both negative and statistically significant.  
Ahortor et al. (2012) employ annual data from 1970-2008, and the openness index 
turned out insignificant and was then deleted from the estimated model. A dynamic 
modelling approach was adopted, and after diagnostic tests were run, a threshold 
rate of 10% was estimated. 
Marbuah (2011) used Khan and Senhadji‘s (2001) threshold autoregression model 
on data from 1955-2009 and estimated 6% and 11% as the threshold rates in the 
absence of a structural break. However, after adjusting for the existence of a 
structural break, the estimated model indicates a 10% threshold rate which then 
passes robust tests with regard to the size of the sample and the estimation 
technique employed. He concluded by supporting the BOG‘s inflation targeting 
regime which stood at 7-11% at the time. 
Frimpong and Oteng-Abeyie (2010) used Khan and Senhadji‘s (2001) threshold 
regression model to analyse data from 1960-2008 and found evidence of a threshold 
effect. They estimated an 11% threshold rate at which the inflation-growth 







relationship in Ghana becomes negative. They concluded by suggesting that the 
current medium inflation target of 6-9% in Ghana is in the right direction as it is well 
below the estimated threshold level. 
Quartey (2010) investigated both the revenue maximizing and the growth maximizing 
rates of inflation using the Laffer curve approach with annual data from 1970 to 
2006. The analysis began by employing the Johansen cointegration approach to 
determine the effect of inflation on long-term economic growth. Inflation was found to 
negatively affect growth, and the subsequent threshold estimations indicated a 
growth maximizing inflation rate of 22.2%. Although his finding fails to agree with the 
earlier study of Frimpong and Oteng-Abeyie (2010), Quartey went on to conclude 
that the growth maximizing rate of inflation for Ghana is not a single digit, and as 
such, much more careful consideration should be given to monetary policy that 
seeks to achieve single digit inflation in Ghana 
4.3 METHODOLOGY 
Data is sourced from the Ghana Statistical Service (GSS), and the World Bank‘s 
2016 World Development Indicators (WDI). We employ annual data from 1970-2015. 
We follow Levine and Renelt (1992), Fischer (1993), Sarel (1995) and Sala-i-Martin 
(1997) and define an output model of the form: 
 ),,,,( TOPPOPGRFDGFCFCPIfGROWTH   …(4.5) 
where        = growth rate of real GDP,     = consumer price index,      = 
investment,    = Financial Sector Depth9,       = human capital, and     = trade 
openness10. 
Two commonly employed measures of inflation are the percentage change in CPI 
and the GDP implicit price deflator. Sarel (1995) suggests however that in order to 
reduce the problem of negative correlation between inflation and growth rates, it is 
better to employ data on the former since changes in GDP deflators are, by their 
construction, negatively correlated with GDP growth rates. CPI is calculated 
independently of output volume, and as such, their usage in this manner of studies 
will prevent the problem of negative correlation.  
A large body of literature reveals human capital as one of the most important factors 
of economic growth (Pelinescu, 2015). Extant literature emphasizes the role of 
human capital in the form of educational attainment by its influence on production 
through labour productivity (Romer, 1990; Mankiw et al., 1992) and by contributing to 
                                                          
9
 This is the ratio of broad money (currency outside banks + demand deposits + time, savings, and 
foreign currency deposits + bank and traveller‘s cheques + certificates of deposit + commercial paper) 
to GDP. 
10
 Trade ratio is used to capture trade openness and is computed as ((export+import)/GDP), see 
Odhiambo et al. (2004). 







increased competitive advantage through innovation and diffusion technology 
(Pistorius, 2004; Siggel, 2001; Horwitz, 2005). Human capital is typically captured by 
school enrolment variables. In our study, however, the results from using such 
variables show no regime-switching effects. We therefore employ the growth rate of 
labour force as a suitable replacement and proxy it with the growth rate of Ghana‘s 
population. 
Population growth rates and growth rates of investment are used as control variables 
due to their authenticity in empirical literature on growth (Mubarik, 2005). Solow 
(1956) and Swan (1956), who developed the first neoclassical models of growth, 
take the rate of growth of population as one of the exogenous variables in their 
model to show that the faster the rate of population growth, the poorer the country.  
Fischer (1993) included investment in his model to show that inflation reduces 
growth by reducing investment and productivity growth. Mankiw et al. (1990) also 
include investment growth and population growth in their growth model. Sims (1980) 
found that the rapid increase of money supply affects the real output through the 
industrial production index. 
We employ terms of trade data to eliminate the negative correlation between growth 
and inflation that is caused by external supply shocks (Fischer, 1993; Sarel, 1995). 
Khan and Senhadji (2001) include terms of trade data in their model, while in Sala-i-
Martin (1997) and Levine and Renelt (1992), it is one of the few variables to have 
passed the myriad tests for robustness. This variable captures the degree of 
openness in the economy and reflects varying policy episodes. 
We then consider the regression Equation 4.6 below which is the standard linear 
model of Equation 4.5: 
 
ttttttt TOPPOPGRFDGFCFCPIGROWTH   543210  …(4.6) 
where t is the associated error term assumed as in the usual fashion to be serially 
uncorrelated with zero mean and constant variance. 
As discussed above, however, a myriad recent studies predict the presence of 
threshold effects associated with rates of inflation above or below certain critical 
values, implying a non-linear relationship between economic growth and inflation 
(Boyd et al., 2001; Munir and Mansur, 2009). Thus, discussed below are peculiar 
econometric issues pertaining to the estimation and inference of economic models 
with threshold effects. 
The TAR model, introduced by Tong (1978) and further developed by Hansen (1996; 
2000), presents tests for threshold effects, threshold parameter estimation, and the 
identification of threshold parameter asymptotic confidence intervals. The concept 







behind these tests by Hansen (2000) is that an exogenously given variable,11 which 
may or may not be a regressor, is used to split the sample into two regimes. More 
distinctly, we consider a two-regime structural equation in a TAR model: 
 kFIifexy ttt  11t '  …(4.7) 
 kFIifexy ttt  12t '  …(4.8) 
where   ,    and    denote the regime-splitting threshold variable, the 
dependent, and explanatory variables (m vector) respectively,     is the error 
term white-noise     properties, and   is the threshold value or parameter. Prior 
knowledge of   permits an OLS estimation, however since the threshold value is not 
known a priori, it has to be estimated in addition to other parameters. We further note 
that when the threshold variable is greater than the threshold parameter, the model 
estimates Equation 4.6. Conversely, the model estimates Equation 4.7 when the 
reverse is the case. 
Defining a binary variable   ( )  *     + where *+ is the indicator function, 
with  * +              * +         , and setting   ( )      ( ), then 
Equations 4.7 and 4.8 can be rewritten as a single equation: 
 
ttt ekxxy  )(''t   …(4.9) 
where             , and  ,   and   are the regression parameters to be 
estimated. The post estimation sum of squared residuals (SSR) can be written as: 
 )(ˆ)'(ˆ)(1 kekekS tt  …(4.10) 
The least squares technique is recommended by Hansen (1996; 2000) in estimating 
the threshold parameter  , and Munir and Mansur (2009) note that the minimization 
of SSR as a function of the expected threshold value is the easiest approach to 
implementing Hansen‘s recommendation. We can thus write the optimal threshold 
value as: 
 )(minargˆ 1 kSk   …(4.11) 
Conditional on  ̂, the regression equation is linear in   and   , giving rise to the 
conditional OLS estimates of  ̂( ) and  ̂( ) by regression of dependent variable on 
explanatory variables. Following Khan and Senhadji (2001) and the foregoing 
procedure, the linear equation (2) can be expressed as a nonlinear equation under a 
two-regime TAR model as follows: 
                                                          
11
 This variable is known as the threshold variable. 








titit XkFIDFIGROWTH   2210t )(  …(4.12) 
where the dummy variable,  , is defined as   * +              * +          itX  
is a vector of control variables which include: 
TOPandPOPGRFDGFCFFI ,,, where        = log difference of output,    = 
log difference of CPI,      = investment growth rate,    = financial sector depth, 
      = labour force growth rate, and     = trade ratio.  
Apart from POPGR and FI12, we expect all the other variables to be positively 
signed. 
Given that Ghana is an open economy with a flexible exchange rate, it is appropriate 
to control for supply shocks such as import prices or the exchange rate. In our 
analysis, we implicitly account for these factors by allowing for variations in the 
variance of the error term of the estimated equation (Kabundi et al., 2015).  
From Equation 4.12, the optimal threshold value can be determined by obtaining the 
threshold value that minimizes the RSS. The threshold variable employed in the 
analysis is inflation since the primary goal of this paper is to investigate the 
inflationary threshold effects in the relationship between sectoral inflation and output. 
Whether or not a threshold effect exists is the main focus of Equation 4.12. This 
requires the examination between both the linear and two-regime model. Thus, the 
null hypothesis of no threshold effect
 
(                        )
 
is tested 
against an alternative hypothesis where a threshold effect is present
 
(          )  
Conventional hypothesis testing procedures cannot be employed here since under 
the null hypothesis of an absence of a threshold effect, the threshold parameter   will 
be unidentified. To overcome this, Hansen (1996) suggests a standard 
heteroscedasticity-consistent Lagrange Multiplier (LM) bootstrap method to calculate 
the asymptotic critical and p-values. A test with near-optimal power against 











  …(4.13) 
where    and    respectively are SSR under the null and alternative of      
                  . The residual variance  ̂





  ( ̂̂)
 
. Hansen 
                                                          
12
 In a scenario of one threshold, FI is expected to be positive and insignificant at low levels of 
inflation, and then later become negative and significant as inflation rises. In a scenario of two 
thresholds however, FI is expected to initially be negative and insignificant at the lowest levels of 
inflation, and then become positive and significant as inflation rises, but finally revert to being negative 
at the highest levels of inflation 







(1996) shows that a bootstrap procedure achieves the first-order asymptotic 
distribution, so the bootstrap p-values are asymptotically valid.  
Having estimated the threshold effect, the next step is to determine whether the 
estimate is statistically significant (                        ). In this case the 
estimate  ̂ is consistent for the true value of  , say   . Since the asymptotic 
distribution of the threshold estimate  ̂ is highly non-standard, Hansen (2000) uses 
the likelihood ratio statistic for the tests on   to form confidence intervals for  . The 













  …(1) 
where   ( ) and   ( ̂) are the sums of the squared residuals from Equation 4.10 
given the true and estimated value, respectively. The null hypothesis is rejected for 
large values of     (  ). Hansen (2000) showed that there is an asymptotic 
distribution of    (  ) to form valid asymptotic confidence intervals for  . Hansen 
(2000) demonstrates that the distribution function has the inverse  ( )        (  
√   ) from which it is easy to calculate critical values. Where   is a given 
asymptotic level then the no-rejection region of the confidence level is    . In other 
words, if    (  )   ( ) then the null hypothesis of         cannot be rejected.  
Munir and Mansur (2009) posit that in order to examine more than one threshold 
value, the foregoing procedures should be applied until the null hypothesis can no 
longer be rejected. Thus, we follow Crespo Cuaresma and Silgone (2014), who 
suggest the possible existence of two thresholds in such growth regressions, and we 
specify an alternative model as such: 
 
titit XKFIDFIGROWTH   2210t )(  …(4.15) 
where the dummy variable,  , is defined as   * +                  * +        
          where    and    are the lower and upper bounds of the threshold band 
of inflation. 
This study employs Mubarik‘s (2005) graphical test as a preliminary procedure, to 
provide a more precise picture of the historical nature of the relationship between 
inflation and agricultural sector output. This procedure involves sorting inflation rates 
in order of magnitude, either ascending or descending. We are interested in 
obtaining the average growth rate at each linear level of inflation. Thus we divide the 
entire data sample into a smaller number of observations which must correspond 
with the number of linear levels of inflation in the data. Average growth rates for each 
linear level of inflation are then calculated and a graph is plotted with the linear levels 
of inflation and average growth rates as the X and Y axes respectively. In line with 







the BOG‘s inflation targeting band as ±2% of the BOG‘s optimal inflation rate of 8%, 
we also employ a maximum width of ±2% to each linear level of inflation (see Figure 
4.4). This preliminary test also helps indicate a plausible existence or otherwise of an 
inflation threshold within the data. Descriptive statistics (Table 4.1) and the 
correlation table13 (Table 4.2) are presented below.  
Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics 





 Mean 23.18 0.70 17.40 23.33 16.57 0.57 
 Median 23.06 1.26 18.34 23.26 16.58 0.57 
 Maximum 24.27 5.19 23.08 34.11 17.13 1.16 
 Minimum 22.56 -6.10 10.10 11.30 15.99 0.06 
 Std. Dev. 0.52 3.57 4.42 6.56 0.34 0.30 
 Skewness 0.68 -0.57 -0.28 -0.11 -0.04 0.13 
 Kurtosis 2.24 2.08 1.64 1.92 1.75 1.85 
       
 Jarque-Bera 4.52 4.02 4.05 2.27 2.93 2.58 
 Probability 0.10 0.13 0.13 0.32 0.23 0.27 
 Sum 1043.11 31.68 782.84 1049.93 745.44 25.79 
Observations 45 45 45 45 45 45 
Source: Authors‘ computation 
Note: Data for GDP, CPI, Investment and Population size are logged. 
Table 3.2: Correlation table 






GDP 1      
CPI -0.4729 1     
 (0.001)      
Investment 0.9473 -0.5167 1    
 (0.00) (0.0003)     
Financial development 0.4938 -0.3423 0.6182 1   
 (0.0006) (0.0214) (0.00)    
Population size 0.9601 -0.4412 0.9474 0.6088 1  
                                                          
13
 Spearman rank is preferred to the Pearson correlation coefficient since unlike the Pearson, the 
Spearman rank does not require all variables be normally distributed (see Mukaka, 2012).  







 (0.00) (0.0024) (0.00) (0.00)   
Trade ratio 0.7484 -0.4332 0.851 0.725 0.8364 1 
 (0.00) (0.003) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  
Source: Authors‘ computation using Spearman‘s rank.  
Note: Values in () are the p-values. 
4.4 RESULTS 
In testing for unit roots, nonlinearity may impact inflation in the form of structural 
breaks, leading to the erroneous acceptance of nonstationarity (Arize and 
Malindretos, 2012). We cater for this by employing the Zivot Andrews (ZA) unit root 
test which accounts for possible structural breaks in the data. From the results 
below, the null hypothesis of a unit root with a structural break is not rejected, 
implying that the variables are I(1) or not stationary14 (see Table 4.3). For our 
subsequent estimations, we therefore employ first differencing to our variables. 
Table 4.3: Zivot Andrews unit root test results 
Variable Break in constant Break in trend Break in both 
CPI  -5.2941** n/a -7.1535*** 
 (1985) () (1984) 
Investment 0.1903 -5.6613*** -4.5056 
 (2009) (2006) (2003) 
Financial Development -3.7701 -3.8236 n/a 
 (1979) (1984) () 
Population size  -3.7044 -7.4434*** -7.5138*** 
 (1988) (2000) (2000) 
Trade ratio -4.7073* -3.9612 -4.3244 
 (2006) (2001) (1996) 
 
Note:  ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.  
 Values in () are the suggested break dates.  
 n/a implies that the ZA test could not compute the t-statistics. 
We then employ the Granger causality test to deal with the unique failure of previous 
Ghana-specific papers in failing to test for the direction of causality between inflation 
and growth. The test result below (see Table 4.4) indicates a one-way causality from 
inflation to growth, which supports the assertion by Fischer (1993) that causality is 
more likely to run from inflation to growth. 
                                                          
14
 This result obviously does not hold for CPI which is strongly I(0). 







Table 4.4: Pairwise Granger causality test 
 Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
 CPI does not Granger Cause Output  43  6.4444 0.0039 
 Output does not Granger Cause CPI   2.3529 0.1088 
Source: Authors‘ computation (using lag 2) 
Figure 4.5 below also shows results of Mubarik‘s (2005) graphical test. The findings 
suggest a unitary sectoral threshold of approximately (10±2)% for the sector thereby 
verifying our assumption that the sector‘s threshold lies outside the Central Bank‘s 
aggregate inflation target of [8±2]%. 
More interestingly, at the central bank‘s preferred inflation target, output is lower than 
at (10±2)%. As inflation builds up, output is indeed adversely affected. 
 
Figure 4.5: Average growth at linear level of inflation  
While the above graphical test indicates a threshold which seems to support our 
initial a priori hypothesis, we still go further to employ Hansen‘s (1996, 1999) 
likelihood ratio test, and Khan and Senhadji‘s (2001) threshold test. As discussed 
above, in testing for the existence of a threshold effect in our data, we employ the 
likelihood ratio (LR) test as given in Equation 4.13, where         implies a null of 
no threshold effect. This test involves iteratively estimating Equation 4.12 across all 
inflation values and obtaining the minimum sum of squares residual (SSR) from 
Equation 4.11. A simple linear form of Equation 4.12 is also estimated, and its SSR 
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from Equation 4.11 becomes the subtrahend, with the denominator of 4.13 being the 
bootstrapped variance of   15. The LR test results are summarized below. 
Table 4.5: Test results of threshold effects 
Sample Size Critical Value Probability 
36 6.53 0.0000 
Source: Authors‘ computation 
The null hypothesis of no threshold effects is rejected at the 1% significance level, 
strongly supporting the existence of threshold effects within Ghana‘s inflation. 
Subsequent estimation and results are presented below. 
From Table 4.5 below, a threshold of 10.98% is identified, confirming our earlier 
finding from Figure 4.5. Besides the obvious discovery that the threshold lies outside 
the targeted aggregate band of the entire economy, another crucial finding is that our 
estimate is a single point of inflation, and not a range or band, like the central bank 
currently employs. It is also worth pointing out that within the first regime, the 
coefficient of inflation is not significant (p-value=0.1261). This however is not a 
problem at all since according to Sarel (1995), we actually expect the probability 
value to be statistically insignificant at low levels of inflation. As stated earlier, a key 
drawback in this study is the paucity of data for Ghana. Within the first regime, 
therefore, the inadequate sample size of 8 observations below the threshold value 
makes it impossible to produce coefficients for the control variables. 
Table 4.6: Single threshold estimate on quarterly data 
 Linear model  Threshold model 
Variables (OLS without 
threshold) 




C 0.14 (0.03)***  n/a 0.10 (0.04)*** 
Inflation -0.31 (0.10) ***  0.68 (0.44) -0.23 (0.10) ** 
Gross Fixed Capital 
Formation 
0.24 (0.06) *** 
 n/a 0.23 (0.06) *** 
Financial development -0.71 (0.15) ***  n/a -0.70 (0.14) *** 
Population size -0.43 (0.21) **  n/a -0.44 (0.20) ** 
Trade ratio -0.31 (0.07) ***  n/a -0.30 (0.07) *** 
Observations 44  8 36 
                                                          
15
 Hansen (1999) intimates that the LR-statistic in (9) does not depend on the parameter    under the 
null of no threshold effect, so any value of     may be used. In our case, we select the   of inflation 
since that is our main variable of interest. 








Notes: The dependent variable is the output growth rate. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. The estimation results correspond to trimming percentage of 15%. ***, 
**, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively 
The expected signs and corresponding significance levels are observed for the 
investment and population variables. However, financial development has a negative 
sign which could possibly be the result of how this variable was measured. The 
Ghanaian economy has always been a cash-driven economy, and as a result, it will 
be expected that initial efforts to switch it to a cashless one may not necessarily be 
rewarded by an instantaneous increase in output. One will therefore expect a 
positive financial development variable to be observed only after a couple of years of 
heightened financial deepening.  
The trade ratio variable bears a significantly negative coefficient, which leads us to 
dig deeper into the trade dynamics of the Ghanaian economy. Harrison (1996) posits 
that openness is associated with both higher output growth as well as higher returns 
to human capital. However, the link (and effect of trade on growth) could be 
ambiguous (Frankel and Romer, 1999; Rodriguez and Rodrik, 2000). Trade can 
increase output through enhanced foreign exchange and productivity gains from 
exports, and enhanced productivity and technological efficiency from imports of 
intermediate goods/machinery, health products and technology. This positive effect 
also depends on the effect on domestic production dynamics. Increased trade that 
enhances domestic production competition can adversely affect non-tradeable goods 
(i.e. goods that are not tradeable on the international market), of which the 
agricultural sector, which is the dominant sector in Ghana, falls under. It is therefore 
possible this could give rise to a negative net effect in the aggregate economy given 
that agricultural production will shift into more tradeable goods at the expense of the 
production of non-tradeable (food) goods, in the face of increased openness. 
Figure 4.6 below illustrates the estimated inflation threshold against the actual 
inflation target currently pursued in Ghana – a wide discrepancy is observed. 
Moreover, it seems to suggest a pattern of increasing inflation during each election 
year, which in itself could be an indication of built-up inflationary inertia from an 
election period. 








Figure 4.6: Diagrammatic representation of Inflation16, and the estimated 
inflation rate lying outside the aggregate inflation target  
In ensuring robustness of our earlier findings, we employ here the Smooth Transition 
Regression (STR) method developed by Teräsvirta (1998). Indeed, TAR is 
developed to identify abrupt changes in the threshold variable, while STR is able to 
model both smooth and abrupt changes in the threshold variable (Reyes, 2004). 
Moreover, both TAR and STR are widely used in univariate frameworks.  
One downside of STR identified in the literature is the cumbersome computation of 
some of its diagnostic tests which essentially make the STR end up as a TAR 
(Reyes, 2004). Eitrheim and Teräsvirta (1996) also note that the moment matrix of 
regressors in the auxiliary regressions used in computing the test statistics 
effectively become singular. 














0  …(4.16) 
where ty is the dependent variable, tix  are the observations on   explanatory 
variables, for         (with the option of incorporating lags of the dependent 
variable), t is an independent and identically distributed disturbance, with mean 
zero and variance   , while )( tzF  is a transition function between regimes. 
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 Inflation trend line is read against the left vertical axis, with all other trend lines read against the 
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We test for linearity in our model, with a null of linearity )...,,1,0( 321 niiii  

























0  …(2) 
From Table 4.6 below, the null hypothesis of linearity is rejected at the 5% 
significance level, strongly supporting the existence of a nonlinear STR specification. 
Table 4.7: Test for linearity in Smooth Transition Regression 
 LM statistic P-value 
Transition variable: Cubic expansion 29.713 0.008 
Table 4.7 shows the test for transition significance in our variable of interest under a 
null of insignificance of the transition variable. The results indicate that the inflation 
variable significantly possesses properties of being a transition variable in our model. 
Table 4.8: Test for significance in transition variable 
 F-statistic P-value 
Inflation 10.376 0.000 
STR estimation results are presented in Table 4.8. A threshold of 10.96% is 
identified, comparing very favourably with our earlier TAR estimate of 10.98%. A 
high p-value in STR models (as in column 4 of table 4.8) suggests that a TAR model 
may be preferred in identifying the threshold (Ronderos, 2015). 
Table 4.9: Smooth Transition Regression estimation results 
Variable Coefficient Standard error P-value 
Inflation 0.1096 0.4611 0.8136 
We conclude our analysis by estimating transition probabilities (Table 4.9) between 
high and low inflation17 regimes, as well as expected durations (Table 12) of those 
regimes by employing a Markov switching model as per Kim and Nelson (1999). 












  High inflation Low inflation 
High inflation 0.9433 0.0567 
Low inflation 0.9736 0.0265 
                                                          
17
 We define high inflation as inflation above the estimated threshold rate and vice versa. 
18
 Rows denote initial states and columns denote end states 







The results from Table 4.9 indicate an almost definite chance (97%) of a high 
inflation regime succeeding a low inflationary period. Furthermore, a minimal chance 
(3%) is estimated of a low inflation period succeeding a previously low inflation 
period. A high expectation is estimated for a high inflation era to succeed itself, and 
indeed only a one in twenty chance is given for a high inflation regime to give way to 
a low inflationary period. These findings thus suggest dire consequences for prices 
of goods and services in Ghana by providing evidence for a very strong upward 
rigidity in Ghana‘s prices. 
Table 4.11: Expected durations of inflation 
High Inflation Low Inflation 
37.7689 1.0601 
Having established upward price rigidity, we are interested in determining how long 
or short prices will be expected to remain in each regime. Results from Table 4.10 
imply an expected duration of over 37 years for high inflationary periods while lower 
inflation is expected to last for merely one year. These findings speak to our earlier 
discussion on inflation persistence being a bane for the Ghanaian economy. Indeed, 
urgent action needs to be taken to salvage Ghana‘s economy from the ill effects of 
high and persistent inflation.  
4.5 CONCLUSION 
In this study, we have tested for the presence of threshold effects in Ghana‘s 
headline inflation. We employed regime switching TAR and STR models in 
identifying the inflation thresholds and its effects on output growth. We further 
employed Markov switching models to determine expected state-dependent 
durations of inflationary spells as well as expected switching probabilities of 
inflationary regimes in the Ghanaian economy. We adopted Mubarik‘s (2005) 
graphical test to the case of Ghana to preliminarily identify the possible existence of 
a threshold rate of inflation. We used annual time series data from 1970 to 2015 and 
the following conclusions emerged from the study.  
After employing the TAR and STR models, we find an 11% inflation threshold level, 
which marginally lies outside the targeted 6% to 10% inflation targeting band for the 
Ghanaian economy. Taken in isolation, this may not be a major source for concern. 
However, we also find that there exists a 97% chance of a high inflation regime 
succeeding a low inflationary period. Furthermore, only a 3% chance is estimated of 
a low inflation period succeeding a previously low inflation period. This indicates that 
the Ghanaian economy is inclined towards high levels of inflation, suggesting 
therefore that if urgent steps are not taken to reduce inflationary levels now, inflation 
will only get harder to curb as time goes by. 







Furthermore, we find that in the Ghanaian economy, there is a 94% chance of 
succession from a high inflationary period to another high inflationary period and only 
a 6% chance of transition from a high inflation era to a low one. These findings thus 
provide evidence for a very strong upward rigidity in Ghana‘s price levels. Long term 
implications arise for Ghana‘s import and export markets since imported goods may 
turn out to be less costly than locally produced Ghanaian commodities. 
We also find that once the Ghanaian economy enters a high inflationary period, it will 
take approximately 37 years for the economy to exit the high inflation spell. In the 
case of low inflation, we estimate that the Ghanaian economy can sustain a 
continuously low inflation era for no more than one year. These findings suggest a 
problem of inflation persistence within the Ghanaian economy. Indeed, urgent action 
needs to be taken to salvage Ghana‘s economy from the ill effects of such high and 
persistent inflation. 
  








INFLATION PERSISTENCE IN GHANA: 
AGGREGATE AND SECTORAL LEVEL ANALYSES19 
Abstract 
This paper examines Inflation Persistence (IP) in Ghana by employing Stock‘s 
(1991) 95% confidence interval for the largest root of the auto regression. We 
identify a reduction in IP during low and stable inflationary episodes in Ghana, as 
well as an increase in persistence during higher levels of inflation. We also adopt 
Dornbusch-Fisher‘s (1993) framework in mapping out moderate persistent inflation 
spells and find that the Structural Adjustment Program of the 1980s and the inflation 
targeting framework in 2007 both led to reductions in IP. At the sectoral level, 
Ghana‘s food sector is the most affected by IP. We empirically examine the 
effectiveness of historical policy interventions on aggregate and sectoral IP and find 
dwindling levels of effectiveness over time. Lastly we compare Ghana‘s inflation 
persistence with other economies and conclude that in pursuing single digit inflation, 
policy makers should continuously monitor inflation persistence. Based on its 
findings, this paper implies that sectoral inflation data subscribes to the non-linearity 
strand of inflation-growth literature. 
 
JEL classification: E31; E52; C22 
 
Key words: Inflation, Persistence, Sector-Specific, Ghana 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Inflation persistence has been a problem in many developing countries and Ghana is 
no exception (Phiri, 2016; Gerlach and Tillmann, 2012; Ocran, 2007; Vega and 
Winkelried, 2005). As one of the earliest economies (if not the first) to have had 
recurring challenges with high and persistent inflation, a significant number of studies 
exist on inflation in Ghana.  
However, most if not all explain factors influencing inflation and/or its effects on the 
economy and dwell less on inflation persistence (Sowa and Kwakye, 1993, 1994; 
Sowa 1994, 1996; Boafo-Arthur, 1999; Ocran, 2007; Marbuah, 2011). Furthermore, 
no study on Ghana accounts for inflation persistence in modelling sectoral dynamics. 
Reyes (2007), and Tung and Thanh (2015) note that an economy has differentiated 
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dynamics hence failure to account for such dynamics usually result in handicapped 
policy decisions. Heintz and Ndikumana (2010) and Chaudhry et al. (2013) reinforce 
the above assertion for countries with strong regional variations. 
In low income countries like Ghana, Walsh (2011) posits that food price inflation is 
more volatile, more persistent, and higher on average than non-food inflation. 
However in the Ghanaian economy, as we will prove later, only the first two hold. 
Given such a unique context, it is plausible that sectoral dynamics in Ghana may not 
follow conventional economic thinking with regard to inflation, and thus a shift from 
aggregate thinking to sectoral research is warranted particularly since each sector 
has economic drivers different from the other. 
Inflation persistence is sometimes defined as the tendency for price shocks to push 
the inflation rate away from its steady state—including an inflation target—for a 
prolonged period (Roache, 2014; Fuhrer and Moore, 1995). For example, when the 
unemployment rate deviates significantly from its ‗natural‘ rate, most economists 
would not expect it to return immediately. Persistence is important because it affects 
the output costs of lowering inflation back to the target, often described as the 
―sacrifice ratio‖. Equivalently, the lower is persistence the greater is ―policy space,‖ 
defined as the ability of monetary policy to accommodate temporary price shocks. 
Countries with high persistence and low policy space may need to adjust 
macroeconomic policies in a material way to price shocks given that they influence 
overall inflation and inflation expectations for a sustained period. Failure to 
incorporate this ‗inflation persistence‘ in economic modelling can produce misleading 
policy prescriptions. 
This is a reduced form interpretation of persistence and does not provide a structural 
explanation. Persistence may change due to a number of structural reasons, 
including: inertia in the underlying ―driving process,‖ such as marginal costs or the 
output gap; the policymaker‘s reaction function to price or output shocks; and inertia 
intrinsic to the inflation process itself. Recent studies, notably Fuhrer (2010), suggest 
that intrinsic factors may be the most important explanation for large changes in 
persistence. The likely pivotal role of intrinsic persistence is of particular importance 
for Ghana given its long history of high and variable levels of inflation. 
Persistence in inflation may arise for several reasons, including the inertia that wage 
and price contracts impart to the inflation rate, the inertia that slowly adjusting 
expectations may impart to inflation, or the inertia that imperfect credibility may 
impart to inflation (Fuhrer and Moore, 1995). Different sources of inflation 
persistence bear different implications for the conduct of monetary policy. If inflation 
persistence arises from a lack of central bank credibility, then the central bank 
should determine whether and how it can improve its credibility. If persistence arises 
from other aspects of price-setting behaviour, then monetary policy must adopt 
behavioural changes (Fuhrer and Moore, 1995).  







In this paper we adopt a structuralist approach to inflation persistence by examining 
a cost factor and time-varying approaches for robustness. We hypothesize that the 
extent to which a firm in a particular sector matches an increase in either its costs 
and/or its competitor‘s prices by increasing its own price depends on how persistent 
the increase will be expected to be. In other words, we posit that low and more 
stable inflation should be associated with less persistent inflation. We also do a 
comparative analysis of inflation persistence for four countries that have adopted 
Inflation targeting: Ghana, Nigeria, South Africa, and New Zealand. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 5.2 delves into the 
literature review while Section 5.3 outlines the methodology. Results follow in 
Section 5.4, with and the conclusion and recommendations in Section 5.5. 
5.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Economists for several decades had been in consensus with regard to inflation being 
an inertial or persistent economic variable. Gordon et al. (1982) introduced the 
concept of a sacrifice ratio – the number of point-years of elevated unemployment 
required to reduce inflation by a percentage point – implying that inflation does not 
move freely, but requires significant economic effort in the form of lost output to 
reduce its level. Early attempts at modelling this apparent inertia within the 
framework of the Phillips curve included lags of inflation. Gordon‘s ―triangle model‖ of 














Inflation    depends on its own lags
20, a measure of real activity (in this case the 
deviation of unemployment,   from the NAIRU), and supply-shifters such as key 
price shifts, summarized in   . In such a model, inflation moves gradually, partially 
anchored by its recent history, in response to real activity and supply shocks. If these 
other variables are themselves persistent, inflation may inherit some of their 
persistence.  
A key question is whether and why inflation has its own or ―intrinsic" persistence, 
beyond that inherited from   and     (or perhaps    if it is also serially correlated). If 
inflation exhibits intrinsic persistence, then a model of inflation may require the 
equivalent of the lags in Equation 2.8 above. The inclusion of lags of inflation in such 
a model is justified both empirically and theoretically (Fuhrer, 2010). On the empirical 
front, the lags help the model fit the data. Theoretically, the inclusion of lags is a 
proxy for expected inflation, for contracting and for other price-setting functions. 
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With regard to rational expectations and inflation persistence, the introduction of 
Muth‘s (1961) rational expectations theory into the macroeconomics literature and 
the consequent move toward explicit modelling of expectations posed considerable 
challenges in modelling prices and inflation. In the earliest rational expectations 
models of Lucas (1972) and Sargent and Wallace (1975), the price level was a 
purely forward-looking or expectations-based variable like an asset price, which in 
these models implied that prices were flexible and could ―jump" in response to 
shocks. A number of economists recognized the tension between the obvious 
persistence in the price level data and the implications of these early rational 
expectations models.  
Fischer (1977), Gray (1976), Taylor (1980), Calvo (1983), and Rotemberg (1982, 
1983) developed a sequence of models that rely on nominal price contracting in 
attempts to impart a data-consistent degree of inertia to the price level in a rational 
expectations setting. The overlapping contracts of Taylor and Calvo/Rotemberg were 
successful in doing so, allowing contracts negotiated in period   to be affected by 
contracts set in neighbouring periods, which would remain in effect during the term of 
the current contract. The subsequent trajectory of macroeconomic research drew 
heavily on these seminal contributors, who had neatly reconciled rational 
expectations with inertial (or persistent) macroeconomic time series. 
Theoretical underpinnings of the effect of the general inflationary environment on the 
pricing behaviour of firms in a sector make use of two strands of economic research: 
monetary theory and the theory of price setting with imperfect competition (Taylor, 
2000). Theories of price adjustment readily accommodate models of imperfect 
competition in which firms have some market power (Arrow, 1959). Blanchard and 
Kiyotaki (1987) and Svensson (1986) show the importance of such theories in 
macroeconomic models. 
In an economy facing demand pressures, a decline in pricing power is often cited as 
a potential explanation for benign inflationary levels as firms will hold back price or 
wage increases which typically will be associated with low unemployment and high 
levels of capacity utilization. Taylor (2000) argues that in such a low inflation 
environment, employers are reluctant to pass on cost increases to customers, and in 
doing so, will vehemently resist worker demands for wage increments due to their 
loss of pricing power. Moreover, firms fear that any attempts to increase their prices 
may backfire and lead to them losing market share and profits since their 
competitors may not necessarily follow suit.  
This view was widely held in explaining a phenomenon particularly experienced in 
the United States in the late 1990s. Estimates of the growth rate of potential GDP 
during the period fell well below the actual. By the start of 1999, the gap had risen to 
3% while the unemployment rate had declined to levels well below estimates of the 
natural rate of unemployment. Despite all this, there was no evidence of increased 







wage inflation and, most importantly, the overall inflation rate kept plummeting 
throughout the entire period. Greenspan (1999) summarizes this experience by 
stating that because neither business firms nor their competitors can currently count 
any longer on a general inflationary tendency to validate decisions to raise their own 
prices, each company feels compelled to concentrate on efforts to hold down costs. 
The same holds in a developing country context. 
Taylor (2000) posits that the amount by which a firm increases its own price to reflect 
an increase in either its marginal cost and/or in the price at other firms depends 
greatly on how permanent the cost increase is expected to be. The World Bank 
(2007) also suggests that activities of cooperatives may be improving the bargaining 
power of farmers, thus raising food prices, which can translate into non-food-price 
inflation by pushing up inflationary expectations and prompting higher wage 
demands (Zhang and Law, 2010). 
Fuhrer and Moore (1995) also propose a contracting model in which workers care 
about the level of their real wage relative to those of previous and successive 
cohorts of workers, while Gali and Gertler (1999) postulate that a fraction of firms set 
their prices based on a backward-looking rule of thumb, thus automatically 
introducing a backward-looking component into aggregate inflation dynamics. 
Christiano (2005) notes that firms that are not allowed to re-optimize their price will 
change it nonetheless, reflecting, either fully or partly, past inflation. 
5.3 METHODOLOGY 
Data from 1960 to 2017 is sourced from the Ghana Statistical Service (GSS), and 
the World Bank‘s 2017 World Development Indicators (WDI), with analysis run using 
GRETL 2017. We follow Stock (1991), Taylor (2000), Dossche and Everaert (2005), 
and Phiri (2016) who construct a 95% confidence interval for the largest root of the 
autoregression (AR) in comparing inflation persistence in multiple periods.  
Most measures of inflation persistence derive from the autocorrelation function for 
inflation where the     autocorrelation,   , of a stationary variable,    – the correlation 








  …(5.2) 
where  ( ) is the variance of   and    (    ). The variable‘s autocorrelation 
function is correspondingly defined as the vector of correlations of current period   
with each of its own lags      from     to  : 
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A time series will be said to be relatively persistent if its correlations with its own past 
decay slowly. Generally speaking, a time series may be deemed persistent if the 
absolute value of its autocorrelations is high, so that a strongly negatively 
autocorrelated series would also be characterized as persistent (Fuhrer, 2010). The 
magnitudes of roots in the confidence intervals thus represent the degree of inflation 
persistence in the respective time periods under analysis. The sum of coefficients on 
the lagged dependent variables in the AR further reinforce the above, with larger 
sums corresponding to higher levels of persistence. 
Inflation persistence or inflation inertia, measured by the coefficient on lagged 
inflation, is usually interpreted as capturing the effects of indexation or inflation 
expectations. When there is no inertia, the parameters on lagged inflation should be 
zero. On the other hand, when the level of inflation is only determined by inertia, the 
parameters on lagged inflation should sum to unity and all others should be zero 
(Loening et al., 2009). 
To see how the effect of an increase in marginal costs on the price depends on how 
permanent the increase in marginal costs is, suppose that marginal cost follows a 
simple first order univariate AR (Taylor, 2000): 
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Its autocorrelation function is: 
 ],...,,[ 2 kuuuA   …(5.5) 
The autocorrelations of    (where            ) die out geometrically at the rate 
determined by the AR parameter  , hence a smaller   (persistence parameter) 
reduces the size of the pass-through coefficient. Taylor (2000) notes that a firm (or at 
least an economist observing the firm) will likely refer to the smaller   as a loss of 
pricing power. In reality, however, the smaller   implies a reduction in the 
persistence of cost increases. 
A more generalized univariate    ( ) model is as follows, where low inertia is 
implied if ∑     
 
        (Petrovska and Ramadani, 2010). 
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Lag length selection for the autoregressive order ( ) is determined by the minimized 
values of the Akaike (AIC), the Schwarz Bayesian (BIC), and the Hannan-Quinn 
(HQC) criteria. 





We run the analysis on food and non-food sector inflation in Ghana, and 
subsequently on aggregate inflation in Ghana, Nigeria, New Zealand and South 
Africa21. 
Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics for CPI 
 Mean Median Max Min Std. Dev. Skewness Jarque-Bera Prob Obs 
Aggregate Inflation 126.7 114.9 352.0 7.4 98.6 0.6 29.3 0 336 
Food Inflation 151.9 129.1 539.7 4.4 139.0 0.9 44.9 0 336 
Non-Food Inflation 144.0 126.2 1401.1 5.4 138.3 2.7 5390.0 0 336 
Source: Authors‘ computation 
5.4 RESULTS 
In testing for unit roots, we employ the Zivot Andrews (ZA) unit root test which 
accounts for possible structural breaks in the data. From the results below, the null 
hypothesis of a unit root with a structural break is indeed strongly rejected, implying 
that CPI is stationary (see Table 5.2).  
Table 5.2: Zivot Andrews unit root test results 
Variable Break in constant Break in trend Break in both 
Aggregate Inflation  -6.2717*** -4.3234* -5.6169*** 
 (2013m1) (2012m4) (2013m7) 
Food sector inflation  -10.1585*** -3.5449 -9.4318*** 
 (2013m7) (2010m12) (2013m7) 
Non-food sector inflation   -7.4953*** -3.5709 -7.5721*** 
 (2013m7) (2011m11) (2013m7) 
Notes:***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.  
Values in () are the suggested break dates.  
We begin our analysis by testing for any observable differences in inflation 
persistence in the aggregate economy before and after the Structural Adjustment 
Program (SAP) in the 1980s. 
Table 5.3: Aggregate inflation persistence for SAP 
Pre-SAP: obs 1962-1984 (T = 23) Post-SAP: obs 1986-2015 (T = 30) 






                                                          
21
 We employ Nigeria, New Zealand and South Africa merely for comparison purposes. 






Sum of AR coefficients = 0.7983 
  
Sum of AR coefficients = 0.4994 
As per our criteria indicating inertia to be low if ∑     
 
       , we find that inflation 
persistence in the pre-SAP era was high since it exceeds the 0.7 benchmark. In the 
post-SAP era however, we find inflation persistence to be low. The sum of the AR 
coefficients drastically dropped from 0.7983 in the pre-SAP era to 0.4994 in the post-
SAP era, showing a huge fall in inflation persistence after the SAP. 
We now test for differences in inflation persistence in the aggregate economy before 
and after the formal adoption of inflation targeting (IT) in 2007. 
Table 5.4: Aggregate inflation persistence for IT 
Pre-IT: obs 1990:05-2007:04 (T = 204) Post-IT: obs 2007:09-2017:12 (T = 124) 













Sum of AR coefficients = 0. 9707 
Since ∑     
 
       , we conclude that high levels of inflation persistence are 
observed before and after the adoption of IT, albeit a marginal increase in the sum of 
the AR coefficients from 0.9657 to 0.9707 is recorded. 
We then run the same analysis for the food sector, comparing inflation persistence 
before and after the adoption of IT.  
Table 5.5: Food sector inflation persistence for IT 
Pre IT: obs 1990:05-2007:04 (T = 204) Post IT: obs 2007:06-2017:12 (T = 127) 













Sum of AR coefficients = 0. 9701 
Similar to the above, high levels of inflation persistence are observed in the food 
sector before and after the adoption of IT. A marginal increase from 0.9539 to 0.9701 
is recorded. 





We also analyse the situation in the non-food sector before and after the formal 
adoption of the inflation targeting framework below. 
Table 5.6: Non-food sector inflation persistence for IT 
Pre-IT: obs 1990:05-2007:04 (T = 204) Post-IT: obs 2007:08-2017:12 (T = 125) 
  Coefficient 
const  25.9263 
u(-1)  1.3327 
u(-2)  −0.2335 
u(-3)  0.0597 
u(-4)  −0.1926 







Sum of AR coefficients = 0.9163 
While both erae indicate high levels of persistence in the non-food sector, we 
observe a reduction in inflation persistence since the formal adoption of IT. 
In Table 5.7 below, we show the percentage drop in inflation persistence in each of 
the policies tested. 
Table 5.7: Percentage changes in inflation persistence 
Policy Intervention Before Intervention After Intervention % change 
SAP 0.7983 0.4993 -37.4 
IT (Aggregate) 0.9657 0.9707 0.5 
IT (Food Sector) 0.9539 0.9701 1.7 
IT (Non-Food Sector) 0.9664 0.9164 -5.2 
Evidently, the greatest decline in persistence was as a result of the SAP in the 
1980s. Persistence is still highest during the IT policy but the absence of reliable 
monthly data in the 1960s can also bias the earlier results. In the IT era, the greatest 
drop in inflation persistence has been witnessed in the non-food sector. 
We then attempt to identify which sector experiences the most persistence in 
inflation. 
Table 5.8: Sectoral inflation persistence: Food vs Non-food 
Food Sector: obs 1990:05-2017:12 (T = 332) Non-Food Sector: obs 2007:09-2017:12 (T = 124) 













Sum of AR coefficients = 0.9632 





The food sector records a higher sum of AR coefficients than the non-food sector, 
hence we safely conclude that the food sector in Ghana experiences more persistent 
inflation than the non-food sector. This could partly be the result of the seasonal 
nature of food sector output due to high dependence on rainfall. 
We tabulate persistent moderate inflation spells in Ghana since 1960 using a 
framework designed by Dornbusch and Fisher (1993). We observe that the durations 
and period averages of moderate inflation have consistently fallen over time since 
the early 1970s, with the most recent spell lasting 3 years between 2014 and 2016 
with a period average of 16.7% inflation. In the face of such dwindling inflation levels, 
however, we wish to ascertain if a declining inflation rate necessarily implies a 
declining level of inflationary persistence. 
Table 5.9: Persistent moderate inflation spells since 1960 
  Average Period Inflation (%) 
Period of moderate 
inflation 
Duration During the period 3 years before 
period 
3 years after 
period 
1973-1984 12 years 59.8 7.6 24.9 
1986-1991 6 years 29.4 57.6 20.0 
1993-1998 6 years 33.1 21.8 23.5 
2000-2003 4 years 24.9 18.3 12.9 
2014-2016 3 years 16.7 9.8      n/a 
We therefore map out the progression of inflation persistence in the Ghanaian 
economy before and after the SAP and IT regime. 
Table 5.10: Aggregate inflation persistence pre- and post-SAP 
Pre SAP 15 years after SAP 
(1987-2000) 
20 years after SAP 
(1987-2004) 
30 years after SAP 
(1986-2015) 
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Figure 5.1: Aggregate inflation persistence: pre- and post-SAP 
Although persistence has fallen over time in the aggregate Ghanaian economy since 
the SAP, it is clearly evident that inflation persistence is creeping back to pre-SAP 
levels. 
We also attempt to map out how inflation persistence has changed over time in the 
aggregate Ghanaian economy since the formal adoption of inflation targeting in 2007 
using monthly data. 
Table 5.11: Aggregate inflation persistence pre- and post-IT 
Pre IT 3 years after IT 
(2007:07-2010:12) 
7 years after IT 
(2007:07-2014:12) 
10 years after IT 
(2007:09-2017:12) 
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Figure 5.2: Aggregate inflation persistence: pre- and post-IT 
Approximately seven years after the adoption of IT, inflation persistence hit a high 
and has since started to drop to pre-IT levels. It may thus be possible that public 
perception about the inflation target is getting well anchored only after a decade of 
formal adoption. Dossche and Everaert (2005) argue that if monetary policy gives 
rise to unstable inflation, it afterwards becomes very hard to dis-inflate due to the 
slow adjustment of inflation expectations in response to changes in the inflation 
target. 
We now attempt to map out how inflation persistence has changed over time in the 
food sector since the formal adoption of inflation targeting in 2007. 
Table 5.12: Food sector inflation persistence pre- and post-IT 
Pre IT 3 years after IT 
(2007:07-2010:12) 
7 years after IT 
(2007:06-2014:12) 
10 years after IT 
(2007:09-2017:12) 
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Figure 5.3: Food sector inflation persistence: pre- and post-IT 
While persistence levels post-IT are still higher than pre-IT levels, we observe a 
gradual disinflation of inflation expectations in the food sector since the formal 
adoption of IT. This might be attributable to a shift from strict patterns of seasonality 
in output due to improved farming methods, as well as increased use of irrigation as 
against rain fed farming. 
We also attempt to map out how inflation persistence has changed over time in the 
non-food sector since the formal adoption of inflation targeting in 2007. 
Table 5.13: Non-food sector inflation persistence pre- and post-IT 
Pre-IT 3 years after IT 
(2007:07-2010:12) 
7 years after IT 
(2007:08-2014:12) 
10 years after IT 
(2007:09-2017:12) 
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Figure 5.4: Non-food sector inflation persistence: pre- and post-IT 
Three years after the formal adoption of IT, inflation persistence remained virtually 
unchanged in the non-food sector. It subsequently experienced a marginal drop 
seven years after formal adoption of IT. More recently however, persistence seems 
to be trending upwards. Unlike in the food sector, inflation targeting has really not 
been effective in taming inflationary expectations in the non-food sector. The early 
reduction in persistence was reversed, perhaps as rational observers developed 
mistrust in the inflation targeting framework, making its implementation unsuccessful. 
Over time, perceptions may heighten even further and persistence levels risk 
returning to the pre-policy implementation levels.  
We next compare and contrast inflation persistence of three other inflation targeting 
economies22 (South Africa, Nigeria, and New Zealand) with that of Ghana. 
Table 5.14: Cross-country comparison: aggregate inflation persistence  
Ghana Nigeria South Africa New Zealand 
  Coefficient 
 const 27.9971 
 u(-1) 0.2908 
 u(-2) 0.3473 
  
Sum of AR 
coefficients = 0.6382 
 Coefficient 
 const 16.3556 
 u(-1) 0.7861 
 u(-2) -0.2358 
  
Sum of AR 
coefficients = 0.5502 





Sum of AR 
coefficients = 0.8937 





Sum of AR 
coefficients = 0.8532 
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 New Zealand and South Africa are selected to represent relatively well-developed economies with 
single digit inflation. New Zealand is the first economy to formally adopt inflation targeting. Nigeria is 
selected since, like Ghana, it is also a developing economy which has had its share of inflation 
problems in the past. As at the writing of this paper, South Africa, Ghana and Uganda are the only 
SSA economies to have fully adopted inflation targeting. However, while Ghana, South Africa, Nigeria 
and New Zealand all have inflation data from 1960, Uganda has it only from 1981 and as such is 
eliminated from the analysis due to issues of comparability. 





Over the period 1960-2015, Nigeria has proved to possess the least persistence in 
inflation, with levels of up to 38% lower than the persistence recorded in the more 
advanced economies of South Africa and New Zealand which have consistently 
recorded single digit inflation rates every year since the early 1990s. Ghana records 
persistence levels 28% lower than South Africa and New Zealand. Although further 
and extensive investigation is warranted, our preliminary findings suggest that 
prolonged periods of single digit inflation may not be a sufficient condition for low 
levels of inflation persistence. Therefore in pursuing single digit inflation, policy 
makers should continuously monitor inflation persistence. Figure 5.5 below illustrates 
the phenomenon of a possible inverse relationship between inflation and inflation 
persistence (at least in inflation targeting economies). Indeed, contours of such a 
dynamic relationship may not be readily perceptible and thus warrant further 
research. 
 
Figure 5.5: Cross-country inflation and inflation persistence 
5.5 CONCLUSION 
In this study, we have investigated inflation persistence at the aggregate and 
sectoral levels in the Ghanaian economy. We employed Stock‘s (1991) 95% 
confidence interval for the largest root of the auto regression as the estimation 
technique and adopted Dornbusch-Fisher‘s (1993) framework in mapping out 
moderate persistent inflation spells. We empirically examined the effectiveness of 
the Structural Adjustment Program and Inflation Targeting frameworks on aggregate 
and sectoral inflation persistence. We concluded by comparing Ghana‘s inflation 
persistence with selected inflation targeting economies. We used annual time series 
data from 1960 to 2017 and monthly sectoral data from 1990 to 2017. The following 
conclusions emerged from the study. 





The highest decline in inflation persistence in the Ghanaian economy was observed 
after the implementation of the SAP. In the post-SAP era, the strongest gains 
observed were immediately after its implementation but dwindled over time. It is 
likely that as rational observers identify deficiencies in the policy, distrust in its 
implementation becomes evident. Perceptions heightened even further and the 
inflationary trend returned to the high pre-SAP levels. It is worth noting that the 
absence of reliable monthly data in the 1960s can bias the results we obtained. 
Across the aggregate economy as well as the food and non-food sectors, inflation 
persistence pre- and post- the IT era have been very high. Indeed current estimates 
for inflation persistence are much higher than prior to the formal adoption of IT. A 
decade on, nonetheless, the trend indicates a gradual drop to pre-IT levels. In the 
food sector, this trend shows consistently dwindling levels of persistence while in the 
non-food sector, persistence seems to be rising over time. 
Given the varied reactions in inflation persistence across the sectors to inflation 
targeting, we encourage policy makers to ensure sustained effectiveness of policies 
right from the implementation stage. The central bank should intensify efforts to 
further enhance the overall effectiveness of the inflation targeting framework in 
Ghana, bearing in mind that different sectors respond differently. 
Inflation persistence is higher in the food sector than in the non-food sector even 
though we find that reductions in food sector persistence are higher than in the non-
food sector. The government must tame inflationary expectations in the food sector, 
particularly in the minor rainy season where, due to a relative scarcity of food crops, 
expectations of rising food prices are heightened as compared to the major rainy 
season where food is in relative abundance. Reduction of import duties for food 
sector importing firms who wish to import essential food crops during the minor rainy 
season might be a step in the right direction as this will reduce import costs (cost 
push inflation) for such firms and ultimately assist in driving down expectations of 
rising inflation.  
Given the fact that each of the various sectors in the Ghanaian economy possesses 
varying inflation persistence dynamics, studies to determine sector-specific threshold 
rates of inflation are recommended for future research and policy consideration. 
Chaudhry et al. (2013) observe that no empirical study has been carried out to 
ascertain the inflation threshold level within the various sectors of an economy. 
Research directed at estimating sectoral threshold inflation levels is crucial since the 
nationwide inflation target band set by the central bank may favour only certain 
sectors of the economy to the detriment of other sectors, thereby unduly sacrificing 
sectoral output growth. Indeed Christiaensen et al. (2011) and Cervantes-Godoy and 
Dewbre (2010) assert that stifling the output potential of any sector which is a 
lynchpin for inclusive growth could impede efforts at achieving poverty reduction in 
the economy. In the same manner that cross-country inflation threshold studies fail 
to recognize the idiosyncrasies of the various countries within the study, nationwide 





inflation threshold studies may also fail to recognize the idiosyncrasies of the various 
sectors within the economy. More studies on inflation persistence are therefore 
strongly encouraged. 
We concluded with a cross-country analysis of inflation targeting economies. We 
found that economies which enjoyed continual levels of low inflation experienced 
high levels of persistent inflation. In other words, a declining inflation rate did not 
necessarily imply that inflationary expectations were also being subdued. We posit 
that an inverse relationship might exist between inflation and inflation persistence – 
at least for the inflation targeting economies in our sample. Contours of such a 
relationship between inflation and inflation persistence may not be readily perceptible 
and thus warrant further research, particularly with higher frequency data since we 
employed annual data for the cross-country analysis in this study. Having said that, 
policy makers and politicians in IT economies must be cautious when trumpeting 
their achievements at reducing inflation to single digits without first determining if 
persistence has also reduced in tandem with inflation levels. Indeed, low and stable 
inflation as well as low inflation persistence are both crucial drivers for the long-term 
growth of any economy and must be treated as inextricably linked to each other. 
  






INERTIA AND THRESHOLD EFFECTS IN SECTORIAL INFLATION: 
THE CASE OF GHANA’S FOOD AND NON-FOOD SECTORS23 
Abstract 
This paper tests for the presence of inflation inertia and threshold effects in sectoral 
inflation in Ghana. It uses Regime Switching Threshold Autoregressive and Smooth 
Transition Regression Models to identify thresholds and also the effect of sectoral 
inflation on sectoral output growth. The findings suggest that threshold effects exist 
within Ghana‘s sectoral inflation, with estimated thresholds of 11.5%-15.2% and 13% 
for the food and non-food sectors respectively. In the food sector, while no threshold 
is identified for the dry season, a markedly differing threshold of 6.1% is identified for 
the rainy season as general food prices in Ghana drop during periods of sustained 
rainfall. Inflationary expectations (inertia) are evident in the non-food sector and 
serve as a key determinant of non-food output growth in Ghana. Using Markov 
Switching models, expected durations and expected switching probabilities of 
inflationary regimes are also estimated. This paper contributes to the literature by 
pioneering the probe of threshold inflation non-linearity at the sectoral level of an 
economy. 
 
JEL classification: E31; E52 
 
Key words: Threshold, Inflation, Threshold Autoregressive Model, Food, Non-Food, 
Output, Ghana 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
Inflation inertia prompted by adaptive expectations is not infrequent in Ghana and 
although a significant number of studies exist on inflation in Ghana, most if not all 
explain factors influencing inflation and/or its effects on the economy but dwell less 
on inflation inertia - particularly at the sectoral level. To the best of our knowledge, no 
study on Ghana accounts for inflation inertia in modelling sectoral dynamics or the 
inflation threshold at the sectoral level (Heintz and Ndikumana, 2010; Chaudhry et 
al., 2013). 
In the same manner that cross-country inflation threshold studies fail to recognize 
the idiosyncrasies of the countries within the study, nationwide inflation threshold 
studies also fail to recognize the idiosyncrasies of the sectors within the economy 
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(Sepehri and Moshiri, 2004; Hult et al., 2008; Kremer et al., 2013; Van de Vijver et 
al., 2015; Temple, 2000) and given the relationship between inflation and economic 
growth, a nationwide inflation target band which favours only certain sectors of the 
economy, to the detriment of other sectors, may unduly sacrifice sectoral output 
growth. 
Sectors in the Ghanaian economy are uniquely different from each other. In the food 
sector for example, a biannual rainy cycle is experienced as two distinct rainy 
seasons. With this cycle, general food prices fall drastically in the major season, 
between April and mid-July, while a less rapid fall in food prices is witnessed in the 
minor season, between September and mid-November. Moreover, between the 
northern and southern farming hubs of the country, these rainy cycles do not occur in 
tandem. Since Ghana‘s food sector is majorly rainfall-dependent, it is highly probable 
that each region or sector will have optimal inflation rates which are growth-
enhancing, and yet distinct from the aggregate target. However no prior attempt has 
been made to estimate sector-specific inflation thresholds. 
Given that the agricultural sector is a lynchpin for inclusive growth, efforts at 
achieving poverty reduction in Ghana could be impeded if the output potential of 
agriculture is stifled (Christiaensen et al., 2011; Cervantes-Godoy and Dewbre, 
2010). In an urban-rural economy while urban households derive only a small share 
of their income from agricultural activities, rural households derive the majority of 
their income from agriculture-related activities (Dessus et al., 2008). Hence for urban 
households, food inflation will only affect the price of their consumption basket, 
leaving their income unchanged. In contrast, rural households derive a substantial 
part of their income from agricultural activities, and thus the estimation of a threshold 
inflation level for the food sector is critical both for poverty reduction and the 
enhancement of inclusive growth.  
Inflation data from the Ghana Statistical Service (GSS) clearly reveal these sectoral 
and regional variations which uniquely drive economic activities. This paper therefore 
argues that individual sectors should each determine their sector-specific optimum 
inflation levels, so as not to stifle the overall growth of Ghana‘s economy. 
In this paper we examine the issue of inflation inertia at the aggregate and sectoral 
levels of the Ghanaian economy. We also estimate switching probabilities between 
high and low episodes of inflation as well as expected durations of each inflationary 
episode.  






Figure 6.1: Monthly sectoral inflation dynamics, December 2015  
Source: Ghana Statistical Service (2015)  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 6.2 looks at inflation 
management in Ghana. Section 6.3 delves into the theoretical and empirical review 
on threshold inflation and growth, while section 6.4 outlines the methodology. 
Results are presented in Section 6.5, with the conclusion and recommendations in 
Section 6.6. 
6.2 INFLATION PATTERNS AND MANAGEMENT IN GHANA 
This section of the paper examines the various aspects of Ghana‘s inflationary 
experience since independence as well as policy interventions put in place to 
manage inflation over the years. Figure 6.2 illustrates the inflationary trend of Ghana 
from the early 1960s. Prior to 1972, lower inflation rates on average are observed 
compared to subsequent periods of hyperinflation and declining economic growth, 
ultimately leading to the adoption of an Economic Recovery Program (ERP) in 1983. 
Following the example of Ocran (2007), we divide the discussion into five phases: 
the post-tranquil era (1957-1966), rising inflation (1967-1971), the hyperinflation 
period (1972-1982), stabilization phase (1983-2003), and the current inflation 
experience (2004-date). 
6.2.1 Post-tranquil era (1957-1966) 
Ocran (2007) describes Ghana‘s inflation experience prior to this first period as 
tranquil due to the existence of the West African Currency Board (WACB), to which 
Ghana belonged. With the help of the WACB, the Ghana government was able to 
keep inflation at bay by relying solely on taxing or borrowing, and not on the printing 





of money to finance its expenditure. Indeed, in the years of the WACB, Ghana 
persistently experienced single digit inflation rates which were estimated at less than 
1%. However, following Ghana‘s independence and exit from the WACB in 1957, the 
board could no longer dictate the path of Ghana‘s monetary policy. The then 
Nkrumah administration swiftly embarked on a massive and unprecedented 
industrialization drive. All over the country, import substitution industries were 
established, and due to the sudden volumes of major infrastructure investments, the 
economy inevitably began to heat up (Sowa, 1994; Ocran, 2007).  
Being state owned and managed, and excessively protected by overlapping levels of 
tariff structures, these industries performed woefully, due in part to incompetent 
management and difficulties in obtaining input supplies and to dwindling foreign 
exchange reserves. Following the collapse of the commodity market, surpluses 
which Ghana had stored up due to the heavy taxation of its cocoa crop eventually 
dried up. Yet the investment drive went on unabated, being financed heavily with 
overseas loans. Gradually, inflation started to rise from its previous less than unitary 
value under the WACB to an average of 8% per annum between 1960 and 1963. 
The excessive investment activity during this period was evidenced more in demand 
pressure than in output expansion, causing a strong upward pressure on prices 
(Sowa, 1994).  
The growing inflation was managed by maintaining import supplies and financing 
fiscal deficits with external reserves which had been accumulated prior to 
independence. As these reserves dried up, the government resorted to central bank 
financing since attempts to increase import duties failed to close the budget gap. 
From an average of 8% per annum between 1960 and 1963, inflation increased to 
15.8% in 1964, and almost tripled to an average of 23% per annum between 1964 
and 1966. Ripples of the 1964 inflationary pressure led to a persistence in inflation, 
particularly sustained by constraints on foreign exchange which led to shortages of 
most consumer items. Following the 1966 military takeover, the first inflationary 
phase was immediately succeeded by the IMF-supported stabilization attempt in 
1967 which nevertheless failed to stem the steady rise of inflation. 






Figure 6.2: Inflation and rates of real GDP growth (1960-2015)  
Source: WDI (2016) 
6.2.2 Rising inflation (1967-1971)  
In a bid to cool down the economy, the new military government, the National 
Liberation Council (NLC) promptly entered into a standby agreement with the IMF, 
which among other things was aimed at driving external trade liberalization, and the 
tightening of monetary and fiscal policies by reducing public spending and excessive 
bank financing. This yielded some fruit as Ghana registered her first ever and only 
deflation rate of -8% in 1967 (Figure 6.2). In July of that same year, the currency was 
devalued by 30%. Meanwhile extensive state participation in the economy was 
reduced and minimal investments made, leading to a massive nationwide economic 
retrenchment. Evidently, the measures which managed to contain inflation also took 
a heavy toll on the growth of the economy as monetary policy was further tightened 
through credit restrictions and interest rate increases. The ensuing civilian 
government that took over deepened its predecessor‘s pro-liberalization policies, 
while it relaxed its fiscal policy stance. External borrowing and foreign reserves 
sustained the government‘s recurrent and investment outlays which had increased 
substantially over the period.  
Inflation was kept in check as a result of the contractionary orientation it adopted 
towards its monetary policy, despite having a rather relaxed approach to its fiscal 
policy. Economic activity experienced a marked boost in growth between 1969 and 
1970, the highest in Ghana‘s history at the time. As this era drew to a close in 1970, 
inflation had risen to 10% from a low of 3%. During this period, the commodity 
market collapse forced the government to draw up an austere budget aimed at 
cutting expenditure and exploring potential revenue sources in order to cushion the 
economy from the effect of the cocoa price downturn. This was coupled with a 
further 44% devaluation of the local currency in 1971, and an additional 10-20% tax 
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and ultimately led to the government‘s demise and overthrow in 1972, ushering 
Ghana into an unforgettable episode of hyperinflation. 
6.2.3 Hyperinflation period (1972-1982)  
Arguably, the 1972-1978 period saw the most reckless expansionary economic 
policy stance ever in Ghana‘s history (Ocran, 2007). Under the new military regime, 
a major reversal of the ousted government‘s economic policy was effected. This 
began with the revaluation of the local currency by 42%, and the reinstating of 
external trade controls. A succession of military takeovers led to incumbent regimes 
repetitively pursuing expansionary fiscal programmes attended by increased budget 
deficits which were primarily financed by central bank loans to government and state 
institutions. Economic stagnation, widespread shortage of goods and distorted 
relative prices with strong upward price rigidity were some of the inevitable effects of 
the reckless central bank financing. 
Following the 1973 oil price shock and the accompanying erosion of its balance of 
payment position, the then government resorted to excessive borrowing through the 
central bank as well as arbitrary printing of money to close its budget gap. The 
ensuing printing of money led to an inflation spiral, with inflation rocketing to 117% in 
1977 and 1981. The inflation crises worsened when extensive price control 
mechanisms were employed in the hope of curtailing the inflationary spiral. Indeed, 
despite widespread price controls during this decade, corruption, foreign currency 
trading in parallel markets, and smuggling of goods became the order of the day, so 
much so that average inflation hovered at a staggering 51% per annum between 
1972 and 1982. Another military takeover occurred in 1978, and that regime quickly 
moved to devalue the currency by 58% in search of a short term (one year) standby 
agreement with the IMF. After yet another military takeover in June 1979, a civilian-
elected government came to power barely three months later in September 1979.  
This government also embarked on expansionary economic policies, especially in 
the public sector, where the country experienced a doubling of the producer price for 
cocoa, and an overnight tripling of public workers‘ wages. Sowa (1994) and Ocran 
(2007) attribute the inflationary experience during this phase to excessive demand 
pressure sustained by an expansionary fiscal stance and loose monetary policies.  
Foreign exchange scarcity as a result of over-dependence on volatile cocoa earnings 
constrained the ability to supply essential imports for consumption and production 
due to the behaviour of the world commodities market during that period. This was 
coupled with structural economic constraints, low output and a weak production base 
– all major actors on the influence of the inflationary trend of this era. 
Inflation management was primarily undertaken using price controls and fixed 
exchange rates during this period. However these mechanisms did little to remove 
the causes of inflationary pressure at the time, leading to several distorted prices 
underscoring widespread structural constraints, particularly in domestic production 





and external trade. By the end of 1982, declining per capita incomes, increasing 
external deficits and poor infrastructure led to pronounced calls for a revised 
direction of economic management. 
6.2.4 Stabilization phase (1983-2003) 
The revised direction of economic management came in the form of the ERP which 
was launched in 1983 by the PNDC government in April 1983. This stabilization 
phase was attended by a dual combination of unfavourable man-made and natural 
conditions.  
The price distortions of the late 1970s, and a rather dysfunctional economic system 
forced the government to turn to the IMF and World Bank for assistance particularly 
when inflation reached a record-high of 123%. This high inflation can be attributed to 
a 991% devaluation of the local currency that year (Ocran, 2007). The primary goals 
of the ERP were to stem the slide in the economy, minimize imbalances, control 
inflation and establish a path of sustainable growth (Sowa, 1994). It employed 
mechanisms which included price deregulation, financial management reforms, 
exchange rate corrections, trade liberalization, and the rehabilitation of economic 
and social infrastructure. Although one year after the introduction of the ERP, 
inflation plummeted from 123% to 40%, Sowa (1994) contends that the remarkable 
drop cannot fully be attributed to the programme since the ERP did not really take off 
until 1984, and moreover since the agricultural sector had also started to recover 
from the infamous 1983 drought.  
During the reform years of 1983-2000, annual inflation averaged 34%, although in 
some years (such as in 1985 and 1992), inflation hovered around 10%. Inflation 
dropped to an annual average of 27% between 1987 and 1993, as against 50% 
during the early reform years of 1983-1986. Nevertheless, Sowa (1994) asserts that 
while the ERP failed to rein in inflation during the period, it enabled the agricultural 
sector to recover quickly by attracting external inflows which eased supply 
constraints.  
All in all, during this phase, inflation management was highly unsuccessful (Ocran, 
2007) as the overall period average was 34% per annum. Indeed the target for 
inflation by the year 2000 was 5%, while the economy actually registered a 25% 
inflation rate. Even in 1985, 1992 and 1999, when inflation came close to being 
single digit, it could not be sustained over the next calendar year. Such has been the 
pattern of consistently missed inflation targets to date (Frimpong and Oteng-Abeyie, 
2010). 
6.2.5 Current inflation experience (2004-date) 
Presently, Ghana finds herself in the post second stabilization inflation phase, where 
annual inflation over the period 2004-2015 has averaged over 13%, hitting a high of 
19% in 2009. By and large, inflation in this phase is best characterized as persistent, 





experiencing a somewhat cyclical pattern, with sharp hikes in inflation rates 
particularly in years immediately succeeding an election year. 
In Table 6.1 below, we assess inflation persistence in Ghana following the 
framework developed by Dornbusch and Fisher (1993) who define moderate inflation 
as at least three consecutive years of annual inflation rates between 15% and 30%. 
We seek to address how inflation has persisted in Ghana over the years, and the 
nature of the progression before the after the observed persistent inflation episodes. 
Clear patterns can be identified from the table. The analysis identifies five episodes 
of persistent moderate inflation since 1960. The moderate inflation episode 
experienced prior to the period of vigorous macroeconomic reforms was incidentally 
the longest moderate inflation spell ever experienced. The episode lasted over a 
decade (1973-1984) with average annual inflation rates of 60%. It had succeeded a 
period of low inflation (7.6% per annum) but for the next three years, inflation 
averaged 25% and the economy drifted into another spell during which inflation 
averaged 29% between 1986 and 1991. 
Table 6.1: Persistent moderate inflation spells since 1960 








3 years after 
period 
1973-1984 12 years 59.8 7.6 24.9 
1986-1991 6 years 29.4 57.6 20.0 
1993-1998 6 years 33.1 21.8 23.5 
2000-2003 4 years 24.9 18.3 12.9 
2014-2016 3 years 16.0 9.8 n/a 
Source: Authors‘ computation based on WDI (2016,) 
Note: n/a: not available 
The dawn of democracy in 1992 did little to halt the persistence in inflation that had 
been generated, with average annual inflation hovering at 33% per annum between 
1993 and 1998. The six year period from 1993-1998 was both preceded and 
succeeded by average annual inflation rates of over 20% for three consecutive 
years. Moderate inflation spells seem to have been stemmed between 2004 and 
2013. However, from 2011, average annual inflation has consistently risen, from 9% 
to 15.5% in 2014, and 17.1% in 2015, which indicates that the economy has recently 
been ushered into another spell of inflation persistence, with the official 2016 inflation 
rate recording 15.4% (see Table 6.1). Unlike other countries that did not stay in 





moderate inflation spells for long (Dornbusch and Fisher, 1993), Ghana appears to 
have been saddled with moderate inflation for a long time (Ocran, 2007). 
In May 2007, in its bid to try and curb the inflation problem, the BOG formally 
adopted the inflation targeting framework using interest rates as its monetary 
instrument (Bank of Ghana, 2007). Even so, the inflation target each year has 
consistently been missed (Frimpong and Oteng-Abeyie, 2010) (see Table 6.2 and 
Figure 6.3 below), and average annual inflation has reduced only marginally from 
12.9% between 2004-2006, to 12.8% between 2007-2014, with single digit inflation 
rates recorded only in 2011 and 2012.  
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-1.7±2 0.3±2 -0.2±2 -2.6±2 -6.5±2 -9.1±2 -9.5±2 n/a 
Source: Ghana Statistical Service CPI Newsletters (several issues), WDI (2017)  
Note: n/a: not available 
A graphical radar chart depiction of Table 6.2 is given in Figure 6.3 below. 
 





Figure 6.3: Actual and targeted inflation levels (2007-2016) 
In trying to achieve economic stability, monetary and fiscal policies have been 
directed at keeping inflation low (price stability) while sustaining high rates of 
economic growth. This emphasizes the need for the BOG to target the correct 
inflation band so as not to lose its credibility or harm Ghana‘s economic growth. 
6.3 LITERATURE REVIEW 
The commonality of price rises in food documented in the literature arises in either or 
both of two ways: shocks to demand and shocks to supply (Gilbert, 2010) Several 
other factors relating to trade, global prices, food management, policy variables 
related to deficits (budget, revenue, fiscal), monetary expansion (broad money), and 
speculative activities are also documented. These factors may be of a short-term 
nature, a long-term nature, or even operate both in the short as well as long term.  
Most explanations of food price movements focus on shifts in the demand curve – 
through population growth, wage hikes etc. Elementary economic theory indicates 
that a rightward shift in the demand curve will, in almost all circumstances, lead to a 
price rise, with the extent of the rise depending on the slope of the supply curve. If 
supply is very elastic, the price rise is modest. If supply is less responsive, the price 
rise is more substantial. If supply is very inelastic, even a small shift in demand can 
have a large price impact. Price hikes due to limited supply responsiveness are 
further heightened when markets are linked (see Figure 6.4 below). 
 
Figure 6.4: Price responses to idiosyncratic and common demand shocks 
Source: Gilbert (2010) 
Gilbert (2010) considers a demand shock      which is specific to an individual 
agricultural market. The appropriate supply curve in that market is  . Factors are 
drawn in from other markets and supply is elastic, with the result that the demand 
shock leads to the small price rise      . If, instead, the demand shock is common 
across a range of agricultural markets, the position becomes more complicated. First 
there may be cost increases as outputs from one sector are used in another, e.g. 
energy inputs into agricultural production. This is reflected in the upward shift of the 
supply curve to   . Second, because the possibilities for reallocation of land and 





other inputs across crops are limited in the context of a common demand shock, 
additional factors are only available at considerable extra cost, making supply 
inelastic. The supply curve becomes less elastic, rotating to    . The result is that the 
same demand shock in terms of the market in question will lead to the much larger 
price rise      . In the absence of mechanisms to promptly and adequately 
augment demand-supply imbalances, a shock to supply such as a decline in food 
production is bound to raise food prices (Chand, 2010). Chand (2010) contends that 
there are two ways of addressing such imbalances: through cross-border trade, and 
the maintenance of an adequate inventory.  
More on the demand side, Engel‘s (1857) law states that as incomes rise, the share 
of food in total expenditure declines. Bennet (1941) supports this law by asserting 
that as income increases, the proportion of the budget spent on starchy staples 
decreases – a desire for dietary diversity. Income levels shape demand. Whether or 
not a household is able to consume what they prefer depends not only on market 
access and food availability but also on income. As income increases, the quality of 
food consumed increases (see Figure 6.5 below). This pattern suggests that poor 
households spend a greater proportion of their income on food consumption relative 
to wealthier households (Engel‘s Law) and that they spend more of their incomes on 
starchy staples (Bennett‘s Law). Therefore, price increases of starchy staples are 
extremely burdensome to poor households because large portions of their budgets 
are spent on staples. 
 
Figure 6.5: Measures of food consumption relative to household income level 
(in log form)  
Source: Timmer et al. (1983) 
Notes:  Engel‘s Law is labelled ―Food expenditure‖, Bennett‘s Law is labelled 
―Starchy staples‖.  
 The figure is drawn in logarithms to illustrate elasticities: (log) Food quality = 
(log)food expenditure - (log)food quantity.  





Engel‘s law also tells us that when incomes increase, demand for food increases. 
The effect on demand for particular products depends on whether such goods are 
normal goods or inferior goods. Normal goods are those for which an increase 
(decrease) in income results in an increase (decrease) in demand. This pattern is 
because the income and substitution effects are both operating in the same 
direction, as seen in Figure 6.6 below. For inferior goods, an increase (decrease) in 
income results in a decrease (increase) in demand. When incomes fall for very poor 
households, demand for an inferior good can increase because households can no 
longer afford to buy more expensive foods and thus spend more money on cheaper, 
lower quality calorie sources. Potatoes are a common inferior good for many 
households. For inferior goods, the income effect is in the opposite direction from the 
substitution effect (i.e. the income and substitution effects are countervailing) 
resulting in a decrease in demand when income increases. 
 
Figure 6.6: Income and substitution effects due to a price increase  
Source: Timmer et al. (1983) 
Understanding the cyclical linkages between macroeconomic policies and agriculture 
is crucial when in exploring the potential role of agriculture‘s supply-side factors with 
regard to food inflation. According to Thompson (1988), two peculiarities exist: first, 
that developing economies generally face large income (expenditure) elasticities of 
demand for farm products, and second, that short-run price elasticities of supply are 
still lower. As a result, shifts in demand for farm products which are induced by 
macroeconomic factors (e.g. through fiscal stimulus) can have significant price 
effects. Additionally, except for commodities with support prices, agriculture prices 
tend to be more responsive to monetary shocks, whereas prices of many goods 
produced by the manufacturing sector of the economy are stickier in the short run 
due to long-term contracts (Thompson, 1988). In other words, monetary shocks are 
not neutral, at least in the short run and not at least for the primary agriculture 
products. 





Reddy (2013) identifies three types of inflation drivers from the supply. One is a 
supply shock, which is like an exogenous factor, not permanent in nature; the 
second is a supply bottleneck, which is endogenous to a system and can be 
answered by catering for supply-side logistics and other support mechanisms; and 
the third is supply inelasticity, which requires substantial investments.  
Aside from the above, other important supply side factors such as weather shocks 
and farm wage rates have served as triggers of rising costs of agricultural 
production. Damodaran (2012) points out that apart from the effects on agriculture, 
what rising farm labour costs also do is to raise the benchmark ‗reservation wage‘ in 
the economy – the lowest rate that workers are prepared to accept for jobs across 
sectors. Loening et al. (2009) posit that ‗unconventional‘ supply-side factors such as 
reduced distress selling by farmers equipped with better access to credit, storage 
facilities and marketing information systems may also partly explain food price 
inflation. The implications of a ‗reservation wage‘ to the Ghanaian economy may be 
far-reaching but are outside the scope of this current study.  
The pace of growth in domestic production in relation to the growth in demand is a 
major determinant of long-term inflation (Chand, 2010). This involves the level or 
magnitude of growth of output, year-to-year fluctuations, and the composition of 
growth. Low food storage capacity and inadequate storage infrastructure accentuate 
yearly fluctuations, particularly for perishable and semi-perishable goods. Difficulties 
in carrying bumper production over to meet a shortfall in production in the next 
season suggest that from an inflation point of view, smooth growth is essential, and 
indeed much more important than high and fluctuating growth. Changes in 
international prices, particularly in crude oil, also exert significant direct and indirect 
influences on domestic food prices through trade as well as adjustments in domestic 
policies aiming to maintain a balance with global prices.  
In an economy with a growing integration with the world economy, global food prices 
inevitably affect domestic prices even in the absence of trade (Gilbert, 2010). 
Demand side pressures are triggered by a growing population and rising incomes, 
while supply side pressures stem from urbanization, diversion of arable land for non-
agricultural purposes, inadequate investment in research and technology leading to 
a slowdown of productivity growth, spikes in input costs (global oil prices, fertilizer, 
transportation costs). The impact of these factors are further amplified by country-
specific policies such as export bans on specific commodities, import barriers to 
protect nascent domestic producers, and the provision of subsidies for farm 
production. 
Quite recently, the speculation in commodity futures and a weak U.S. dollar have 
been identified as key drivers to high food inflation (Subbarao, 2011). Agricultural 
commodities are denominated in dollars. A significant depreciation of the dollar 
against world currencies thus shortens the measuring rod against which prices are 
measured, leading to commodity price increases in world currencies and a 





substantially higher increase in nominal dollar terms (Abbott et al., 2009; Gilbert, 
2010). Regarding speculation, a chance upward movement in a price may be taken 
by speculators as indicative of a positive trend resulting in further buying and hence 
driving the price further upwards, despite an absence of any fundamental justification 
(Gilbert, 2010). 
In addition, the increasing trend in the diversion of food crops as biofuels is argued 
by Rosegrant et al. (2008) as a clear ‗food-vs.-fuel‘ trade-off. According to this view, 
the diversion of food crops and, more generally, arable land into the production of 
biofuel feedstock puts upward pressure on food prices and links changes in food 
prices to changes in the crude oil price. Oil prices may affect food commodity prices 
in two ways. First, increases in oil prices will result in higher food production costs, 
partly through the costs of nitrogen-based fertilizers and partly through transport 
costs. The second route arises through demand for food commodities as biofuel 
feedstock. 
Seasonal rainfall patterns in rainfall-dependent agrarian communities, droughts and 
increases in the average cost of production of major crops due to hikes in prices of 
inputs such as fertilizer, fuel and transportation also drive food inflation (Gilbert, 
2010). These increases are accentuated in the absence of technology in the 
production process.  
Food and non-food components of the CPI exhibit trends diverse from each other, 
with several factors differently influencing the two broad components of CPI inflation 
(Khan et al., 1996). They provide evidence to suggest that the determinants of food 
and non-food prices inflation are distinctly different from each other. 
Durevall (1998) intimates that inflation originates either from price adjustments in 
markets with excess demand or supply or from price adjustments due to import 
costs. Both focus on the monetary sector, the external sector (including the markets 
for tradable food and non-food products), and the domestic market for agricultural 
goods. Loening et al. (2009) further postulate that changes in the domestic price 
level are affected by deviations from the long-run equilibrium in the money market 
and the external sector, represented by food and non-food products, giving rise to 
three long-run relationships: 
                …(6.1) 
 
             …(6.2) 
 
             …(6.3) 





where   is the log of the money stock,   is the log of the domestic price level,   is 
the log of real output,   is a vector of rates of returns on various assets and other 
sources of money demand,     and    are the log of domestic non-food and food 
prices,   is the log of the exchange rate,    and     are the log of world non-food 
and food prices, and    and    are potential trends in the relative prices. 
Monetary sector equilibrium is spelt out in Equation 6.1. Demand for real money is 
assumed to be increasing in  , where   = 1 for the quantity theory. In economies 
with liberalized and competitive financial markets, the relevant rates of returns are 
usually the interest rate paid on deposits as well as Treasury bill discount rates. 
Equations 6.2 and 6.3 can be viewed as the long-run equilibrium in the external 
markets for non-food and food products. Together they capture relative purchasing 
power parity. However, in an economy with few exportable non-food goods, 6.2 
primarily measures a relationship between prices of goods sold in the domestic 
market and imported consumer and intermediate goods. 
Regarding money supply, inflation occurs when world prices rise or the exchange 
rate depreciates, while money supply is partly endogenous, as in Nell (2004), or that 
the monetary transmission mechanism mainly operates through the exchange rate 
channel (Al-Mashat and Billmeier, 2008). In economies with restricted capital flows, 
the mechanism at work in the latter case would be through the impact of credit 
supply on imports and availability of foreign reserves, and not the traditional 
exchange rate channel where interest rates affect capital flows, which in turn affect 
the nominal exchange rate. 
An alternate explanation by Dornbusch (1980) and Kamin (1996) is that domestic 
goods are made up of non-tradables, exportables and importables, and that relative 
prices change due to an increase in export prices, for example. This leads to an 
improvement in terms of trade and disequilibrium in the external sector. As a result, 
either the nominal exchange rate appreciates, or the prices of non-tradables 
increase for equilibrium to be restored. Decreases in terms of trade, on the other 
hand, require a depreciation of the nominal exchange rate or a decline in domestic 
prices. Consumer price may rise in both cases. This occurs if the nominal exchange 
rate is not allowed to appreciate enough when terms of trade improve and 
‗devaluations‗ push up prices through feedback effects when terms of trade 
deteriorate. Money supply would in this case be demand determined, or solely 
influence domestic prices through its effects on their proximate determinants. 
As per Woo and Hooper (1984), exchange rate movements affect the domestic price 
level mainly through the prices of imports: exchange rate appreciation makes imports 
cheaper, and this in turn retards increases in the prices of domestic goods through 
cheaper imported inputs and through competition from cheaper finished imported 
goods. They provide four channels through which the exchange rate can affect the 
price level. The first is the prices of imported consumer goods, which directly affect 





the consumer price index. The second is the prices of imported inputs, which directly 
affect costs of production. The third is aggregate demand via the trade multiplier: 
exchange rate movements change the current account position, which in turn affects 
aggregate demand. The fourth is foreign prices, which affect the prices of 
domestically-roduced competing goods. The effect through this channel is difficult to 
model because it involves price-setting behaviour in sectors of economies 
characterized by imperfect competition. The importance of these foreign price effects 
depends, among other things, on the size of a domestic economy‘s supply and 
demand in the world market. If the domestic market is small, foreign prices are fixed 
in foreign currencies. At the opposite extreme, if the domestic market is very large, 
then the dollar prices of tradable goods may be largely independent of exchange rate 
movements, because both domestic and foreign firms will price to the domestic 
market, as is the case in the United States (Woo and Hooper, 1984). Regarding 
policy, they posit that the effect of an expansionary fiscal policy on the exchange rate 
will depend on the response of capital flows to interest rate changes. The greater the 
response, the more likely the exchange rate will appreciate. 
Woo and Hoooper (1984) go on to suggest that the relative size of a market is only 
one of the factors that cloud the relationship between the exchange rate and prices 
of tradable goods. Strategic considerations and institutional factors are also 
important in oligopolistic situations. Those who export goods to the large economies 
may be sufficiently influenced by that economy‘s objections to particular imports that 
they would not expand their market shares rapidly even when that currency 
appreciates sharply but instead would choose higher profit margins by maintaining 
their prices in that foreign currency. Moreover, firms are less likely to change 
domestic prices when a change in the exchange rate is perceived to be temporary. 
Food-price inflation can translate into non-food-price inflation by pushing up 
inflationary expectations and prompting higher wage demands (Zhang and Law, 
2010). Inflation expectations on their own can also explain a large fraction of inflation 
dynamics (Loening et al., 2009. 
Considering the fundamental issues regarding the inflation-growth nexus, a variety of 
theoretical models which are grounded in neoclassical growth theory exist. 
According to Yilmaz (2010), the following three approaches effectively address the 
fundamental issues regarding the inflation-growth relationship: 
i. the money in-utility approach (MIU) 
ii. the cash-in-advance model (CIA) 
iii. the transaction costs approach (TCA) 
The MIU approach includes money into general equilibrium models by assuming that 
money yields direct utility. This model incorporates money balances into the agents‘ 
utility model: 











      ( )   ̇( )   ̇( )   ( ( )  ( ))    ( )  ( ( )   ) ( )   ( ) …(6.5) 
where        and ℓ are consumption, real money balances, physical capital stock 
and labour effort per capita respectively,     and   are rates of time preference, 
population growth and inflation respectively, and   denotes lump-sum real money 
transfer payments (taxes if negative). The instantaneous utility function  ( ) is 
assumed to satisfy the conditions of                          
            While the instantaneous production function  ( ) is neoclassical, 
Equation 6.2 denotes the flow budget constraint.  
According to Yilmaz (2010), studies that have utilized this model include Tobin 
(1965), Sidrauski (1967), Fischer (1979), and Asako (1983). Using this approach, 
Sidrauski (1967) finds that due to the neutrality of money in the long run, a rise in the 
rate of monetary expansion would raise prices but leave the capital stock and output 
level unaffected. 
The CIA model captures the role of money as a medium of exchange by requiring 
explicitly that money be used to purchase consumption and/or investment goods. 
This specification can be represented by assuming the individual faces, in addition to 
a budget constraint, CIA constraint (or liquidity): 
  ( )    ̇( )   ( ) …(6.6) 
All the consumption goods  ( ) and only a fraction   ,   - of investment 
goods  ( ), are purchased by real money balance,  ( ). 
Studies that have also employed this model include Lucas (1980), Stockman (1981), 
Gomme (1993), Ireland (1994) and Dotsey and Sarte (2000). Using this approach, 
Stockman (1981) presents a model of an economy in which money complements 
capital. 
In the TCA approach, Yilmaz (2010) explains that in order to model the role of 
money in facilitating transactions, one has to assume that the purchase of goods 
requires the input of transaction services, and that these services are produced by 
money and time. The shopping time   required for given levels of consumption  , 
and real money holdings   is defined by   (   ), where  ( ) is a well-defined 
function. 
Here, the utility function is defined as 
  (     )   (       (   )) …(6.7) 





where  ( )     ( )    is leisure. 
Studies that have also employed this model include Wang and Yip (1992). 
In developing the theoretical framework for the non-linear relationship between 
inflation and growth, we begin with Sarel (1995), who suggests that as economies 
target inflation rates below the threshold level, but greater than zero, they are able to 
avoid the negative effects of inflation on growth, and thereby achieve sustainable 
growth rates and lower unemployment in the long run. 
According to Tobin (1972), at the inflation threshold level, full employment occurs, 
and below full employment, prices decline and stagnate since labour supply exceeds 
labour demand. When labour demand exceeds labour supply, the economy will 
move above full employment and will witness increments in prices. 
Harris et al. (2001) suggest that the reason for the inflation–growth non-linearity is 
that at low rates of inflation, consumers use money primarily for purchases, and use 
very little credit. As a result, the demand for money is inelastic, and only becomes 
elastic as inflation rises. As long as demand remains inelastic and inflation is low, 
consumers are more likely to use money for credit and consumption goods for 
leisure. At higher inflation rates and a more elastic demand for money, the rate of 
substitution from goods to leisure falls and is rather translated into an increase in the 
rate of substitution from money to credit. The growth rate decreases by increasingly 
smaller quantities because leisure increases at a decreasing rate. Subsequently, at 
higher rates of inflation, a larger negative impact on growth occurs than at lower 
rates of inflation. 
Huybens and Smith (1998), in modelling a small open economy, find a unique 
relationship between inflation and growth at both high and low steady states of 
inflation. They find that at the higher steady state level of inflation, when the money 
growth rate is increased, it will result in a further increase in inflation rates beyond 
levels at which capital formation becomes conducive, thereby harming economic 
growth. On the other hand, with a lower steady state of inflation, when the money 
growth rate increases, there will be an attendant increment in the steady state level 
of inflation. Huybens and Smith (1998) however suggest that this increment will be 
small enough to still accommodate capital formation. 
The uncertainty associated with high, volatile and unanticipated inflation has been 
found to be one of the main determinants of the rate of return on capital and 
investment (Bruno, 1993; Pindyck and Solimano, 1993). Indeed, inflationary 
expectations in an economy may reduce the rate of return of capital, accumulation of 
human capital, and investment in research and development, and inevitably 
undermine investor confidence regarding the direction of monetary policy. This 
channel is the ‗accumulation or investment channel‘ (Yabu and Kessy, 2015) (see 
Figure 2.3). In the literature, an alternate channel exists although Briault (1995) 
documents that it is harder to formalize in a theoretical model. 






Figure 2.1: Transmission mechanism from inflation to growth  
Source: Li (2006), Yabu and Kessy (2015) 
Through an ‗efficiency channel‘, high inflation reduces total factor productivity by 
inducing frequent changes in price that may be costly to firms. This impacts 
consumers‘ optimal levels of cash holding and generates larger forecasting errors by 
distorting the information content of prices, encouraging economic agents to spend 
more time and resources in gathering information and protecting themselves against 
the damage that may be caused by price instability, thereby jeopardizing efficient 
resource allocation (see Figure 2.1). 
Keynesian models thus provided a more comprehensive model which aptly linked 
inflation to growth under the AD–AS framework, where the AS curve is upward 
sloping in the short run so that changes in the demand side of the economy affect 
both price and output (Dornbusch et al., 1996). A strictly vertical AS curve will not 
suffice as changes on the demand side of the economy will affect only prices and not 
output.  
The AD–AS framework thus yields an adjustment path which shows an initial positive 
relationship between inflation and economic growth but eventually turns negative 
towards the latter part of the adjustment path (Dornbusch et al., 1996) (see Figure 
2.4) due to the time inconsistency problem (TIP). Under the TIP, producers feel that 
only the prices of their products have increased while other producers are operating 
at the same price level. The relationship between inflation and growth is thus positive 
as the TIP lures the producers into more output. Moreover, Blanchard and Kiyotaki 
(1987) argue that along this section of the adjustment path, inflation and economic 
growth are positively related because of the agreement of firms to supply goods at a 
later date at pre-agreed prices, with the implication being that output will not decline 
even at increased economy-wide prices since the firm is obliged to produce. 






Figure 4.2: Unitary and double inflation threshold levels 
Source: Fabayo and Ajilore (2006) 
Giving credence to the Keynesian model, Huybens and Smith (1998) intimate the 
existence of a threshold levl above which inflation has a negative effect on long-run 
growth (Figure 2.2). π1 is the inflation threshold if only one threshold exists, while π0 
and π1 are the two thresholds in a scenario where two thresholds exist. This 
phenomenon occurs as financial market efficiency becomes affected by varied 
informational asymmetries because in the presence of high inflation, market frictions 
are heightened, which then interfere in the effectiveness of the financial system in 
allocating resources, leading to a reduction in real returns to savings, increased 
credit rationing, and limited investment levels, thereby stifling growth. 
In the late 1980s, endogenous growth models were postulated, being pioneered by 
Romer‘s (1986) and Rebelo‘s (1991) Ak models, Lucas‘s (1988) human capital 
model; Romer‘s (1990) variety expansion R&D endogenous growth model; Aghion 
and Howit‘s (1992) Schumpeterian R&D growth models.  
Gillman and Kejak (2005) present a general monetary endogenous growth model 
with both human and physical capital. Within this model, they categorize a nested set 
of models. In the first subset of models, inflation acts as a tax on physical capital with 
a negative long-run Tobin (1965)-type effect. In the second subset, inflation acts as a 
tax on human capital and there is a positive Tobin (1965) effect. Within the third 
subset of more generalized models with human and physical capital, inflation acts 
more as a tax on human capital and there is a positive Tobin (1965) effect.  
In their models with human capital, the employment rate and inflation rate are 
negatively related and thus models which exclude this tend to overstate inflationary 
effects above the given baseline level if indeed non-linearity is significant. The 
underlying money demand elasticity explains the non-linearity in that rising interest 
elasticity, coupled with increasing inflation, causes easier substitution away from 





inflation. A near constant interest elasticity money demand, as in the standard cash-
in-advance model, leads to a near linear response. In the physical capital models, 
producing an implied interest elasticity of money demand that rises in magnitude with 
the inflation rate where credit production included as a substitute to cash can 
account for the inflation-growth non-linearity.  
 
Vaona (2012) extends the New-Keynesian literature with wage staggering from the 
relationship between inflation and the level of output to the inflation-growth nexus. 
The labour market serves as a transmission channel in exploring how inflation 
affects growth while side-stepping credit, capital or product markets.  
At low levels of inflation, the time discounting effect prevails leading to a greater 
labour supply and therefore to faster capital accumulation and growth. On the 
contrary, at high inflation rates the employment cycling effect is stronger leading to 
less labour demand and therefore to slower growth. The labour cycling effect is due 
to the fact that firms substitute between different kinds of labour because agents 
belonging to different cohorts have different wages, being some of them locked in 
past contracts. In accommodating an intertemporal elasticity of substitution of non-
negative values for working time, inflation proves to have considerable real effects 
such as hurting economic growth and reducing welfare of economic agents. 
The inflation-growth nexus with regards to the Schumpetarian growth model with CIA 
constraints on consumption and R&D investment can be viewed in two theortical 
frameworks using open and closed economies. 
In the open-economy framework, Chu et al. (2015) analyze the growth effects of 
inflation by considering a setting with international trade in intermediate goods. Given 
that technologies transfer across countries through trade, monetary policy can 
induce a technology spillover effect across countries by affecting domestic 
innovation. They aruge that if R&D subsidies are financed by a labor-income tax, 
then increasing R&D subsidies will raise the income tax rate and reduce labor 
supply. Conversely, decreasing inflation will increase labor supply leading to 
unidentical effects of the two instruments. An increase in domestic inflation 
decreases domestic R&D investment and the growth rate of domestic technology. 
Since a country‘s economic growth depends on both domestic and foreign 
technologies, an increase in foreign inflation also affects the domestic economy, and 
when each government conducts its monetary policy unilaterally to maximize the 
welfare of only domestic households, the Nash-equilibrium inflation rates are 
generally different from the optimal inflation rates chosen by cooperative 
governments who maximize the aggregate welfare of domestic and foreign 
households. Under the special case of inelastic labor supply, the Nash-equilibrium 
inflation rates coincide with the optimal inflation rates while under the more general 
case of elastic labor supply, the Nash-equilibrium inflation rates become higher than 
the optimal inflation rates due to a crosscountry spillover effect of monetary policy. 





The intuition can be explained as follows. When the government in a country 
reduces its inflation, the welfare gain from increased R&D is shared by the other 
country through technology spillovers, whereas the welfare cost of increasing labor 
supply falls entirely on domestic households. As a result, the governments do not 
reduce inflation sufficiently in the Nash equilibrium. 
The wedge between the Nash-equilibrium and optimal inflation rates depends on the 
market power of firms. Under the CIA constraint on consumption, a larger markup 
reduces this wedge. However, under the CIA constraint on R&D investment, the 
opposite resultant effect is that a larger markup amplifies the inflationary bias from 
monetary policy competition. These different implications highlight the importance of 
the differences between the two CIA constraints. The main difference between the 
CIA constraint on consumption and the CIA constraint on R&D is that under the 
latter, an increase in the inflation rate leads to a reallocation of labor from R&D to 
production. As a result, higher inflation rates would be chosen by governments in the 
Nash equilibrium to depress R&D when the negative R&D externality in the form of a 
business-stealing effect determined by the markup becomes stronger. In contrast, 
under the CIA constraint on consumption, this reallocation effect is absent because 
an increase in the inflation rate reduces both R&D and production by decreasing 
labor supply. Given that increasing the markup worsens a monopolistic distortionary 
effect on the production of goods, governments would reduce inflation in the Nash 
equilibrium to stimulate production when this monopolistic distortion measured by the 
markup becomes stronger. 
Chu et al. (2017) further develop the open-economy framework in a monetary 
Schumpeterian growth model with endogenous entry of firms and random quality 
improvements. With elastic labor supply, the scale of the economy becomes 
endogenous and exerts an influence on the inflation-growth relationship. The growth 
effect of the nominal interest rate via the CIA constraint on consumption disappears 
under an endogenous market structure because the market structure endogenously 
responds to the scale of the economy, measured by equilibrium labor, through which 
the nominal interest rate affects economic growth. Under an endogenous market 
structure, the growth effect of the nominal interest rate via the CIA constraint on R&D 
continues to be present because the nominal interest rate directly affects the 
incentives for R&D (rather than through the scale of the economy. Specifically, an 
increase in the nominal interest rate decreases R&D and the arrival rate of 
innovations which fruther increases the present value of future profits. The resulting 
higher value of inventions leads to a lower threshold of quality improvements above 
which an innovation is implemented generating a positive effect on economic growth 
due to more entries. Together with the negative effect on the arrival rate of 
innovations, an increase in the nominal interest rate would have an inverted-U effect 
on economic growth if the entry cost is sufficiently large. 





He and Zou (2016) who apply Chu et al. (2015, 2017) argue the government 
crowding-out effect which suggests that governments reap seigniorage revenue from 
higher rates of money growth, attract additional labor into the government and 
banking sectors and thereby decrease the profit of entrepreneurs. When part of the 
revenue goes to entrepreneurs, the seigniorage effect kicks in and more resources 
would be attracted into R&D. When government retains the larger share of the 
revenue, the government crowding-out effect dominates and inflation retards growth. 
Conversely, when entrepreneurs get the larger share, the seigniorage effect 
dominates and inflation boosts growth. 
Within the closed economy framework, Awaratari et al. (2018) formulate an R&D-
based endogenous growth framework which assumes the existence of 
heterogeneous production capabilities amongst economic agents in a production 
function whereby agents above a certain capability threshold automatically become 
innovators and entrepreneurs, whereas those below the threshold are incapable of 
undertaking entrepreneurial activities and therefore become workers. In this 
analytical framework, a variety of intermediate and final goods were introduced into 
the model as well as money in the form of cash-in-advance (CIA) constraints on 
consumption and expenditure. 
However, if agents are homogeneous a spike in inflation will negatively affects the 
net profit margin of intermediate good firms, which disincentivizes the benefits of 
R&D and consequently depresses economic growth. Therefore, the negative 
relationship between inflation and growth is nonlinear in an economy with 
homogeneous capabilities. However, in a heterogeneous capability production 
function, the link between inflation and growth is nonlinear as an increase in inflation 
rate depresses the marginal benefit of R&D, which implies an increase in the 
production capability threshold level of entrepreneurship. In a low inflation economy, 
the effect of a rise in inflation on economic growth is relatively insignificant. 
Conversely, in a high inflation rate economy, a further rise in inflation rates would a 
significant effect on occupational changes for economic agents with high production 
capabilities with a concomitant large adverse effect on economic growth. 
6.4 METHODOLOGY 
Data is sourced from the Ghana Statistical Service (GSS), the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration‘s National Climatic Data Centre (NOAA-NCDC), and the 
World Bank‘s 2017 World Development Indicators (WDI). First differences of logged 
values of variables are generated to reduce asymmetry, induce stationarity, and 
obtain growth rates as this allows for better implications during analysis and 
discussion of results (Mubarik, 2005; Khan and Senhadji, 2001; Ghosh and Phillips, 
1998). We employ annual data from 1990-2015, and quarterly data spanning 
2006Q1-2014Q4 in order to test the hypothesis by Bruno and Easterly (1998) who 
posit that the negative relationship between inflation and growth exists only in high 
frequency data and with extreme inflation observations.  





For the food sector, we follow Odhiambo et al. (2004) and Enu and Attah-Obeng 
(2013) who focus on the four most important determinants of agricultural output and 
define an output model of the form: 
 ),,,( ROADLABPRODTOPRAINfTFPG   …(6.8) 
where      = agricultural total factor productivity growth,      = climate,     = 
trade policy,         = human capital,      = activities of the government. 
In line with Odhiambo et al. (2004), we employ an index of annual rainfall in the 
different agricultural areas of Ghana as a rainfall variable representing climate.  
Primarily, Owuor (1997), Ekbom (1998), Mundlak et al. (2004), Odhiambo et al. 
(2004), Abugamea (2008), Teryomenko (2008), Olujenyo (2008) and Quaye (2008) 
find that approximately 90% of output and growth in the agricultural sector is 
attributable to factor inputs – labour, land and capital. They also find that trade 
policy, climate, physical and human capital, government expenditure on agriculture, 
the real exchange rate, rainfall and soils, inflation, GDP per capita, as well as access 
to market and credit, are other important determinants of agricultural total factor 
productivity growth.  
We capture trade openness with a trade ratio variable defined as the ratio of imports 
plus exports to Ghana‘s GDP to reflect varying policy episodes in the economy. 
Government‘s direct involvement in agriculture is also proxied with its expenditure in 
agriculture. For lack of a better variable, the number of kilometres of motorable road 
(national and international trunk roads, primary, secondary and tertiary/minor roads) 
will represent the Government‘s expenditure towards agricultural infrastructure in the 
economy. 
Human capital in agriculture is typically captured with data on primary or secondary 
school enrolment. In this study, however, we follow Odhiambo et al. (2004) in using 
agricultural labour force as a proxy for human capital in agriculture. This is measured 
as the percentage of total employment in agriculture. 
We then consider the regression Equation 6.9 below which is the standard linear 
model of Equation 6.8: 
 
tROADLABPRODTOPRAINTFPG   443322110t  …(6.9) 
where t is the associated error term assumed as in the usual fashion to be serially 
uncorrelated with zero mean and constant variance.  
For the non-food sector, we follow Kopeva et al. (2010) and Chaudhry et al. (2013) 
and define a non-food output model of the form: 
 ),,( TOPSENRNFIfGROWTH   …(6.10) 





where        = Non-food output growth,     = macroeconomic behaviour, 
     = education, and     = trade policy. 
A large body of literature reveals that growth of the non-food sector is determined by 
factors such as innovation behaviour, trade openness, investment growth rate, 
deregulation and investments, bank lending rate, the log of the population size, 
education, female participation rate in the workforce, competitiveness, fiscal policy, 
inflation, international trade, the rate of literacy, and the financial system (Kopeva et 
al., 2010; Chaudhry et al., 2013).  
Chaudhry et al. (2013) go on to include female participation rate in the workforce, the 
urban population growth rate, the rate of literacy, and political stability as other key 
determinants of the growth of the non-food sector. 
The literature posits that growth in investment leads to increased market potential 
within industry, and that investments in technology enhance the growth of the sector. 
As such, the above variables will be employed as the control variables in the model 
which will determine the threshold inflation rate for the Ghanaian industrial sector.  
We then consider the regression Equation 6.11 below which is the standard linear 
model of Equation 6.10: 
 
tTOPSENRNFIGROWTH   3322110t  …(6.11) 
where t is the associated error term assumed as in the usual fashion to be serially 
uncorrelated with zero mean and constant variance. 
However, as discussed in section 4.3 earlier, myriad recent studies predict the 
presence of threshold effects associated with rates of inflation above or below 
certain critical values, implying a non-linear relationship between economic growth 
and inflation (Boyd et al., 2001; Munir and Mansur, 2009).  
Following section 4.3, 
 
titit XkFIDFIGROWTHOUTPUTFOOD   2210t )(  …(6.17) 
where the dummy variable,  , is defined as   * +              * +          
itX  is a vector of control variables which include 
ROADandLABPRODTOPRAINFI ,,, where                  =log 
difference of food sector output,    = log difference of food sector CPI,      = 





rainfall measured in millimetres,     = trade ratio24,         = log of labour 
productivity25,     =length of motorable road.  
Apart from FI26, we expect all the other variables to be positively signed. 
For the non-food sector, 
 




where the dummy variable,  , is defined as   * +              * +          
itX  is a vector of control variables which include 
TOPandSENRFI ,,  where GROWTHOUTPUTFOODNON  = log difference of 
non-food sector output,     = log difference of non-food sector CPI,     = trade 
ratio, and      = primary school enrolment rate27.  
Apart from NFI28, we expect all the other variables to be positively signed. 
Also, given that Ghana is an open economy with a flexible exchange rate, it is 
appropriate to control for supply shocks such as import prices. In our analysis, we 
implicitly account for these factors by allowing for variations in the variance of the 
error term of the estimated equation (Kabundi et al., 2015).  
Munir and Mansur (2009) posit that in order to examine more than one threshold 
value, the foregoing procedures be applied until the null hypothesis can no longer be 
rejected. Thus, we follow Crespo Cuaresma and Silgone (2014), who suggest the 
possible existence of two thresholds in such growth regressions, and we specify an 
alternative model as such: 
 
titit XKFIDFIGROWTHOUTPUTFOOD   2210t )(  …(6.21) 
                                                          
24
 Trade ratio is used to capture trade openness and is computed as ((export+import)/GDP), see 
Odhiambo et al., 2004 
25
 This is the size of agricultural labour force divided by agricultural contribution to GDP, which in 
essence is the inverse of GDP per capita in the agriculture sector. 
26
 In a scenario of one threshold, FI is expected to be positive and insignificant at low levels of 
inflation, and then later become negative and significant as inflation rises. In a scenario of two 
thresholds, however, FI is expected to initially be negative and insignificant at the lowest levels of 
inflation, and then become positive and significant as inflation rises, but finally revert to being negative 
at the highest levels of inflation 
27
 Primary school enrolment rate is used as a proxy for physical and human capital, see Odhiambo et 
al. (2004). 
28
 In a scenario of one threshold, NFI is expected to be positive and insignificant at low levels of 
inflation, and then later become negative and significant as inflation rises. In a scenario of two 
thresholds, however, NFI is expected to initially be negative and insignificant at the lowest levels of 
inflation, and then become positive and significant as inflation rises, but finally revert to being negative 
at the highest levels of inflation. 





where the dummy variable,  , is defined as   * +                  * +        
          where    and    are the lower and upper bounds of the threshold band 
of inflation, and 
 




where the dummy variable,  , is defined as 
  * +                   * +                  where    and    are the 
lower and upper bounds of the threshold band of inflation. 
This study employs Mubarik‘s (2005) graphical test as a preliminary procedure as in 
chapter 4. Descriptive statistics and the correlation table29 are presented below 
(Tables 6.3 and 6.4).  















 Mean 21.73 5.42 8.56 0.81 11.11 5.65 
 Median 21.76 5.54 9.19 0.75 11.12 5.68 
 Maximum 22.82 5.85 10.41 1.01 11.18 6.75 
 Minimum 20.45 4.69 0.00 0.65 11.01 4.37 
 Std. Dev. 0.64 0.36 1.98 0.13 0.04 0.65 
 Skewness -0.23 -0.95 -2.65 0.24 -0.59 -0.22 
 Kurtosis 2.26 2.66 11.41 1.42 3.01 2.26 
       
 Jarque-Bera 1.13 5.55 148.22 4.09 2.09 1.10 
 Probability 0.57 0.06 0.00 0.13 0.35 0.58 
       
 Sum 782.38 195.27 308.26 29.03 400.06 203.37 
Observations 36 36 36 36 36 36 
Source: Authors‘ computation.  
Note: All variables except trade ratio are logged. 
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 Spearman rank is preferred to the Pearson correlation coefficient since, unlike the Pearson, the 
Spearman rank does not require all variables be normally distributed (see Mukaka, 2012).  





Table 6.4: Food sector correlation table 
 Food 
sector CPI 





Food sector CPI 1.00     
      
Rainfall -0.05 1.00    
 (0.79)     
Trade ratio -0.10 0.54 1.00   
 (0.58) (0.00)    
Length of motorable road -0.14 0.48 0.85 1.00  
 (0.42) (0.00) (0.00)   
Labour productivity -0.61 0.42 0.62 0.79 1.00 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)  
Source: Authors‘ computation using Spearman‘s rank.  
Note: Values in () are the p-values. 








 Mean 22.43 1.73 105.20 0.81 
 Median 22.44 1.74 106.71 0.75 
 Maximum 23.40 1.84 109.92 1.01 
 Minimum 21.48 1.56 95.35 0.65 
 Std. Dev. 0.62 0.08 4.25 0.13 
 Skewness 0.01 -0.57 -1.31 0.24 
 Kurtosis 1.80 2.25 3.75 1.42 
     
 Jarque-Bera 2.16 2.77 11.19 4.09 
 Probability 0.34 0.25 0.00 0.13 
 Sum 807.46 62.11 3787.33 29.03 
Observations 36 36 36 36 
Source: Authors‘ computation.  
Note: Data for non-food sector output and non-food sector CPI are logged. 
Table 6.6: Non-food sector correlation table 
 Non-food Non-food Primary Trade ratio 







sector CPI School 
enrolment 
rate 
Non-food sector output 1.00    
     
Non-food sector CPI 0.3297 1.00   
 (0.0495)    
Primary School enrolment rate 0.871 0.2216 1.00  
 (0.00) (0.1939)   
Trade ratio 0.843 0.144 0.8667 1.00 
 (0.00) (0.4023) (0.00)  
Source: Authors‘ computation using Spearman‘s rank.  
Note: Values in () are the p-values. 
6.5 RESULTS 
In testing for unit roots, nonlinearity may impact inflation in the form of structural 
breaks, leading to the erroneous acceptance of nonstationarity (Arize and 
Malindretos, 2012). We cater for this by employing the Zivot Andrews (ZA) unit root 
test which accounts for possible structural breaks in the data. From the results 
below, the null hypothesis of a unit root with a structural break is not rejected, 
implying that the variables are I(1) or not stationary30 (see Table 6.7). For our 
subsequent estimations, we therefore employ first differencing to our variables. 
Table 6.7: Zivot-Andrews unit root test results for the food sector 
Variable Break in constant Break in trend Break in both 
Food sector CPI -6.8754*** -6.1712*** -12.764*** 
 (2013q3) (2009q3) (2013q3) 
Rainfall  -4.5329 -3.6802 -6.4917*** 
 (2008q3) (2010q3) (2008q2) 
Trade ratio -4.4717 -2.7366 -6.3921*** 
 (2011q1) (2012q3) (2011q1) 
Length of motorable road  -3.5114 -3.3384 -3.4382 
 (2008q1) (2008q2) (2008q1) 
Labour productivity n/a -2.9601 -3.8449 
 () (2009q4) (2010q4) 
Notes: ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Values in () 
are the suggested break dates. n/a implies that the ZA test could not compute the t-
statistics. 
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 This result obviously does not hold for food sector CPI, which is strongly I(0). 





Table 6.8: Zivot-Andrews unit root test results for the non-food sector 
Variable Break in constant Break in trend Break in both 
Non-food sector CPI   -6.8656*** -6.1943*** -13.6449*** 
 (2013q3) (2009q3) (2013q3) 
Primary School enrolment rate -3.1767 -3.9693 -4.2440 
 (2008q1) (2008q2) (2008q1) 
Trade ratio -4.4717 -2.7366 -6.3921*** 
 (2011q1) (2012q3) (2011q1) 
Note: ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Values in () are 
the suggested break dates. n/a implies that the ZA test could not compute the t-
statistics. 
We then employ the Granger causality test to deal with the unique failure of previous 
Ghana-specific papers in failing to test for the direction of causality between inflation 
and growth. The test result below (Table 6.9) indicates a one-way causality from 
food inflation to food sector growth, which supports the assertion by Fischer (1993) 
that causality is more likely to run from inflation to growth. 
Table 6.9: Pairwise Granger causality test for the food sector 
 Null Hypothesis: Obs F-
Statistic 
Prob. 
 Food sector CPI does not Granger cause nood sector output  33 4.1669 0.0155 
 Food sector output does not Granger cause nood sector CPI  2.5813 0.0750 
Source: Authors‘ computation (using lag 3) 
Table 6.10: Pairwise Granger causality test for the non-food sector 
 Null Hypothesis: Obs F-
Statistic 
Prob. 
 Non-food sector CPI does not Granger Cause non-food sector output  26 5.3008 0.0398 
 Non-food sector output does not Granger Cause non-food sector CPI  0.6536 0.7351 
Source: Authors‘ computation (using lag 10) 
The figures below show Mubarik‘s (2005) graphical test results. The findings suggest 
a unitary sectoral threshold of (4±2)% and (12±2)% for the food and non-food 
sectors respectively, thereby verifying our assumption that sectoral thresholds lie 
outside the Central Bank‘s aggregate inflation target of [8±2]%. 
More interestingly, at the central bank‘s preferred inflation target, food sector output 
actually tends to be falling very close to a growth rate of 0%. Furthermore, at the 
opposite end of the spectrum, at the very lowest levels of inflation, output growth 
becomes negative. 






Figure 6.7: Average food growth at linear level of inflation 
For the non-food sector also, we observe that at the central bank‘s preferred inflation 
target, non-food sector output grows at a negative rate. Furthermore, at the opposite 
end of the spectrum, at the very lowest levels of inflation, output growth becomes 
negative. 
 
Figure 6.8: Average non-food growth at linear level of inflation 
While the above graphical test indicates a threshold which seems to support our 
initial a priori hypothesis, we still go further to employ Hansen‘s (1996, 1999) 
likelihood ratio test, and Khan and Senhadji‘s (2001) threshold test. As discussed 
above, in testing for the existence of a threshold effect in our data, we employ the 
likelihood ratio (LR) test as given in Equation 6.20, where         implies a null of 
no threshold effect. This test involves iteratively estimating Equation 6.17 across all 
inflation values and obtaining the minimum sum of squares residual (SSR) from 
Equation 6.16. A simple linear form of Equation 6.17 is also estimated, and its SSR 


























































linear levels of inflation (%) 





from Equation 6.16 becomes the subtrahend, with the denominator of Equation 6.18 
being the bootstrapped variance of   31. The LR test results are summarized below. 
Table 6.11: Test results of threshold effects for the food and non-food sectors
  
Sample Size LR-statistic Critical 
Value 
Probability 
36 6.56 6.53 0.0000 
Source: Authors‘ computation 
The null hypothesis of no threshold effects is rejected at the 1% significance level, 
strongly supporting the existence of threshold effects within Ghana‘s sectoral 
inflation. 
Starting with the food sector, subsequent estimation and results are presented 
below. The first set of our subsequent output results indicate the analysis on 
quarterly data while the latter set of results indicate the analysis on annual and 
biannual data. This is motivated by the fact that output in the food sector in Ghana is 
predominantly divided into two separate seasons. The first (or major rainy) season 
runs from April till mid-July, while the second (or minor rainy) season runs from 
September till mid-November. 
From Table 6.12, a threshold of 4.84% is identified. However, since the data 
employed is quarterly in frequency, the estimate has to be annualised. A 
compounding32 of the quarterly estimate over four quarters thus gives us an annual 
threshold estimate of 15.24%. It is also worth pointing out that within the first regime, 
the coefficient of food inflation is not significant (p-value of 0.9882). This however is 
not a problem at all since according to Sarel (1995), we actually expect the 
probability value to be statistically insignificant at low levels of inflation. 
The rainfall variable is significant and positive. Given that there is no control over the 
frequency and amount of rainfall, there is a need for the government of Ghana to 
boost expansionary irrigation policies that will help buffer the agricultural sector. In 
essence, the significance of rain shows the importance of precipitation in Ghana‘s 
food growth. It also affirms that Ghana‘s agriculture is largely rain fed. 
The trade ratio variable bears a significantly negative coefficient, which leads us to 
dig deeper into the trade dynamics of the Ghanaian economy. Harrison (1996) posits 
that openness is associated with both higher output growth as well as higher returns 
to human capital. However, the link (and effect of trade on growth) could be 
ambiguous (Frankel and Romer, 1999; Rodriguez and Rodrik, 2000). Trade can 
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 Hansen (1999) intimates that the LR-statistic in Equation 6.9 does not depend on the parameter    
under the null of no threshold effect, so any value of     may be used. In our case, we select the   of 
food inflation since that is our main variable of interest. 
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increase output through enhanced foreign exchange and productivity gains from 
exports, and enhanced productivity and technological efficiency from imports of 
intermediate goods/machinery, health products and technology. The development of 
exports allows a concentration of investments in the sector enjoying a comparative 
advantage and also an extension of infrastructure and transport and communication 
systems which in turn facilitates the production of other goods and services. This 
positive effect also depends on the effect on domestic production dynamics. 
Increased trade that enhances domestic production competition can adversely affect 
non-tradeable goods (i.e. goods that are not tradeable on the international market). 
Food crop productivity typically falls under such goods. Therefore with increased 
competition, agricultural production can shift into more tradeable goods and neglect 
or reduce production of non-tradeable (food) goods. 
Table 6.12: Single threshold estimate on quarterly data  
 Linear model  Threshold model 
Variables (OLS without threshold)  Regime 1 <4.84% Regime 2≥4.84% 
C 5.00 (2.04)**  4.02 (2.09)* n/a 
Food inflation -0.09 (0.34)  0.01 (0.35) -6.22 (2.60)** 
Rainfall 0.09 (0.04)**  0.07 (0.03)** n/a 
Trade ratio -1.37 (0.73)*  -1.36 (0.70)* n/a 
Length of motorable road 0.00 (0.00)***  -0.000125 (0.00)*** n/a 
Labour productivity  0.96 (0.17)***  0.88 (0.18) *** n/a 
Observations 36  27 8 
Notes: The dependent variable is the growth rate of food sector output. Standard 
errors are in parentheses. The estimation results correspond to trimming percentage 
of 15%. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively 
Length of motorable road is significant and bears a negative sign (-0.000125), which 
at first glance seems implausible considering that one would expect a better road 
transportation network to increase agricultural produce by enhancing movement of 
agricultural goods from the farming centres to the distribution hubs for onward 
transport to the major cities. However, it is also plausible that enhancing the road 
infrastructure opens up the rural agrarian economy and marginally shifts economic 
activity from food production to other non-food or non-agricultural activities, 
especially through rural-urban migration. While the government of Ghana must still 
focus on creating and upgrading the current stock of roads in the country, critical 
steps should be laid out to retain skilled labour in such agrarian communities so as to 
boost agricultural output. 
The productivity of labour stands as the most significant variable in the output, and it 
bears a positive sign. This is clear evidence of the importance of productivity in 
output. It shows that labour is productive and that the more skilled the labour, the 





higher food output will be. Within the second regime, the inadequate sample size of 
8 observations below the threshold value makes it impossible to produce coefficients 
for the control variables. It is also worth pointing out that within the first regime, the 
coefficient of food inflation is not significant (p-value=0.9882). This however is not a 
problem at all since according to Sarel (1995), we actually expect the probability 
value to be statistically insignificant at low levels of inflation. 
We then follow Crespo Cuaresma and Silgone (2014) and employ a modified 
model33 which allows for two thresholds. We find thresholds of 3.69% and 4.84% 
(see Table 6.13) for each quarter which translate to annual inflation thresholds of 
11.51% and 15.24%.  
Table 6.13: Multiple threshold estimate on quarterly data 
 Linear model  Threshold model 
Variables (OLS without 
threshold) 






C -1.92 (0.70)***  -2.21 (0.74)*** n/a n/a 
Food inflation -0.12 (0.40)  0.06 (0.38) 7.85 (4.55)* -8.14 (3.08)** 
Rainfall 0.07 (0.04)*  0.06 (0.04)* n/a n/a 
Trade ratio -2.52 (0.76)***  -2.56 (0.72)*** n/a n/a 
Labour 
productivity  
0.60 (0.16)***  0.69 (0.17) *** n/a n/a 
Observations 36  19 8 8 
Notes: The dependent variable is the growth rate of food sector output. Standard 
errors are in parentheses. The estimation results correspond to trimming percentage 
of 15%. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively 
Crucial to this finding first of all is that the threshold for the food sector lies outside of 
the targeted aggregate inflation band irrespective of whether quarterly or annualized 
data is employed (see Figure 6.9 below). Furthermore, the upper threshold estimate 
of 15.24% corresponds perfectly with the regression estimate when a single 
threshold is estimated (see Table 6.12). Also, within the first regime the coefficient of 
food inflation is not significant (p-value of 0.8733). As explained earlier, this is not a 
problem at all since according to Sarel (1995), we actually expect the probability 
value to be statistically insignificant at low levels of inflation. The signs and 
significance of the coefficients do not differ from our earlier results in Table 6.7. 
Indeed, the above findings thus lead us to suggest that the threshold for the food 
sector of Ghana ranges between 11.51%-15.24% and that the aggregate threshold 
of [8±2]% is not ideal for the Ghanaian food sector. 
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 This modified model is equation 21. 





Having said that, the wide threshold range determined above can be narrowed down 
by employing Ahortor et al. (2012) and Seleteng‘s (2010) method of plotting the 
graph of the explanatory powers of the myriad of threshold regressions against their 
corresponding threshold inflation rates, and then going on to super-impose a trend 
line of the explanatory powers on the initial graph. The points of intersection then 
determine the ‗narrowed down‘ optimal inflation range. By employing this method, we 
identify the optimal threshold range of 3.82%-4.4% (see Figure 6.10), which 
translates to an annual inflation threshold of 11.9%-13.8%, thereby supporting our 
earlier results from Table 6.12. 
 
Figure 6.9: Diagrammatic representation of food inflation34, and the sectoral 
target band lying outside the aggregate inflation target 
 
Figure 6.10: Optimal food inflation range  
Source: Following Ahortor et al. (2012) and Seleteng (2010) 
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 Food Inflation trend line is read against the left vertical axis, with the aggregate and optimal 
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We proceed to attempt to capture the effects of the seasonal planting and harvesting 
cycles in Ghana, by running our next set of analysis on biannual data from 1990 to 
2015. Data from July till December is considered first, followed by data from January 
till June, as these are the periods during which harvesting and planting occur 
respectively. We expect to identify dissimilar threshold inflation rates for each of the 
two seasons. 
6.5.1 RESULTS FROM BIANNUAL DATA ANALYSIS: JULY–DECEMBER 
Between July and December, a threshold of 6.12% is identified (see Table 6.9 
below). This drop in estimated threshold can be explained by the fact that during 
these months, harvesting of crops is under way, thus food supply will be at its peak, 
leading to a fall in general food prices and by implication, a lower and optimal 
inflation threshold rate. 
Table 6.14: July-December data results 
 Linear model  Threshold model 
Variables (OLS without threshold)  Regime 1 <6.12% Regime 2≥6.12% 
C 1.55 (0.63)**  1.83 (0.47)*** n/a 
Food inflation 0.06 (0.12)  0.07 (0.07) -1.42 (0.66)** 
Rainfall 0.03 (0.03)  0.04 (0.02)* n/a 
Trade ratio -0.38 (0.18)**  -0.40 (0.13)*** n/a 
Length of motorable road 0.00 (0.00)***  0.00 (0.00)*** n/a 
Labour productivity  -0.38 (0.15)***  -0.45 (0.11) *** n/a 
Observations 25  18 6 
Notes: The dependent variable is the growth rate of food sector output. Standard 
errors are in parentheses. The estimation results correspond to trimming percentage 
of 15%. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively 
Over the entire sample period35 from January 1990 to December 2013, we 
graphically observe a somewhat cyclical inflationary pattern. Evidently, very low to 
negative food inflation growth rates are consistently recorded between July and 
December each year, thus corroborating our result above (see Figure 6.11). 
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 The equal sub-periods are January 1990 - December 1997, January 1998 - December 2005, and 
January 2006 - December 2013 






Figure 6.11: Food inflation growth rates from January 1990 – December 2013 
Source: Authors‘ computation 
Figure 6.11 also suggests that in the Ghanaian economy, optimal food inflation is not 
time invariant, but indeed varies over time, particularly between the major and minor 
rainy seasons. 
6.5.2 RESULTS FROM BIANNUAL DATA ANALYSIS: JANUARY-JUNE  
Within the analysis of data from January till June, we are unable to identify a 
threshold. This could possibly be explained by the fact that most of the cultivation of 
crops occur during this period, and as such there is little to no addition to output in 
the food sector except for the sub-sectors that involve animal rearing and fish 
farming. The unidentification of a threshold is not odd as other studies (Yilmaz, 2009; 
Kheir-El-Din and Abou-Ali, 2008; Hussain, 2005; Singh and Kalirajan, 2003) although 
at the aggregate level have also failed to identify thresholds. Furthermore, it is quite 
possible that the failure to identify a threshold during this period could be due to the 
lag effect arising from consumption of the July to December‘s output, while planting 
takes place within this period of January till June. 
In ensuring robustness of our earlier findings, we employ here the Smooth Transition 
Regression (STR) method developed by Teräsvirta (1998). TAR is developed to 
identify abrupt changes in the threshold variable, while STR is able to model both 
smooth and abrupt changes in the threshold variable (Reyes, 2004). Both TAR and 
STR are widely used in univariate frameworks.  
One downside of STR identified in the literature is the cumbersome computation of 
some of its diagnostic tests which essentially make the STR end up as a TAR 
(Reyes, 2004). Eitrheim and Teräsvirta (1996) also note that the moment matrix of 
regressors in the auxiliary regressions used in computing the test statistics 
effectively become singular. 
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0  …(6.23) 
where ty is the dependent variable, tix are the observations on   explanatory 
variables, for         (with the option of incorporating lags of the dependent 
variable), t is an independent and identically distributed disturbance, with mean 
zero and variance   , and )( tzF  is a transition function between regimes. 
We test for linearity in our model, with a null of linearity )...,,1,0( 321 niiii  

























0  …(6.24) 
From Table 6.15 below, the null hypothesis of linearity is rejected at the 5% 
significance level, strongly supporting the existence of a nonlinear STR specification. 
Table 6.15: Test for linearity in Smooth Transition Regression 
 LM statistic P-value 
Transition variable: Cubic expansion 20.430 0.015 
 
Table 6.16 shows the test for transition significance in our variable of interest under a 
null of insignificance of the transition variable. The results indicate that food inflation 
in Ghana significantly possesses properties of being a transition variable. 
Table 6.16: Test for significance in transition variable 
 F-statistic P-value 
Food inflation 30.493 0.000 
 
STR estimation results are presented in Table 6.17. A threshold of 3.52% is 
identified, translating to an annual threshold inflation rate of 10.95%. This compares 
very favourably with our earlier TAR estimate of 11.51%. A high p-value in STR 
models (as in column 4 of Table 6.17) suggests that a TAR model may be preferred 
in identifying the threshold (Ronderos, 2015). 
Table 6.17: Smooth Transition Regression estimation results 
Variable Coefficient Standard error  P-value 
Food inflation 0.0352 0.0294 0.2410 
 
We conclude our analysis by estimating switching probabilities (Table 6.18) between 





high and low inflation36 regimes, as well as expected durations (Table 6.19) of those 
regimes by employing a Markov switching model as per Kim and Nelson (1999).  
Table 6.18: Expected switching probabilities37 
 High inflation Low inflation 
High inflation 0.7767 0.2232 
Low inflation 0.6497 0.3502 
 
The results from Table 6.18 indicate a great chance (65%) of a high inflation regime 
succeeding a low inflationary period. Furthermore, a minimal chance (35%) is 
estimated of a low inflation period succeeding a previously low inflation period. The 
greatest expectation is for a high inflation era to succeed itself, and indeed only a 
one in five chance is given for a high inflation regime to give way to a low inflationary 
period. These findings thus suggest dire consequences for prices of food items in 
Ghana by providing evidence for a very strong upward rigidity in Ghana‘s food 
prices. 
Table 6.19: Expected durations of inflation 
High Inflation Low Inflation 
4.4798 1.5391 
 
Having established upward price rigidity, we are interested in determining how long 
or short food prices will be expected to remain in each regime. Results from Table 
6.19 imply an expected duration of about four and a half quarters for high inflationary 
periods while lower inflation is expected to last for a much shorter period, merely one 
and half quarters. These findings speak to our earlier discussion on inflation 
persistence being a bane for the Ghanaian economy. Indeed, urgent action needs to 
be taken to salvage Ghana‘s food sector from the ill effects of high and persistent 
inflation.  
We now transition to the non-food sector and observe from Table 6.20 below that a 
threshold of 4.13% is identified. However, since the data employed is quarterly in 
frequency, it has to first be converted to an annual frequency. A compounding38 of 
the quarterly estimate over four quarters thus gives us an annual threshold estimate 
of 12.9%, confirming our earlier finding from Figure 6.8. Besides the obvious 
discovery that the non-food sector‘s threshold lies outside the targeted aggregate 
band of the entire economy, another crucial finding is that when it comes to the non-
food sector, the central BOG should be more interested in targeting a single point of 
inflation, as against a range or band, as it currently does on the aggregate level.  
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 We define high inflation as inflation above the estimated threshold rate and vice versa. 
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 Rows indicate initial states and columns indicate end states. 
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Table 6.20: Single threshold estimate on quarterly data 
 Linear model  Threshold model 
Variables (OLS without threshold)  Regime 1 <4.13% Regime 2≥4.13% 
C 0.11 (0.03)***  n/a 0.19 (0.05)*** 
Lag 1 of non-food inflation -0.07 (0.09)  -2.96 (1.59)* 2.20 (1.27) 
Lag 2 of non-food inflation -0.04 (0.08)  3.44 (1.89)* -5.33 (1.25)*** 
Lag 1 of output -0.69 (0.17)***  n/a -0.83 (1.62)*** 
Lag 2 of output -0.40 (0.17)**  n/a -0.60 (0.14)*** 
Primary School enrolment 
rate 2.77 (1.50)* 
 n/a 2.56 (1.08)** 
Observations 32  9 13 
Notes: The dependent variable is the growth rate of non-food output. Standard errors 
are in parentheses. The estimation results correspond to trimming percentage of 
15%. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively 
In our model, lags of inflation are significant in explaining current inflation. Ocran 
(2007) posits that lagged inflation is a measure of inflation inertia which is usually 
interpreted as measuring indexation or inflation expectations. Absence of inflation 
inertia is thus implied by a zero coefficient of lagged inflation. While indexation has 
never been the practice in the Ghanaian economy, inflation expectations have built 
up over the years, perhaps due to the failure of the monetary policy authorities to 
stabilise prices during the years of reform (Ocran, 2007), and more recently due to 
reckless statements by some high ranking political and central bank officers who 
consistently express pessimism about the economy‘s ability to keep inflation under 
control. The significance of the lags in inflation in our model therefore suggests an 
appreciable level of inflation inertia in Ghana‘s non-food sector.  
Figure 6.12 below illustrates the estimated inflation threshold against the actual 
inflation target currently pursued in Ghana – a wide discrepancy is observed. 
Moreover, it seems to suggest a pattern of increasing non-food inflation during each 
election year which in itself could be an indication of built-up inflationary inertia from 
an election period. 






Figure 6.12: Diagrammatic representation of non-food Inflation, and the sectoral 
target band lying outside the aggregate inflation target 
We estimate transition probabilities (Table 6.21) between high and low inflation 
regimes, as well as expected durations (Table 6.9) of those regimes by employing a 
Markov switching model as per Kim and Nelson (1999).  
Table 6.21: Expected switching probabilities39 
 High inflation Low inflation 
High inflation 0.8357 0.1642 
Low inflation 0.8056 0.1943 
The results from Table 6.21 indicate a very high chance (81%) of a high inflation 
regime succeeding a low inflationary period. Furthermore, a minimal chance (19%) is 
estimated of a low inflation period succeeding a previously low inflation period. The 
greatest expectation is for a high inflation era to succeed itself, and indeed only a 
one in six chance is given for a high inflation regime to give way to a low inflationary 
period. These findings thus suggest dire consequences for prices of non-food items 
in Ghana by providing evidence for a very strong upward rigidity in Ghana‘s non-food 
prices. 
Table 6.22: Expected durations of inflation 
High Inflation Low Inflation 
5.144783 1.1964 
 
Having established upward price rigidity, we are interested in determining how long 
or short non-food prices will be expected to remain in each regime. Results from 
Table 6.22 imply an expected duration of over five quarters for high inflationary 
periods while lower inflation is expected to last for a much shorter period, merely one 
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quarter. These findings speak to our earlier discussion on inflation persistence being 
a bane for the Ghanaian economy. Indeed, urgent action needs to be taken to 
salvage Ghana‘s non-food sector from the ill effects of high and persistent inflation. 
6.6 CONCLUSION  
In this study, we investigated the presence of inflation inertia and threshold effects in 
sectoral inflation in the Ghanaian economy. We employed Regime Switching 
Threshold Autoregressive and Smooth Transition Regression Models to identify 
thresholds and also the effect of sectoral inflation on sectoral output growth. We 
concluded by empirically estimating expected durations and expected switching 
probabilities of inflationary regimes using Markov Switching models. Using quarterly 
time series data from 2006 to 2014 the following conclusions emerged from the 
study.  
Threshold effects exist within Ghana‘s food inflation, with the estimated threshold of 
11.5%-15.2% lying outside the Central Bank‘s targeted inflation band for the entire 
economy. Furthermore, while no threshold is identified for the dry season, a 
markedly lower threshold of 6.1% is identified for the rainy season as general food 
prices in Ghana drop during periods of sustained rainfall.  
Within the non-food sector, threshold inflation effects also exist with an estimated 
threshold of 13%. While a unitary inflation target for the entire economy is being 
practised in Ghana, our results indicate that within the food and non-food sectors, 
the optimal inflation threshold actually lies outside the targeted inflation rate at the 
aggregate level. Our findings therefore suggest that the Bank of Ghana‘s adoption of 
a unitary inflation target could pose negative effects on the output potential of the 
non-food sector. 
Inflationary expectations (inertia) are very evident in the non-food sector and serve 
as a key determinant of non-food output growth in the Ghanaian economy. 
First of all, we recommend that the central Bank of Ghana monetary policy 
committee sets up what could be referred to as sectoral monetary policy committees 
which will spearhead the implementation of sectoral inflation targets for the food and 
non-food sectors, as this will ultimately result in higher levels of sectoral output in the 
country.  
Secondly, increased government intervention to increase enrolment and throughput 
in education by establishing Development Finance Institutions (DFIs) is highly 
encouraged. Indeed widespread efforts to educate the citizenry will be rewarded as 
education has a huge impact in increasing output in the non-food sector. 
Finally, further studies to determine sector specific threshold rates of inflation are 
recommended for the other sectors of the Ghanaian economy. 
  





CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
This research has examined the presence of inflation inertia and estimated the 
inflation-growth non-linearity thresholds at the aggregate and sectoral levels of the 
Ghanaian economy – in support of the view that the Ghanaian economy may not 
attain optimum growth in the face of a single economy-wide inflation target due to its 
unique sectoral variations. Specifically, it sought to empirically determine sector-
specific inflation thresholds for the food and non-food sectors as well as for the 
aggregate economy. The thesis further sought to analyze aggregate and sector-
specific levels of inflation persistence in the Ghanaian economy since independence. 
Next, it examined the effectiveness of historical inflationary policies in curbing 
inflation and inflation persistence at the aggregate and sectoral levels in Ghana. 
Finally, the study compared the level of Ghana‘s inflation persistence with selected 
sub-Saharan economies. 
Annual data from 1960-2017 and monthly data from 1990-2017 for the aggregate 
and sectoral levels respectively were analysed using both the Threshold 
Autoregressive (TAR) approach, as well as the Smooth Transition Regression (STR) 
method for comparability of results. Stock‘s (1991) 95% confidence interval for the 
largest root of the autoregression was employed in the estimation of inflation 
persistence. The Dornbusch–Fisher (1993) framework for mapping out moderate 
persistent inflation spells was also adopted in this study, with Mubarik‘s (2005) 
graphical test being used to preliminarily identify the possible existence of threshold 
rates of inflation at the aggregate and sectoral levels. Markov Switching models were 
utilized to determine expected state-dependent durations of inflationary spells as well 
as expected switching probabilities of inflationary regimes in the Ghanaian economy.  
Each of these methods employed provides a unique benefit to the entire research. 
For example, the Dornbusch–Fisher framework provides a panoramic view of trends 
in inflation persistence in an economy over a period of time of at least a decade. 
Both the TAR and STR methods are more suited to this study for four primary 
reasons. Firstly, in TAR and STR modelling, an exogenously given variable which 
may or may not be a regressor can be used to split the sample into two or more 
regimes. Secondly, TAR and STR models are more suited in situations like ours 
where issues of data availability exist. Thirdly, while the TAR approach was 
developed to identify abrupt changes in the threshold variable, the STR method is 
able to model both smooth and abrupt changes in the threshold variable, hence 
making both methods better suited for the comparability of results. Finally, both 
methods have been very frequently utilized by threshold papers in both time series 
and panel frameworks. We note as an obvious limitation of this study, our inability to 
employ other equally sophisticated methods such as the Threshold GARCH and 
STR GARCH due to the lack of higher frequency data for the Ghanaian economy. 





On the whole, the thesis makes a unique contribution to the literature in three 
primary ways. Firstly, it is a pioneer in probing the threshold inflation non-linearity at 
the sectoral level of an economy. Although extensive research has been conducted 
in the inflation–growth non-linearity nexus at cross-country and country-specific 
levels, similar research at the sector-specific level remains non-existent. Due to the 
unique relationship between inflation and economic growth, this unexplored area is 
of keen interest in this thesis due to the observation by Chaudhry et al. (2013) and 
Heintz and Ndikumana (2011) that a single economy-wide inflation target may not be 
meaningful in attaining optimum growth in an economy with diverse sectoral 
variations.  
The theoretical complexity of the inflation-growth threshold non-linearity relationship 
at the sectoral level has implications for optimal inflation policy and inflation targeting 
(Correa and Minella, 2010; Nobay and Peel, 2000). In an economy such as Ghana, 
where widespread sectoral variations exist, the current framework of an economy-
wide inflation target may have to be critically relooked at if optimal growth rates must 
be achieved. 
Secondly, this thesis adds to the very scanty threshold inflation non-linearity 
literature on the Ghanaian economy, particularly since extant studies fail to arrive at 
a consensus for the threshold rate of inflation for the economy. Indeed only a handful 
of cross-country studies have deemed data on the Ghanaian economy worthy of 
being incorporated in their analyses. Be that as it may, results from cross-country 
studies are flawed with their inability to accurately propose reliable policy directives 
for a unique country. To date, only four studies in this area exist on Ghana as a 
stand-alone economy: Frimpong and Oteng-Abeyie (2010), Quartey (2010), 
Marbuah (2011) and Ahortor et al. (2012). These studies have however been 
criticized for their failure to test for the direction of causality between inflation and 
growth in their studies, which is a critical requirement to every study in the area of 
threshold inflation (Khan and Senhadji, 2001). 
Although most studies in this area apply only the TAR model, this study employs 
both the TAR and STR methods in estimating aggregate and sectoral threshold 
levels of inflation. While neither the TAR nor STR methods may necessarily be 
superior to the other, the comparison of results from both approaches gives this 
study an extra advantage regarding the robustness of its findings. Econometrically, 
the TAR approach was developed to identify abrupt changes in the threshold 
variable, while the STR method is able to model both smooth and abrupt changes in 
the threshold variable. The application of both methods in this study thus gives it a 
unique advantage over extant literature in this area. 
Finally, this research opens up a theoretical and empirical debate regarding which 
strand of the inflation–growth non-linearity literature that sectoral inflation data 
subscribes to and takes a first pass on the possible strand based on its findings. The 
work by Drukker et al. (2005) categorizes into four distinct strands the predictions 





from extant literature regarding the inflation–growth nexus. In the first strand, 
pioneered by Tobin (1965), inflation has a positive effect on long-run growth, the 
second strand posits that inflation has no effect on growth (Sidrauski, 1967);. the 
third strand points to a negative effect of inflation on long-run growth (Stockman, 
1981), and the fourth strand suggests that a nonlinear relationship exists where if 
inflation rises above a threshold level, ithas a negative effect on long-run growth 
(Huybens and Smith, 1998). While aggregate inflation data suggests harmony with 
the fourth theoretical strand of threshold non-linearity, it is necessary to ascertain 
how compatible disaggregated or sectoral data is with the strands identified by 
Drukker et al. (2005). 
7.2 SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS 
The main findings concerning threshold inflation non-linearity at the sectoral and 
aggregate levels of the Ghanaian economy are as follows:  
1) Within the food sector we find an optimal threshold band of 11.5%-15.2%. No 
threshold is identified for the dry season. However, a markedly lower threshold 
of 6.1% is estimated for the rainy season.  
Two key issues arise here. Firstly, the optimal food sector inflation threshold lies 
outside the targeted economy-wide inflation threshold, and secondly, over each 
12-month period, the food sector inflation threshold is time-varying in the 
Ghanaian economy due to the heavy dependence of agrarian output on rainfall 
and climatic patterns. 
2) The non-food sector‘s threshold level of inflation is 13%. A strong determinant of 
output growth in the sector is inflation inertia (expectation).  
Our findings, in the face of the unique relationship between inflation and growth, 
and coupled with evident sectoral variations in Ghana, suggest that the Bank of 
Ghana‘s adoption of a unitary economy-wide inflation target could inflict 
negative outcomes on the output potential of the food and non-food sectors.  
3) Inflation persistence is higher in the food sector than in the non-food sector. 
This is attributable to the cyclical patterns of rainfall, coupled with the rain-fed 
nature of food sector activities in Ghana.  
4) Theoretically, the dynamics of sectoral inflation data subscribe to the literature 
of inflation non-linearity, in line with the fourth strand from extant literature 
regarding inflation–growth predictions (Drukker et al., 2005).  
5) After addressing issues of causality in previous Ghana-specific studies, we find 
an 11% economy-wide inflation threshold level. Our estimated aggregate 
threshold is in consonance with Frimpong and Oteng-Abeyie (2010), Marbuah 
(2011), and Ahortor et al. (2012) who identify thresholds of 11%, 10% and 10% 





respectively for the Ghanaian economy, although in dissonance with Quartey‘s 
(2010) estimate of 22.2%. 
6) In our sample of inflation targeting countries we find an inverse relationship 
between inflation and inflation persistence. We suggest that a declining (or 
single digit) inflation rate does not necessarily imply that inflationary 
expectations are being subdued. Typical examples in our sample, such as New 
Zealand and South Africa, have enjoyed continual levels of low inflation yet 
possess distressingly high levels of persistent inflation, unlike Nigeria and 
Ghana where the reverse is the case. 
7) Ghana has been saddled with the bane of inflation persistence for a long time. 
Currently, the economy is in the middle of another spell of moderate inflation 
which began in 2014, with average annual inflation during this period peaking at 
16%. 
There exists a 97% chance of a high inflation regime succeeding a low 
inflationary period, but only a 3% chance is estimated of a low inflation period 
succeeding a previously low inflation period. This indicates that the Ghanaian 
economy is inclined towards high levels of inflation, suggesting therefore that if 
urgent steps are not taken to reduce inflationary levels now, inflation will only 
get harder to curb as time goes by. 
Furthermore, we find that there is a 94% chance of succession from a high 
inflationary period to another high inflationary period and only a 6% chance of 
succession from a high inflation era to a low inflation era. These findings thus 
providing evidence for a very strong upward rigidity in Ghana‘s price levels.  
We also find that once the Ghanaian economy enters a high inflationary period, 
it will take approximately 37 years for the economy to exit the high inflation 
spell. In the case of low inflation, we estimate that the Ghanaian economy can 
remain in a continuously low inflation era for no more than one year.  
8) The effectiveness of historical inflation policies in reducing inflation and inflation 
persistence is typically at its highest soon after formal implementation. However, 
due to public perceptions and lack of confidence in the competence of monetary 
authorities, among others, the policies lose their effectiveness over time. Sooner 
rather than later, perceptions heighten even further and inflationary trends 
return to the high pre-policy implementation levels. This study empirically 
highlights this phenomenon of a ―post-implementation relapse‖ in policies such 
as the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) of the 1980s, and the adoption of 
the inflation targeting (IT) framework in 2007. The foregoing phenomenon is 
evident at both the aggregate and sectoral levels in the Ghanaian economy. 
 





9) In spite of the ―post-implementation relapse‖ phenomenon, inflation persistence 
has reduced overall (albeit marginally) since the formal adoption of inflation 
targeting at the aggregate and sectoral levels, with the non-food sector 
experiencing a much bigger decline in persistence than the food sector. 
10) In a supply-constrained economy where close to half of the CPI basket is 
comprised of food, as is the case in Ghana, managing inflation can be a difficult 
task. This difficulty is amplified by food supply shocks brought about by natural 
and man-made occurrences coupled with inflationary effects of exogenously 
determined factors such as fuel and utilities, whose prices are often affected by 
government policies unrelated to normal demand and supply considerations.  
11) In line with the above, managing inflation becomes increasingly difficult in the 
face of overwhelming fiscal dominance and a quasi-dependent central bank. 
Historically, contemporaries of Ghana that opted for currency boards and 
monetary unions which were effectively insulated from fiscal interference have 
had much better outcomes in controlling inflation. Fiscal dominance that also 
spills over into central bank financing of budget deficits renders monetary policy 
incapable of properly controlling inflation.  
12) Employing a market-based approach like inflation targeting in an economy with 
relatively low intermediation and shallow financial depth is likely going to be 
flawed with setbacks. The foremost setback is the inability of the financial sector 
to effectively transmit monetary policy signals to the real economy.  
7.3 CONCLUSION 
The combined evidence in this thesis quite strongly indicates the failure of Ghana‘s 
current inflation targeting framework to cater for sectoral differences within the 
economy. Clearly, inflation targets are seldom met, and persistence in inflation is 
increasing to pre-policy implementation levels at both the aggregate economy and 
the food and non-food sectors. The output potential of Ghana‘s sectors as well as 
the long-term success of the inflation targeting framework is therefore in jeopardy if 
urgent interventions are not effectively implemented.  
7.4 RECOMMENDATIONS 
These results suggest some policy recommendations necessary to enhance the 
effectiveness of the current inflation targeting framework and lift the potential of 
Ghana‘s economy. If inflation targeting is to succeed in the Ghanaian economy, 
urgent policies will be needed to transform the financial sector and align it along the 
trajectory of sustainable economic development. 
Sectoral variations are evident in Ghana‘s economy. The Bank of Ghana monetary 
policy committee should oversee the design, implementation, and monitoring of 
sectoral inflation targets in order to avoid stifling the growth potential of critical 
sectors within the economy. Stifling the output potential of any sector which is a 





lynchpin for inclusive growth could also impede efforts to achieve poverty reduction 
in an economy (Christiaensen et al., 2011; Cervantes-Godoy and Dewbre, 2010). 
This study provides strong evidence of the diversity of Ghana‘s sectors, hence a 
single economy-wide inflation target may not be meaningful in attaining optimum 
growth (Heintz and Ndikumana, 2011; Chaudhry et al., 2013).  
Since inflation persistence is evidently higher in the food sector than in the non-food 
sector, the government must tame inflationary expectations in the food sector, 
particularly in the minor rainy season where, due to a relative scarcity of food crops, 
expectations of rising food prices are heightened compared to the major rainy 
season where food is in relative abundance. Reduction of import duties for food 
sector importing firms to import essential food crops during the minor rainy season is 
recommended to reduce import costs (cost push inflation) for such firms and 
ultimately assist in driving down expectations of rising inflation. 
While single digit inflation is being heralded as essential for all economies, a careful 
inquiry into single digit inflation targeting should be undertaken due to the 
emergence of contours of an inverse relationship between inflation and inflation 
persistence. Policy makers and politicians must be wary of trumpeting their 
achievements at reducing inflation to single digits without first determining if 
persistence has also reduced in tandem with inflation levels. We presented evidence 
of economies enjoying continual levels of low inflation and yet having distressingly 
high levels of persistent inflation. Contours of such a dynamic relationship between 
inflation and inflation persistence (at least in inflation targeting economies) may not 
be readily perceptible and thus warrant further research. 
Policy makers are encouraged to ensure policy-effectiveness right from 
implementation into the long term. The highest returns to an inflation policy in Ghana 
are typically observed soon after its implementation but weaken over time. The 
central bank should therefore intensify efforts to enhance the long-term effectiveness 
of the inflation targeting framework in Ghana. 
In supply-constrained economies susceptible to food supply shocks, the common 
practice is to select a core measure of inflation which the monetary authorities can 
effectively control. It is still necessary, however, to monitor the headline measure 
while the authorities consistently provide firm assurances of their preparedness to 
tackle any second-round effects likely to emanate from the influence of exogenously 
determined items in the economy‘s consumption basket. 
Fiscal dominance that also spills over into central bank financing of budget deficits 
renders monetary policy incapable of properly controlling inflation. The restoration of 
the approach of fiscal discipline that complements monetary policy rather than 
opposing it is the way forward. In addition, the Bank of Ghana‘s autonomy needs 
further strengthening so as to give the BOG the necessary liberties to use its 





instruments freely and also be able to resist the arbitrary usage of its funds for 
financing budget deficits. 
Further studies to determine sectoral threshold rates of inflation are strongly 
recommended, particularly in economies with widespread sectoral variations. Also, 
studies on historical trends in inflation persistence are strongly encouraged. 
A limitation of this study has been the short time-series on sectoral data for Ghana. 
As the Ghana Statistical Service continues to collate data over time, longer time-
series would encourage more detailed empirical studies on sector specific inflation 
threshold estimation. In addition, the unavailability of regional output data serves as 
another limitation to this study. The examination of regional and provincial thresholds 
would have greatly enhanced the beauty of this work. The Ghana Statistical Service 
is strongly urged to initiate the collection of such data. 
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